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COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AND SOVIET DIPLOMACY

*Adam B. Ulam**

MUCH effort and ink has been expended in the West in pondering over the ultimate aims of Soviet policy. Is it directed to making the world communist? Is it concerned more with Russia's national interest and security, or with the narrower interests of the ruling group? A more sophisticated approach has recognized that human motivation and political goals seldom, if ever, admit of such simple answers and clear-cut distinctions.

The earliest generation of Bolshevik rulers genuinely believed that they were merely the servants of a world-wide idea and movement and that the interests of the Soviet state could be sacrificed for the sake of a world revolution. Stalin's 'socialism in one country' formula represented the rationalization that the cause of the world-wide communist movement could best be served by strengthening the USSR: that what was good for Russia was good for communism. Only after the Second World War was it seen that there could be a basic incompatibility between the two. Or, to put it most bluntly, that communist China represents a threat to the USSR largely *because she is communist* whereas a non-communist regime there might well, on the analogy of India, have had the friendliest relations with Moscow.

A QUESTION often asked is: do Soviet leaders believe in the possibility of peaceful coexistence of different social systems as against the inevitability of war? Here again different answers have been given at different periods. But even the earliest and most pessimistic formulation, that by Lenin, assumed only the *long-run tendency* towards an inevitable conflict between the two systems. The possibility of peaceful coexistence of socialism and capitalism has, on the contrary, been almost always emphasized as the practical prospect not only for the immediate, but also for the *fairly* long-run, future.

Since the Second World War there has been a somewhat wider gap between what the Soviet leaders have said on this subject and what they actually believe. The growing strength of the USSR, the failure of the United States to exploit its atomic monopoly even for diplomatic purposes, the end of Western empires—all these developments have filled the Soviet leaders with confidence that a major conflict can be avoided.

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With it has emerged the realization of how all-destructive such a thermonuclear conflict would be. And in their speeches and pronouncements they have allowed as much. At the same time they have been unwilling to scrap the dogma which goes back to the earliest days of the Soviet state: the doctrine of the basic hostility of capitalism to the USSR and of the constant, if not for the most part imminent, threat of a capitalist attack.

This doctrine of the outside capitalist world as mainly hostile has obvious politico-psychological advantages: it preserves the image of the Soviet Union as a beleaguered fortress, thus justifying the sacrifices and vigilance the state requires from the citizen whether on the production line or in abjuring the tempting example of the West with its comforts and freedoms. The doctrine justifies interventions in the affairs of other communist states on the order of the one in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Even to themselves the Soviet leaders probably could not fully admit that they were really afraid of the *example* of Czechoslovakia: that demands for similar freedoms and eventually for a multiparty system would be raised in Poland, East Germany, etc., and, if tolerated there, perhaps even in the Soviet Union. It was easier to allege a capitalist plot to overthrow socialism in a fellow communist country, and even to hint at the possibility of armed intervention by NATO.

Realistically, no student of world affairs, nobody reading what is happening in the United States and in other states of the West, could have for at least the last 15 years credited the West with the ability or desire to overthrow communism by force. But for the Soviet regime, the thesis of the West's basic hostility and evil designs is a necessary psychological crutch. In employing it the regime has had at the same time to avoid unduly alarming its own people. It reconciles these contradictory requirements by the formula that while the 'ruling circles' in the West (and it is seldom made clear whether this is supposed to mean the actual governments or the capitalists and their agents within governments) are unremitting in their hostility, the strength and vigilance of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and opposition to war by the people even within capitalist countries on the other, keep aggressive forces in check.

The notion of basic enmity of capitalism is thus welded into the Soviet creed (and much more so into the Chinese Communist one) and it cannot be dispelled even by the most patently peaceful policies of the West, even by periods of collaboration of the West and Russia for attainment of mutually desirable objectives such as the avoidance of an all-out war in the Middle East or a reduction of the burden of armaments.

No matter how different American policies might have been at the close of the war, it is unlikely that Stalin could have afforded or chosen close collaboration with the United States. The need for such collaboration lapsed with the defeat of the common enemy: the continuance of such collaboration was seen, and with some justification, as a danger to the preservation of the Soviet totalitarian system in its full vigour.

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SINCE the war the Soviet regime has found itself in a growing ideologico-political impasse on another point of the official doctrine. First Yugoslavia, then, much more decisively, China undermined the thesis that the spread of communism automatically benefits the interests of the Soviet Union. Privately, the Soviet leaders may well have concluded that peaceful coexistence of the United States and the USSR, though attendant with danger, is possible, while peaceful coexistence is far from being certain as between Russia and China.

No *capitalist* power has publicly advanced, as has China, its claims to vast areas of the USSR. Peking has challenged Soviet leadership of the world communist movement. The present Chinese leadership has made it clear that the price of a full reconciliation with Russia must include virtual subordination of Soviet foreign and interbloc policies to China (the Chinese have not refrained from criticizing Soviet internal policies as well). Moreover, as the Russians have complained more than once, the Chinese have tried to push them into more risky policies vis-à-vis the United States, perhaps into a catastrophic nuclear confrontation. How feeble as against these claims on the Soviets are the alleged plots of the Bonn ' revanchists ' or the supposed designs of the American ' monopoly capitalists '.

An outsider might well ask why, in view of this clear and present danger from another communist power, the official Soviet line is still to picture the Sino-Soviet dispute as a temporary disruption of normally cordial relations between two fraternal communist countries; why the Russians intermittently seek an accommodation through intra-party or intra-government talks as at present; or why Moscow claims the whole trouble is due to the personalities of the current Chinese leaders, rather than to the basic incompatibility of the two super-powers coexisting harmoniously within the communist world.

It is difficult to give a clear answer to such questions and it is probable that different factions within the Politiburo view this all-important problem in different ways. Politicians in all societies are adept at rationalizing the really insuperable problems, at believing that something *might* happen to make them tractable, that in the meantime a compromise, an arrangement, is necessary. The present leaders, for the most part men in their sixties, might well believe that the dispute ought to be patched up, that time is running out on Mao, that his successors would be more amenable or that the Chinese communists would engage obligingly in a long civil war over the succession. For the next five or ten years the problem might be kept from erupting in a violent form, and after five or ten years it would not be up to *them* to deal with it. Others may well be impatient and believe that time is on the side of the Chinese, and hence the Soviets should seek a counterbalance to Peking: promote *actively* dissension within the Chinese communist ranks, seek a rapprochement with Japan, perhaps an understanding with the United States.

Actual Soviet policies reveal a mixture of the two approaches: talks

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are held with China, at the same time as Japanese help is sought to develop Siberia, and thus to discourage Chinese ambitions in the Soviet Far East Territories.

Underlying this basic dilemma is the psychological inability of the Soviet leaders to admit to their people, perhaps even to themselves, the true dimensions and dangers of the Chinese problem. To do so would be to reveal how obsolete are the premises of communism in today's world, to acknowledge unmistakably that the main danger to the security of the USSR comes not from the capitalists but from the growing power of a fellow communist state. This acknowledgment, in turn, would challenge the domestic rationale of the communist regime, the whole structure of the Soviet power, the position of the ruling élite—all this would be put in jeopardy. Thus the danger the regime would be incurring would be much greater than that faced through Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin's crimes and errors. For the blame could no longer be imputed to aberrations of one man and his advisers, but would be linked to the very dogma on which is based the whole Soviet system.

Political and psychological exigencies compel the Soviet regime to persist in this official and unrealistic view of the world: communist China, while temporarily hostile, cannot in the long run have interests antagonistic to the USSR, whereas the United States, while not an immediate threat to Russia, must be considered a constant danger because of the nature of her system. How long this basic attitude will be preserved will depend not only on events on the international scene but on domestic political developments both in the USSR and China.

THE underlying, as contrasted with the official, attitude toward the spread of communism has also undergone changes in areas other than China. Here again the experience has jarred the earlier ideological assumptions.

It has been seen how a communist country could actually become a military ally of the West (as has Yugoslavia through her membership in the Balkan Pact); could even, though staying in the Soviet bloc, undertake extensive diplomatic and economic links with the West (Rumania) or compel the Soviets to vacate a naval base and sever diplomatic relations (Albania). In brief, few of the non-communist neighbours of the Soviet Union would, or could have dared to, display the kind of defiance she has encountered, at times, at the hands of fellow communists. This must have led to a considerable reassessment of the earlier assumption that the spread of communism represents, so to speak, so much more money in the bank for the USSR.

On the contrary, it has become clear in the last 10 years that some of the most valuable allies and clients of the Soviet Union have been non-communist states. The undermining of Western influence in the Middle East was effected through exploitation of Arab nationalism. It is doubtful that this effort would have been successful had one of the Arab states become completely communist. Such a transformation would have

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aroused an immediate opposition of other Arab states and would have most likely led to a decreased Soviet influence and manoeuvrability in the region as a whole. The current, generally anti-U.S. orientation of the majority of Arab states fits the purposes of Soviet policy much better than would special ties with, say, a communist Syria or a communist Egypt.

Such ties would also mean, among other things, special responsibilities. Soviet prestige is vitally involved with the fortunes of other communist countries, even when the given regime, as in the case of North Vietnam, may be under Chinese as well as Soviet influence. But Soviet diplomacy has an obviously freer hand in dealing with Egypt, whose defeat in 1967 could in no sense be interpreted as a defeat for communism or the Soviet Union. Because of the present and unfortunate configuration of events in the Middle East it may be asserted that the dependence of Egypt or Syria on the Soviet Union is as great, if not indeed greater, than if they were communist states, while the Soviet stake in them is smaller. This does not mean that the USSR is not strongly interested in the preservation of the current regimes in Cairo and Damascus (and indeed the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean may have as one of its purposes keeping watch that the pro-Russian Arab regimes do not change their complexion). But this commitment is not as strong as it would be if Egypt or Syria were communist.

Doubts about the desirability of further communist expansion must be reinforced by the consideration that a *new* communist regime, especially one in Asia, may turn out less desirable from the Soviet point of view than a previous neutralist one. For some years prior to the defeat of their attempted coup in 1965 the Indonesian communists had gravitated heavily toward Peking. That explains the rather mild Soviet reaction to the suppression of the Indonesian Communist Party, as contrasted with very violent protests forthcoming from China. The Soviets have striven to have normal relations with the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia. It is difficult to see how, from their point of view, it could be a gain rather than a loss if pro-Peking communist regimes were installed in those countries.

An anti-U.S. or a neutralist regime in which local communists play some part, but with whose fortunes the prestige of the Soviet Union is not too closely bound, appears best suited to Soviet needs and desires in Asia.

The Soviet Union has given strong diplomatic and economic support to the Congress Party government in India. This, and the Soviet proposals for an Asian security treaty, have led to rather violent reactions on the part of the Chinese communists. Ever since 1958–59 Peking has suspected the Russians of (1) trying to preserve the Congress regime and thus working against the interests of Indian communism, and (2) of trying to build in India a counterforce to the Chinese influence in Asia. These charges go perhaps too far, yet there is no doubt that Moscow would view with some apprehension a complete communist takeover since

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whatever faction of Indian communism would emerge on top, communist India would most likely tend to be closer to Peking than to Moscow.

An all-out communist regime presents yet another complication to the Russians. They cannot remain indifferent to internal developments within another communist country. It is obvious that the whole trend of internal evolution of communism in Czechoslovakia from January 1968 was considered to be a danger to the internal cohesion of other communist countries in Eastern Europe and perhaps even in the Soviet Union. These dangers were finally thought to be serious enough to warrant the risk of an armed intervention. The need to bolster the Czech economy, now deprived of the possibility of the infusion of capital from the West, also places certain burdens on the Russians. In brief, the pattern of economic relations between the USSR and the People's Democracies which in Stalin's time was one of straightforward exploitation has changed and, in some cases, it is the Soviet Union which has to incur economic sacrifices for the sake of preserving its political domination.

Were this a more rational world, the rulers of the Soviet Union might well question the need for, or desirability of, such complete domination. In her foreign policy, Finland has to be guided by Soviet desires as much as Czechoslovakia, possibly more than Rumania. However, since Finland is not a communist state her multiparty system and democratic freedoms are not considered to be a threat and a bad example to the Poles, East Germans, etc. Her economic problems are of no particular concern to the Soviet rulers or a source of expense to the Soviet taxpayer.

Yet ideological exigencies dictate Moscow's continuing policies which, from the point of view of Soviet *national* interests, promise no clear-cut gains or are even actually counterproductive. What has now become a world-wide competition between Russia and China for the allegiance of communist and left-wing movements strengthens the fear of the present Soviet leaders of appearing lukewarm in propagating the ideology or too eager to seek an accommodation with the capitalists. Thus, ironically, conscious though they are of the Chinese desire to push them into more risky policies vis-à-vis the West, as well as into more rigid policies at home, the Soviets cannot help being somewhat influenced by this psychological pressure from Peking.

The above suggests how, behind the apparent and impressive self-assurance and sense of direction of Soviet foreign policy, considerable dilemmas and uncertainty are hidden. The removal of Khrushchev now appears, from five years' perspective, as having reflected, insofar as international relations were concerned, the decision to hold the line, to stick to the familiar patterns of the immediate past and to avoid any dramatic steps such as officially reading China out of the communist family of nations and seeking a basic *détente* with the West. Instead, the present rulers have continued an unremitting pressure on the West

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in those areas like the Middle East where it has been most vulnerable, and intermittently sought some ways of patching up the quarrel with Peking. In the latter they have been influenced not only by domestic considerations of the nature discussed above, but by the obvious opposition of many foreign communist parties to a definite breach between the two communist superpowers.

THOSE persons who are unduly impressed by the Soviets' diplomatic skill and the ability usually to get their way might well ponder Soviet attempts in the last five years to get some consensus within world communism on China, and the sad record of those conferences of the world communists, conferences which have sometimes aborted, sometimes adjourned, and even when they met brought no tangible results.

To be sure, there is a definite limit to Soviet inhibitions on account of foreign communists' views: where the situation is seen as definitely threatening as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, no amount of disapproval on the part of the Italian communists will keep the Soviets from protecting their interests. But in the more complex case of China, the views of foreign parties have had some weight on Soviet moves, something which would have been unthinkable in Stalin's time.

What is sometimes described as the Brezhnev doctrine, i.e., the right of the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of another communist country (hardly a novel doctrine and hardly an invention of Brezhnev's), has a counterpart in the as yet timid (except on the part of the Chinese) claims of foreign communists that their views be considered when it comes to Soviet foreign policy and that they be informed about the reasons for major changes within the Soviet Union (such as the removal of Khrushchev).

This tendency could be observed on the occasion of the most recent, the 23rd, Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. There the Cuban delegate argued, in the face of obviously hostile reception by the Congress, that the American bombings of North Vietnam represented such a basic danger to the interests of world communism that the USSR had to stop them even if it meant 'using all the available means and taking the necessary risks.' The representative of North Vietnam, in turn, by implication, chided the Russians for their quarrel with Peking, since in view of the Vietnamese crisis: 'The only correct line at present is unity of all revolutionary forces'. Again, such speeches, or even suggestions made in private, would have been unthinkable in Stalin's time, when foreign communists were expected to, and usually did, sacrifice their particular interests for those of the Soviet Union, and when any suggestions coming from a communist source that Soviet policy was not promoting the interests of the world-wide movement strongly enough would have been treason.

To many in the Soviet Union, possibly including some in the ruling élite, the connexion with the world-wide communist movement, and the responsibility for it of the USSR, must then appear increasingly as

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an encumbrance rather than an advantage. It exposes Russia to dangers of an atomic confrontation with the United States because of the adventurousness and personal ambitions of a communist chieftain who cannot be entirely controlled by Moscow, or to international complications on account of another chieftain who could not contain liberalization within what the Soviet leaders consider safe limits. It should not be forgotten how long Mikoyan had to spend in Cuba soothing Castro's ruffled feelings after the Cuban crisis, nor should the invasion of Czechoslovakia obscure the fact that virtually the whole Politburo of the Soviet party had conferred with the Czechs before the assault, seeking other solutions to the crisis.

Before the Second World War, international communism, i.e., the presence in virtually every country of a disciplined body of men who were friends of the Soviet Union, obviously brought solid advantages. Now it is no longer so in many cases.

SOVIET policies for all their skill and realism rest ultimately upon a premise which is increasingly hard to describe as realistic: the United States is basically an enemy and a threat, China basically a friend and an ally. The hard and realistic men who run the Soviet Union persist in clinging to this fiction partly because they cannot free their own minds of ideological considerations, or, to put it otherwise, because of the habits of thinking and acting of a lifetime. But they cling to this fiction also because probably in their most cynical moments they adhere to a domino theory of their own: acknowledge publicly that one vital element of the ideology is obsolete and the whole structure, not only of that ideology, but of Soviet power may collapse.

It would be tempting to postulate that the next generation of Soviet leaders will be bolder than these men, for the most part in their late middle age, who are fearful of departing from the beaten path. But such need not be the case. History shows that political leaders when confronted with seemingly insuperable dilemmas have not always followed the most logical path, especially if it involved a drastic departure from habits of long standing. One has the analogy of Soviet agriculture: there is but little doubt that the whole economy would benefit greatly if the structure of the collective farm were basically reorganized, probably if the principle of collectivization were gradually abandoned. But so great is the weight of the past and the fear of tampering with a basic ideologico-social feature of the system, that such a beneficial reform is not likely to be undertaken for a long time.

With respect to specific issues and negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, apart from obvious ideological differences and often clashing interests, we have had, to use a currently fashionable term, a failure of communication.

Compared with Russians, the Americans tend to view international problems from either a too large or a too small perspective. For the American public—and this has rubbed off even on the most hard-boiled

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statesmen and diplomats—there have been questions like how to make 'Russia collaborate for peace', or on the contrary the 'Berlin problem', or 'nuclear proliferation'. For the Russians, on the other hand, the underlying nature of international negotiations is, to borrow a legal term, an antagonistic one. In the *very* long run the interests of the two superpowers are antagonistic, not only because of their ideological differences but because of the fact that they are rivals for primacy. This does not mean that they cannot reach a mutually profitable and long-lasting accommodation, but not in the sense that they would ever be able to relax their guard completely or to base their relations on the, say, Canadian-American pattern. Negotiations in the American view are occasioned for the interested parties to state their respective positions and to convince their antagonists of their goodwill and reasonability. The Soviet approach is essentially the traditional one of European diplomacy (with some variations, to be discussed below): diplomatic negotiations are a bargaining procedure in which you assess your opponent's strengths and weaknesses and test his endurance.

The Soviet approach to specific points of international disputes is often more elaborate and indirect than is realized on the other side. We speak of the Berlin crisis of 1948–49 and of the crisis of the 1958–62 period. Yet from the Soviet point of view pressure on Berlin during those periods was but the means of securing much longer objectives.

The threat to the Western position in Berlin in 1948–49 was thought in Moscow to be the most efficacious means of making the West abandon or postpone its plans to set up the West German state. When this pressure proved unavailing and a continuation of the blockade threatened dangerous complications, the Soviets simply discontinued it without securing any concessions or declaring what had been on their mind in the first place.

The war of nerves over the same city in 1958–62 was motivated by similar but even wider objectives: the Russians were eager for a German peace treaty, and especially for a guarantee that Bonn would be prohibited from owning or manufacturing nuclear weapons. The most convenient means for extracting from the United States and its allies pledges to that effect was thought again to be to threaten the West in its most vulnerable spot: its rights and access to West Berlin. To appreciate the comprehensive nature of Soviet diplomatic manoeuvres, one has to recall that the threat to Berlin was lifted not on account of anything happening there or elsewhere in Germany but as a by-product of the Cuban missile crisis. In the wake of a genuine scare over the nuclear confrontation it was thought too risky and uncontrollable to keep up the pressure, and, on the contrary, it was thought desirable to lower the level of international tension. To seize West Berlin was never a Soviet aim in itself, though the cutting off of communications between the two segments of the city had a place, though not a very high one, on the Soviet list of priorities. West Berlin was simply thought of as one area where pressure on the West may extract concessions of much

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greater importance—and Berlin may again become considered such an area.

This example shows that sometimes Soviet policies become oversubtle. It seems like common sense, especially in the nuclear age, to be most straightforward about one's fears and objectives and to negotiate more directly, rather than to employ the circuitous route of veiled advances, veiled to the point of being incomprehensible to the other side, and of threats which taken at face value might lead to a confrontation with incalculable consequences. In a rebuttal, the Russians might echo the argument of defenders of militancy on the contemporary American scene: appeals for change and for solutions which seem reasonable from their point of view are seldom heeded unless accompanied by threats and *faits accomplis*.

Without discussing the merits of this position in either case, it is important to draw attention to another and more important reason for this circuitous approach by Soviet diplomacy. In general the Russians feel it is a mistake to divulge fully the nature of one's real fears and the full extent of one's weakness. Had the Western policy makers realized in 1948 how deeply concerned the Soviets then were over the prospect of the West German army, would they not have (1) speeded up its creation, and (2) used it as a bargaining counter to wrest concessions from the Soviet Union? Was not the West deeply impressed how *apparently* unconcerned the Soviet leaders were between 1945–49 about the American monopoly of the atom bomb; how they seemed to ignore the dangerous and decisive character of nuclear weapons in any future war? Had the real extent of Soviet fears on this count been realized at the time, would the United States have acquiesced so readily in Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and in the Far East?

The ability to engage in diplomatic feints and threats is, of course, a natural advantage any totalitarian regime possesses over a democratic one which has to explain and justify its policies to public opinion at home and to its allies, and which seldom can engage in forceful policies without alarming its own people and allies, as much as its opponents. Yet this advantage carries with it certain corresponding dangers epitomized in the story of the child who used to scare his elders by crying 'wolf'. The nature of Soviet goals was bound to appear to the West so elusive, the usual experience of negotiating with the Russians has proved so frustrating and exasperating, that, for all of its usual skill, Soviet diplomacy has undoubtedly missed several major opportunities for procuring solid advantages and added security for the USSR. Moreover, because of its oversubtlety, Soviet diplomacy has brought about, or helped create, situations of immense danger—as in 1962 and 1967.

There is a great deal of conjectural evidence that between 1958 and 1962 the Soviet regime under Khrushchev engaged in a most complex political manoeuvre. The end result was to be a basic *détente* between the East and West. Its major features were to be a German peace treaty and an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which

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would have banned any newcomers to the circle of powers producing and possessing such weapons, and thus prevent or at least postpone Bonn and Peking becoming nuclear powers. Yet the fantastically circuitous and risky path taken by Khrushchev towards the attainment of those sensible aims contributed to the failure of his design. Threats and pressure on the United States were supposed to impress Peking, but they in fact alarmed and finally provoked counter action from Washington. And advances to, and signals for, an accommodation with the United States, while they failed to be deciphered in America, led first to suspicions, then to the conviction of Soviet betrayal, in the mind of the Chinese communist leaders.

By October 1962 the oversubtle policies of the Kremlin resulted in the most dangerous confrontation yet between America and the USSR. An important consequence of the Cuban crisis was the revelation of the intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute and thus with 1962–63 passed irretrievably the last Soviet hopes of forestalling or delaying China's nuclear armament.

The nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963 meant from the Soviet point of view shutting the barn door after the most valuable horse has bolted. The same goes for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. These treaties are still quite valuable to the USSR, perhaps more so than to the United States. (Unlike the United States, the USSR does not like the idea of even a small stock of nuclear weapons in the hands of an ally. Few people in America lose any sleep over the fact that Britain and France are nuclear powers. But it hardly requires an elaboration on why the Russians would not be happy at the prospect of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Czechs or Rumanians.) But these treaties do not have that fundamental significance they would have had in the fifties when the USSR perhaps still had enough economic and political leverage on communist China to persuade her to forego nuclear ambitions.

The Middle East is another area where overdevious Soviet policies may have worked to Soviet disadvantage. A few years ago an agreement between the US and USSR as to their respective policies in the region would in all likelihood have forestalled the series of events leading to the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Today it is problematical whether even such an agreement could keep the situation there from further deteriorating with all the attendant dangerous consequences. Does the enhanced position of the USSR in the Mediterranean justify the great risks of deeper and deeper involvement by the great powers in the Middle East crisis? There must be people in Moscow who are pondering over this question.

THE above suggests how complex are the motivations and the *modus operandi* of Soviet foreign policy.

The communist regime in Russia emerged not out of an autocratic

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environment, but out of what might be called a disorganized democratic one of March-November 1917. The Bolsheviks, through superior organizational and propaganda ability, were able to outbid and outwit other left-of-centre parties and organizations, and through their opponents' disorganization, rather than their own strength and popularity, seize power. This experience left a definite imprint on communist mentality in so far as dealing with foreign governments is concerned: traditionally left wing non-communist regimes have been treated with less respect and considered easier to outmanoeuvre than conservative or right wing ones.[1]

Whether in an antagonist or an ally, the Soviets have traditionally respected a given state's strength—its industrial and military effectiveness and, most of all, its social stability and its rulers' intelligence and political acumen.

Hitler's regime prior to 1934–35 had been thought unstable and likely to be overthrown by a conservative reaction or a communist revolution in Germany. Once he gave proof of internal endurance and ability to outmanoeuvre Western powers, Hitler was accounted a formidable enemy, but by the same token a potential, even if temporary, ally.

Yugoslavia by 1953 became, in the eyes of the Soviet leaders, a valuable ally; and Tito was courted and appeased not because he was a fellow communist, but because he had been able to survive and preserve internal cohesion in the face of Stalin's attacks.

Until 1947 the Russians counted on the Nationalist regime remaining in power in *most* of Mainland China, and hence were ready to deal with Chiang even against the interests and pleadings of the Chinese communists; and it is only when they became convinced that he would be unable to prevent internal collapse and military defeat that they lost any interest in an accommodation with Chiang and acquiesced in *complete* victory of the communists—something they had not believed possible or particularly desirable prior to the middle of 1947.

As we have seen in the preceding discussion, it is insufficient to view as the basis of all Soviet actions the national interest, and certainly incorrect to trace them exclusively to the desire to propogate communism. It is also a gross oversimplification to credit the Soviets with some magic endowing them with insuperable diplomatic advantages in any negotiations with the West.

What has been true of Soviet foreign policy in the recent past will continue to be true in the foreseeable future: it conceives of international relations mainly in terms of power politics. It gauges the strength of its opponents and rivals not only by their military effectives and

[1] No more fundamental mistake could be made than one current in some British Labour circles in 1945 that a socialist government was bound to have an easier time with the Russians than a non-socialist one; that because it inspired greater sympathy and trust in the Communists, it was bound to enjoy certain advantages in dealing with Moscow.

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industrial potential but also by their social cohesion and the strength of their leadership. Except in terms of propaganda, the ideological character of the government of non-communist countries with which they deal remains a matter of indifference to the Russians. They will not be inhibited if they think it desirable to seek a rapprochement with Greece by the fact that parliamentary institutions have been suspended there; their policies towards the German Federal Republic will not be appreciably different whether a Socialist or a Christian Democratic party is in power. They fashion their policies according to the specific dangers and opportunities they see and not according to the party allegiance of the governments they have to deal with.

The exigencies of the nuclear age have, of course, deeply affected the character of Soviet policies, even if this is not always apparent in statements of the leaders. The earlier disregard of the fundamental change brought to world politics through the atom bomb was, as we suggested above, largely a pose. Later on, with both superpowers equipped with a stock of nuclear weapons, Khrushchev still intermittently behaved as if he believed that a nuclear war would be catastrophic to capitalism and not to the world as a whole. It was only the Cuban crisis, and then the Chinese communists' (undoubtedly also pretended) disregard of the cataclysmic consequences of a nuclear conflict, which made him acknowledge the imperative necessity of peaceful coexistence between the world's leading powers. But both he and his successors have held on to the notion that this coexistence still offers an ample scope for the Soviet Union to adjust the power relationship vis-à-vis the United States in its favour.

Although they are determined to prevent the outbreak of a major war, Soviet leaders seem as yet insufficiently aware of the need to evolve techniques for preventing small crises from escalating into major ones. On the contrary, they see such small crises as offering opportunities for the Soviet Union to improve its diplomatic and power position. The world, in other words, is for the Kremlin still the stage for a competition of the two systems, and for the struggle for primacy between the US and the USSR. The general tendency of the forces of history, as well as their own superior skill in international manoeuvring, afford the Soviet Union, they believe, an opportunity to win those small conflicts while avoiding a major and disastrous one.

Mr. Kennan's celebrated paper of more than 20 years ago postulated that the Soviets' sense of the historical mission of their own system to inherit the earth would eventually yield to a recognition of the strength and desirability of the economy of the free world. Yet, while in terms of their economic growth democracies have passed the test with flying colours, the Soviets may well feel that, in view of the undeniable loosening of the ties of social cohesion and of the sense of purpose in the West, and in view of the continued political disunity of Western Europe, their own system and country is still bound to win the great race.

Such historico-philosophical considerations have probably but an

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indirect influence on the Soviet approach to the concrete issues of the day: disarmament, Vietnam, the Middle East. Yet there is no doubt that the current picture of social unrest and political disunity in the main countries of the West is a factor of importance in the Soviet appraisal of world affairs. This situation strengthens Moscow's temptation to exploit the vulnerability and divisions within the democratic camp; it lessens the sense of urgency about solving or ameliorating the most dangerous situations on the world scene. Though this does not follow logically, the divisions within, and the troubles of, the Western world have in fact made the Soviets more reluctant to admit how serious the split is within the commuunist camp and more reluctant to respond to pressures and tensions within their own society by turning to more liberal policies at home.

STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT

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NEW SOVIET VIEWS ON ECONOMIC AID

Elizabeth K. Valkenier

CHANGING Soviet attitudes toward the role of the state sector in economic development would not be of much interest if they simply reflected ideological infighting among academic experts and communist theoreticians. But they transcend the realm of esoteric theory and illustrate the evolution of Soviet economic policies in the Third World, where almost the entire Soviet aid programme is devoted to constructing projects in the public sector and where Soviet experts in increasing numbers are advising governments to formulate national development plans.

From the changing and expanding discussion of the role of the state in economic development one gains a clear picture of the radical changes that have taken place in Soviet policies over the past decade or so. Basically, the Russians have abandoned supporting economic development through politically motivated radical institutional change in favour of gradual reforms based on the maximum application of economic criteria.

WHEN Moscow reversed its policies in 1954–55 and began granting extensive aid for government-sponsored projects in the newly independent countries, this move was not accompanied by a new look on the part of Soviet scholars at the capacity of the Asian states, with their middle class regimes, to build independent national economies. Academic experts continued to categorize these countries as part of the world capitalist system and to insist that their economic programmes were undertaken in the interest of the bourgeoisie.

The gap between practice and theory could not be allowed to last too long. Chastised at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 for not being awake to the challenge of the new East, Soviet Orientalists began to look for ideological justifications for Russia's involvement in the build-up of non-socialist economies. Accordingly, discussion began on the specific point: Can state capitalism in the Third World be a progressive phenomenon?

Almost barren of any economic content, this debate resulted in awarding the economic policies of some Third World countries a passing political grade. It was decided that, unlike the situation in the industrially developed countries, state capitalism was 'objectively progressive' in the underdeveloped world when it was 'harmful to the interests of imperialism' and 'coincided with the interests of the people'. This interpretation was publicized and endorsed at the 1958 conference

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on state capitalism in the underdeveloped countries convened by the Institute of Oriental Studies.[1]

Although the conference was organized by the economic section of the Institute, the discussion was couched almost exclusively in political terms. Only a few participants (for example, Levkovskii) talked about the 'progressiveness' of state capitalism in terms of the impetus it gave to economic development. The majority (among whom R. Ulianovskii was most prominent) challenged this view and claimed that the progressiveness of state capitalism in the Third World was determined by the degree of its 'anti-capitalist' direction.

In this view, state controls and plans in India, Egypt, Indonesia and Burma (all of them recipients of Soviet aid) were bound to succeed since they were said to be directed at gaining economic independence from the West. Conversely, the endeavours of the central governments in Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey (after the Second World War) were scorned since these countries were said to be under the domination of monopoly capital and of imperialism. What either set of policies might contribute to the actual development of production was not really under intensive study at that time. The overriding concern was to prove that state capitalism among Moscow's economic clients could eliminate capitalist relations and serve as a transition to socialist institutions.

Having found an ideological justification for the state sector in a select group of countries and devised a model, Soviet Third World specialists turned their attention to its expansion. Until about 1964–65, the performance of the public sector was judged almost exclusively in terms of its size. Discussion and investigation centred almost exclusively on ways of expanding public ownership.

Industrialization was regarded as the best means of endowing a regime with a strong position in the national economy. It was only by owning the means of production that the central government could exercise direct control over the economic life of the country. Thus, Soviet experts attending the first UN conference on programming for economic development, held in Delhi in the autumn of 1961, were highly critical of its working papers which largely saw the public sector in the role of providing an impulse. The Russians advocated instead the expansion and strengthening of the public sector, primarily through industrialization.[2]

Nationalization of foreign and domestic private property was another method favoured by the Russians in this period. Direct state ownership was believed to be the best way of diverting the enormous funds, which the foreign companies were said to be syphoning off as profits, into development investment. At times more moderate voices would

[1] *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, No. 4, 1958, pp. 213–25.

[2] I. Evenko, "Pervaya konferentsiya OON po problemam ekonomicheskogo planirovaniya v stranakh Azii," (The First UN Conference on Problems of Economic Planning in Asian Countries), *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, No. 2, 1962, pp. 91–95.

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suggest that the state could increase domestic resources of capital accumulation by taxing foreign companies more heavily and decreasing the profits they could take.[3] The prevalent mood, however, was to encourage such totalitarian methods as nationalization without compensation to increase the level of savings. Accordingly, it was regretted that the second Indian Five Year Plan did not resort to any nationalization to secure more investment funds.[4] And expropriation decrees promulgated by regimes ranging from Indonesia to Guinea were loudly applauded in the daily and academic press.

The third method of enhancing the position of the state sector was the expansion of economic relations with the Soviet bloc. Western aid was denigrated because it tended to promote 'capitalist relations' and safeguard ties with Western markets—which perpetuated backwardness and dependence. Conversely, Soviet assistance was extolled for strengthening the public sector through the construction of industrial enterprises. 'Soviet credits above all promote the development of the state sector of the national economy, which represents the strongest basis for genuine independence of underdeveloped countries'.[5]

SOVIET aid policies through 1962 accorded closely with the foregoing theories. These were the days when Moscow granted generous credits for steel mills, machine building plants and import replacing industries, often without any regard for either the size of the domestic market or the availability of resources. Aid officials were guided primarily by the 'political effectiveness' of the projects, by the desire to build up the public sector into the dominant force in the economies of these countries. Their political convictions relieved the Soviets of any worry about whether their projects fitted neatly into the pattern of economic growth and represented the optimal investment choice. The overriding consideration was to build a 'progressive' institutional framework that would determine the course of development.

An excellent example of this approach was the granting of another $250 million credit to Indonesia in 1960 for yet more projects even though none of the projects in the 1956 credit of $100 million had been completed and many had not even been started.

Moscow's advice and generous credits encouraged the adoption of radical and ambitious policies by many of the aid recipients. In the absence of full documentation it is impossible to argue that the Russians were actually responsible for such measures as Mali's withdrawal from the Franc zone or Guinea's nationalization of domestic trade. But given the presence of numerous Russian advisors in both countries, and their

[3] *Problemy industrializatsii suverennykh slaborazvitykh stran Azii* (Industrialization Problems of Sovereign Underdeveloped Asian Countries) (Moscow 1960), pp. 52–53.
[4] R. A. Ulianovskii, "O osobennostiakh razvitiya i kharaktere gosudarstvennogo kapitalizma v Indii" (On the peculiarities of development and the character of state capitalism in India), *Problemy Vostokovedeniya*, No. 3, 1960, pp. 28–29.
[5] V. Rymalov, "Soviet Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries", *International Affairs*, No. 9, 1959, p. 25.

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views on development strategy, it can be assumed that these radical measures were undertaken at least with the approval of communist experts. As for the Soviet press, it welcomed these reforms as 'steps toward the achievement of full economic independence' and as 'blows to capitalist elements'.

In India, the bias of Soviet experts for industrialization was undoubtedly a contributing factor in the disproportionately large investment in the production of capital goods and in capital-intensive industries in the second Plan.

Signs of stocktaking and reappraisal on the part of the Russians began to appear by 1963. The aid granted in 1962 was 20 per cent below the 1961 level. [$800 million as against $1 billion.] And in 1963 high aid officials began to visit the larger aid recipients to check on the progress of the assistance programme. Previously, only less important, specialized missions had been sent out to check on the completion of specific projects.

Thus, a mission was dispatched to Guinea in June 1963 for the specific purpose of studying new methods to 'increase the effectiveness of Soviet aid'. The economic inspection of Mali in April 1963, despite broad hints from Modibo Keita about his country's expectation of assistance for the next development plan (scheduled to start in 1964), did not result in any new credits. There was only the adoption of unspecified measures to 'increase the efficiency and speed up work' on many projects.[6] By this time the Russians were beginning to feel the burden of helping the Malians run their over-centralized economy. In January 1963, they had to grant a 10 million ruble credit to the state farming enterprise—Office du Niger—nationalized in the spring of 1961. The following year, Moscow had to pay in hard currency for almost all the peanuts imported from Mali because the new Mali franc proved to be inconvertible on the international market. Given such results, the radical political measures that had previously been favoured lost their appeal for the Russians.[7]

Thus already before the ousting of Khrushchev in October 1964, there were signs that Moscow was taking a hard look at the economic results of its aid policies and was questioning the headlong expansion of the public sector. Fewer credits for new projects were granted; instead the Russians began to concentrate on completing projects already started, as well as on assuring their efficient operation. There is less evidence to show it, but it is likely that the Russians also began to favour less politically radical but economically more practical methods of running the economy. For example, Guinea's domestic trade was denationalized in late 1963.

However, the new concerns of the aid administrators were not reflected in specialized literature of that time. Among academic

[6] AFP, 4 May 1963.

[7] *Antiimperialisticheskaya revoliutsiya v Afrike* (The Anti-imperialist Revolution in Africa) (Moscow, 1967), p. 266.

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specialists the firm belief in the efficacy of expanding state controls, as well as the conviction that expulsion of Western interests heralded prosperity, died slowly.

Critical comments on the economic performance of the large aid recipients were practically non-existent through 1965. If the domestic programme and foreign alliances of a recipient were adjudged right from the Soviet viewpoint, if the country followed a 'non-capitalist course', then no thorough going criticism could appear in print.

Even though Moscow did not underwrite Guinea's second Plan, the first theoretical book on planning in the Third World to appear in the USSR cited Guinea as a successful example of development strategy. To prove his point the author thought it sufficient to enumerate all the projects envisaged by the first Plan in the public sector without mentioning how any of them would contribute to economic growth. As for the second Plan, the fact that it provided for a steel mill was enough to commend it. What was decisive was the goal of the plan—industrialization and the liquidation of private enterprise. From this alone various economic benefits were expected to follow more or less automatically.[8]

Authors who occasionally referred to some difficulties or to the lack of spectacular results did not, however, stress the point or voice any serious alarm. Burma's progress along the non-capitalist path received good coverage. The government's consistent nationalization policy and the greater role played by the public sector were praised by Soviet economists. The fact that the country was experiencing inflation and mounting indebtedness was mentioned in passing as a temporary difficulty of no serious consequence.[9]

If any remedies were alluded to in those days, they were not based on economic factors. Thus in his discussion of the state of Indonesian economy, in the October 1963 issue of *Narody Azii i Afriki*, M. A. Andreev noted that the government-run enterprises, which accounted for over half of the country's productive capacity, hardly contributed to the national budget. However, this realistic description of actual performance in the public sector elicited no practical deductions. Andreev blamed corruption and maladministration on the 'penetration of bourgeois elements' into high posts. Since public ownership was still a sanctified institution, the remedy suggested did

[8] E. Utkin, *Problemy planirovaniya v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh* (Problems of Planning in the Developing Countries) (Moscow, 1967), pp. 27–29. Another author, A. Firsov, took no easy comfort in the fact that the regime relied on the state sector to generate development. Instead he pointed out that public enterprises contributed only 2½ per cent of the national income and referred to the problems that plagued them—low labour productivity, poor marketing and improper cost accounting. But he did not go into any extensive discussion of these difficulties, nor did he come up with any remedies. *Ekonomicheskie problemy Gvineiskoi Respubliki* (Economic Problems of the Guinean Republic) (Moscow, 1965).

[9] S. Bilinyak, 'Ekonomicheskoe razvitie Birmy i gosudarstvennye finansy' (Economic Development of Burma and State Finances), *Finansy SSSR*, No. 2, 1964, pp. 44–51. Cited in *Yuva Newsletter* (London), v. IV, No. 1 (January 1965), p. 6.

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not touch on the scope of the government's ambitions. And so Andreev proposed a political solution—the admission of the 'real representatives of the people' into the councils of the state enterprises so that these bodies could become the 'organs of effective popular control over the entire economic life of the country'.

BY 1966 the stage was set for new departures both in Soviet practice and theory. Instead of merely cutting down on credits or enforcing stricter construction schedules on aid projects, Moscow began to insist that aid recipients take various practical steps to put their economic house in order and use Soviet credits more effectively. Moreover, both popular and specialized writing on Third World economics now started to offer realistic descriptions of the state of affairs in government-run enterprises among many Soviet aid clients, as well as to recommend vigorous remedies.

Underlying the new policy were far less radical assumptions about the capabilities and goals of Third World economic development. A much more flexible attitude toward economic factors in generating growth became evident. Government control and ownership were no longer regarded as the panacea. Economic efficiency took precedence over political dogma in decision making.

The confluence of several developments brought about this change. Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964. Among the contributing factors were his largesse in granting credits despite the mounting economic difficulties of the regimes on which he lavished aid and the delays in the completion of the new projects he promoted.

Next, there was the fall of several radical leaders, beginning with Ben Bella in June 1965. In each case the new regime cited the chaotic economic conditions brought about by over-ambitious government schemes among the main reasons for the coup. And yet these very policies were at the time extolled in Soviet specialized literature as signifying the choice of the non-capitalist development and had been encouraged with generous aid at least until 1963.

And lastly, Moscow was by then facing the repayment problem. The assumption behind any aid is that completed projects will generate goods and services that will earn income which in turn will make it possible to repay the loan. The Soviets were especially shrill in claiming that their aid, particularly for the large industrial projects, would prove more effective in producing results than Western credits for infrastructure. But, instead, Indonesia sought a rescheduling of debt repayment as early as 1963, and Egypt proved unable to begin repayments in 1964.[10] Similarly, Mali's interest payments had to be cancelled and debt repayment deferred in 1965.[11]

[10] Marshall Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid* (New York, 1967), pp. 13, 72.
[11] N. Kovrygina, "Gosudarstvennyi i chastnyi sektor v ekonomii Mali" (State and Private Sector in the Economy of Mali), *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, No. 1, 1967, p. 130. Hereafter referred to as MEMO.

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Detailed information on Soviet actions to promote economic rationality and efficiency is scarce and scattered. But the growing public discussion of the problems that afflict the public sector, as well as the solutions that are proposed, provide a good many indications about the type of advice or decisions that Soviet aid administrators and economic advisors might now favour when considering the role of the state in economic development.

There is no doubt that Moscow is now quite worried about the ways the new states have been misusing their power in the economic field. Finding a solution to the deteriorating situation is very much on everybody's mind. The top leadership seldom misses an opportunity to deliver a lecture. At the 1967 celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the October revolution, instead of boasting about the advancement of the former colonies through their alliance with the USSR, Brezhnev limited his remarks about the Third World to a disquisition on how 'constant efforts to advance the economy' were necessary to guarantee progress.[12] And when Kosygin visited India in early 1968, he was reported to have strongly advised Mrs. Gandhi to concentrate more on the internal economic situation and to cease worrying about external threats.[13]

Popular political literature has upgraded economic efficiency into a revolutionary category. *Osnovy Nauchnogo Kommunizma*, which in 1966 replaced the Khrushchev-era *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma* as the basic text on communist theory, stresses that the success of revolutionary forces in the Third World depends to a large extent on proper management that assures economic growth.[14]

Scholars are being exhorted to study the actual performance of the public sector. An editorial in the December 1967 issue of *Narody Azii i Afriki*, the leading professional quarterly on Third World affairs, called on specialists to concentrate on the results of the policy of expanding public ownership rather than on expansion itself.

Both the specialized and popular press now object to 'ultra-revolutionary haste' in resolving complex economic problems. This term covers almost any institutional reform that extends the state's management and control beyond its capacity to administer efficiently. It ranges from the condemnation of Mali for setting up hundreds of agricultural producers' co-operatives when there was only a handful of trained agronomists to supervise their operations, to criticism of Burma's nationalization of retail trade when the state was in no position to operate an efficient distribution network of its own.

[12] *Pravda*, 4 November 1967.
[13] *Hindu Weekly Review*, 12 February 1968.
[14] p. 179. Similarly, the Communist parties in Afro-Asian countries are beginning to advocate economic efficiency in their programmes. Thus the Iraqi Party appealed to the new regime, that took over in 1968, to resort to scientific planning that would consolidate the state sector, introduce efficient management of the state oil company, and encourage private investment. *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin*, No. 19 (7 Nov. 1968), pp. 16–19.

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Included in this unjustified (in the economic sense) extension of state control are Soviet objections to a premature rupture of traditional economic ties with the metropole and expulsion of foreign capital.[15]

GIVEN these concerns, what are the new departures that emerge from the ever-widening discussion?

The most forward-looking economists advocate a flexible and dynamic economic policy instead of rigid, centralized controls. Back in 1961, the prominent economist V. G. Solodovnikov argued, in terms typical for those days, that the state could regulate the economic life of the country only when it owned the means of production and occupied a strong position in the national economy.[16] Nowadays, N. Shmelev, among the most original younger economists, specifically advocates the use of indirect methods, such as taxation, tariff rates and credit policy, for 'steering' the economy.[17]

Another economist has written: 'The purposeful activity of the state . . . does not preclude the need for sober consideration of the general state of the market and its possibilities. . . . The state can exercise its guiding role . . . primarily through planning, relying on a quite flexible and dynamic economic policy'.[18]

It cannot be doubted that similar advice is offered by the Soviets to the less developed countries directly. The most dramatic example of such advice was a lecture to the seminar on the course of revolution in Africa, held in Cairo in September 1966. A. Sobolev, a long-time expert on problems of the transition to socialism, deplored the tendency of new states to eliminate what they might consider 'outdated' institutions by 'non-economic means'. Instead he urged them to carry out gradual reforms 'with the maximum application of economic laws' so that their economies might develop with 'minimum error and cost'.[19]

Comments in the Soviet press, even though they do not reveal what steps the Soviets might have taken, make it abundantly clear that Moscow nowadays approves measures that free the economy from excessive government control. Thus *Pravda* on 22 January 1969, approved steps taken by the UAR to free partially the private sector from rigid controls and to promote private investment in industry.

As late as 1965 economists argued that profitability could not be

[15] V. Shelepin, "Africa: Why the Instability?", *New Times*, No. 52 (30 December 1968), pp. 21–24.

[16] *Burzhuaznye teorii i problemy ekonomicheskogo razvitiya slaborazvitykh stran* (Bourgeois Theories and Problems of the Economic Development of the Underdeveloped Countries) (Moscow, 1961), pp. 78–86.

[17] "Razvivayushchiesia strany: formirovanie khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma" (Developing Countries: Formation of the Economic Mechanism), MEMO, No. 8, 1968, pp. 52–62.

[18] R. Andreasian, A. Elianov, "Razvivayushchiesia strany: ekonomicheskaya diversifikatsiya i strategiya industrial'nogo razvitiya" (Developing Countries: Economic Diversification and the Strategy of Industrial Development), ibid., No. 1, 1968, p. 39.

[19] *World Marxist Review*, No. 1, 1967, p. 24.

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the primary criterion in deciding on the advisability of a project. It was believed that big enterprises would have such a beneficial influence on employment and national income that the initial deficit operations were not considered to be a problem.[20] Nowadays Soviet experts caution against programmes involving prolonged subsidies and protectionism. These measures should be resorted to 'only within very narrow limits' since they are bound to have 'ruinous effects on the accumulation of capital, as well as the ability to compete in the export field'.[21] It is acknowledged that the problem of how long the existence of various unprofitable enterprises can be tolerated, and on what scale, is one of the most complex problems in devising development strategy. But economists tend to show more interest in profitable operations than in the multiplier effects.

Thus instead of financing new plants in the public sector, whose deficit operations will entail an additional drain on already scarce resources, Russians now deem it more practical to grant credits for the modernization or expansion of existing enterprises.

In the early 1960s when the US refused to grant Indonesia credits for new chemical plants, recommending instead that this money be spent on renovating rubber estates and modernizing mines, the Russians had nothing but words of condemnation.[22] Since then they have reached similar conclusions. Thus E. Utkin, whose 1965 book on planning was based on the principle that the larger the state sector the better, has since reversed his opinions. He now argues that it is more expedient to modernize, enlarge or reconstruct the existing enterprises than to build new projects.[23] And, following Khrushchev's ouster, the USSR has been definitely cutting back aid commitments for new projects. As early as December 1964, A. Shelepin was dispatched to Cairo to take a hard look at the way Soviet military and economic assistance was being spent. He is reported to have informed the worried Egyptians that economic co-operation would continue, but only on a 'realistic basis'.[24] After several other check-up visits, a protocol amending the September 1964 credit, granted by Khrushchev, was signed in February 1966. Significantly it omitted the heavy machinery plant, promised by the former Premier, altogether, and instead of adding another steel mill, it provided for the integrated enlargement of the Helwan steel complex. Similarly in India, when the country sought Soviet assistance for additional large industrial projects to build during

[20] N. I. Gavrilov, ed., *Nevavisimye Strany Afriki: ekonomicheskie i sotsiainye problemy* (Independent countries of Africa: Economic and Social Problems) (Moscow, 1965), p. 61.

[21] R. Andreasian, A. Elianov, op. cit.; A. Levkovskii, "Syr'e, diversifikatsiya i tretti mir," (Raw Materials, Diversification and th Third World), *Aziya i Afrika Segodnia*, No. 9, 1968, pp. 2–5.

[22] *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1964, pp. 235–37.

[23] "Planirovanie: teoriya i praktika" (Planning: Theory and Practice), *Aziya i Afrika Segodnia*, No. 11, 1968, pp. 13–14.

[24] *The New York Times*, 1 January 1965.

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the fourth Five Year Plan, the Russians were very reluctant to undertake the commitment. A comparison of the list Asoka Mehta presented to the Russians in May 1965 with the agreement that was finally signed in December 1966 reveals that Moscow mainly undertook projects designed to increase the capacity of already existing plants.[25]

In addition to exercising a restraining influence through their own credits, the Russians are also giving level-headed advice to the Third World planners.

Here, the Soviet reaction to the changes Cairo had to institute in the second development plan are very instructive. The 1965–70 plan called for an even greater emphasis on industry than the first one. In late 1965, it was revised to last two more years in order to lessen the annual level of investment. But the mounting economic crisis prompted Nasser in 1966 to seek the advice of the International Monetary Fund, whose team recommended a stiff austerity programme designed to bring the economy into balance. As there were disagreements in the government over the Fund's report, Nasser next asked a top-level Soviet team for advice. Shortly thereafter, the Western press reported that Soviet recommendations were roughly the same as those of the Fund.[26] This is confirmed by the fact that the following month the seven year expansion plan was scrapped for a three year stabilization programme, designed to complete projects already started and to promote those that promised the earliest profitability.

At that time there were no press comments in the USSR to indicate the Soviet position. But when it became possible to write with greater candour about the economic problems of the large creditors, the shift was regarded very favourably. One book described the seven year plan as being beyond Egypt's means—'in fact there were no means to carry it out'.[27] And the Middle East expert, G. Mirskii, cited that plan as an example of over-ambitious economic policies which resulted in inflation and indebtedness and had to be replaced by a stabilization programme.[28]

Of course, neither author drew attention to the fact that it was the easy availability of Soviet credits that had encouraged the Egyptians in the first place to formulate a plan that proved to be beyond their financial and other capacities.

Current attitudes toward nationalization also show awareness that the new states are not capable of running their economies effectively. R. A. Ulianovskii, a prominent economist specializing in Asia and Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee division dealing with the Third World, until quite recently advocated nationalization as both politically and economically 'progressive'. At the academic conference

[25] *Ibid.*, 18 May 1965; *India Weekly News*, 23 December 1966.
[26] *The New York Times*, 23 September 1966.
[27] *Ob'edinennaya Arabskaya Respublika* (The United Arab Republic) (Moscow 1968), p. 157.
[28] "UAR: Home Front", *New Times*, No. 50 (18 December 1968), p. 8.

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in early 1964 on Socialism, Capitalism and the Developing Countries, he argued that 'in general, prospects for nationalization of the basic means of production are favourable' and welcomed the fact that 'nationalizing foreign and local capitalist property had intensified'.[29] Ulianovskii has since reversed his views radically. Writing in the March 1968 *Kommunist*, he came out against excessive nationalization because it crippled domestic trade and services, as well as small and medium-size industry.[30] He did not question the principle of nationalization itself, only its hasty application. In other words, the Soviets now favour nationalization only when it can be carried out efficiently, without any losses in production and services.

The tenor of discussion indicates that most Soviet specialists think that nationalization has been too readily resorted to by countries ill-equipped for this responsibility. Many articles discuss frankly how many developing countries overburden their weak administrative machinery with too many responsibilities. Unable to cope, they only resort to more 'voluntaristic' (i.e., economically unjustifiable) steps, such as enlarging the bureaucratic apparatus, introducing even stricter controls and printing more money.[31]

In the eyes of the Russians the phenomenal growth of the bureaucratic apparatus has been among the unwelcome results of excessive state involvement in managing the economy. They see the swelling ranks of the state administration as eating up the funds that could be devoted to more productive purposes. Moreover, this 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' regards the public sector not as a means for political and economic transformation of the country but as a field for personal advancement and profit which results in widespread corruption and other costly abuses.[32]

Accordingly, when Moscow now undertakes to help a country develop a national industry it urges the recipient to make sure that professional cadres are also trained to run it effectively. Thus in Algeria, where assistance is being given to organize a state petroleum company, a higher vocational school to train specialists was set up even before Soviet aid for the oil venture began to flow. Instead of merely making it possible for the Algerians to produce and market their own oil, the Russians now take steps to ensure proper management of this state enterprise.

In countries where the damage has been done and Soviet aid projects are languishing under poor management, Russia is now ready to divert some of its credits for management consultants. When Kosygin visited

[29] MEMO, No. 4, 1964, p. 119.
[30] "Nauchnyi sotsializm i osvobodivshiesia strany" (Scientific Socialism and the Liberated Countries), *Kommunist*, No. 4, p. 104.
[31] V. Yordanskii, "Protivorechiya nekapitalisticheskogo razvitiya v Afrike" (Contradictions of the Non-capitalist Development in Africa), *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 3, 1968, pp. 45–56.
[32] "Sotsialnye sily i perspektivy 'Tret'ego Mira'" (Social Forces and Prospects of the Third World), MEMO, No. 5, 1968, pp. 93–94.

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India in January 1968, he was reported to have been appalled by the poor management and under-utilization of the giant plants set up with Soviet assistance.[33] Within a month teams of experts were dispatched to study the performance of the heavy electrical equipment plan at Hardwar, of the state oil industry, and of the engineering plants at Durgapur and Ranchi. As a result of this and other inspection missions the 1966 aid agreement was revised in December 1968, and some of the Soviet funds were earmarked for 'raising the efficiency' of these industrial enterprises.[34]

THE goal of Soviet aid is no longer to make the largest possible political impression and institutional impact through ever new projects in the public sector. Moscow now seeks to consolidate its programmes, as well as the entire state sector among its larger economic constituents, for greater economic effectiveness. What concerns the Russians now is not the size of the public sector but the proper functioning of the economy.

But it should not be assumed that the Russians have become so pragmatic that they are in favour of any enterprise as long as it is enterprising. Political considerations are not absent altogether, and economic rationality has not become the sole motivating force in Soviet economic relations with the Third World. The Russians want the developing countries to put their economic house in order by eschewing much of the former radicalism. But the question of what political forces are behind the renovation remains more important than the viability of the reforms themselves. The programme can be quite liberal and be acceptable to the Russians as long as people friendly toward the USSR are carrying it out. The minute that political forces hostile to the Soviet Union propose similar measures, they become unacceptable to the Russians since this implies a change in the entire orientation of the country.

Reactions to the series of reforms designed to extricate the UAR from the mounting economic difficulties illustrates the limits of the new pragmatic economic liberalism of the Soviets. As was indicated above, they favoured far-reaching reforms in the autumn of 1966, even though they envisaged restraints on the public sector and easing up restrictions on private enterprise. However, when after the Arab defeat in the June 1967 war Mohieddin proposed additional reforms consisting of a slower tempo of industrialization, the closing down of deficit state enterprises, the dismissal of surplus labour and various advantages to the private sector, the Russians opposed his programme. What made these measures unacceptable to the Soviets was their political thrust.

Subsequent Soviet comments revealed that what the Soviets objected to was not these particular steps to streamline the economy but the

[33] *Hindu Weekly Review*, 5 February 1968.
[34] I. Temirskii, "Moscow and Delhi", *New Times*, No. 5 (5 February 1969), pp. 10–11.

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fact that they were combined with attempts to change Egypt's domestic and foreign orientation. Unlike the 1965–66 period, the Russians saw in the highly charged and politically polarized situation that resulted from the Six Day War a grave threat to their own influence. G. Mirskii has charged that Mohieddin's plans involved 'doing away with the socialist orientation of the UAR' and lessening its dependence on the Soviet bloc.[35] But Mirskii had no objections to economic reforms adopted by Nasser in the summer of 1968 and has characterized them as being based on industrialization, priority of the state sector and a re-affirmed collaboration with the Soviet bloc. However, this programme, presented to Nasser after Mohieddin's resignation in March 1968, does not seem to be so radically different from Mohieddin's. It also envisaged the elimination of deficit government plants and easier conditions for private business. But the fact that it re-affirmed close co-operation with the USSR indicates that whereas 'priority of the state sector' and 'industrialization' can be interpreted quite liberally, alliance with the Soviet Union remains fundamental and unalterable for Soviet acceptance of a country's economic policy.

Moscow is quite ready at present to accept and to counsel a reduction in industrial build-up and in government regulation of economic life for the sake of promoting efficiency and growth.[36] But it is not ready to tolerate any inroads on the public sector or relaxation of restrictions on domestic and foreign business if they are associated with re-orienting a country politically and economically away from the USSR.

In the final analysis all the measures now being undertaken or advocated by the Russians to resuscitate state management of the economy are aimed as much at preserving the good name of socialism as at assuring economic viability of the new states. They are trying to correct the malfunctioning of the state sector and to improve methods of state controls not in order to lessen the influence of 'socialist' economics but to improve its chances and popularity.

[35] "Novaya revoliutsiya v OAR" (New Revolution in the UAR), MEMO, No. 1, 1969, pp. 38–48.

[36] For disagreements among scholars on degree of state intervention, see V. Kollontia, *Voprosy Plainrovaniya v Tretem Mire*, Memo no. 7 1969 pp. 91–100 and discussion in following three issues.

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NATO AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION

Elliot R. Goodman

THE problem of mending the riven European continent is, at its core, intra-European in nature. It involves breaking down the barriers between the nations of Europe, East and West, and creating new pan-European ties that can create military security, political stability and economic prosperity. An integral part of this mending process, although perhaps coming as its culmination, would be some form of reunifying Germany. This bundle of intra-European problems can only find resolution, however, if the extra-continental superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States are also integrally associated with the terms of settlement. From the Western side, NATO can be an important and useful instrument for relating American and European aims and evolving the procedures to pursue them.

The German problem will be both the most difficult and the most important to resolve, since any improvement in the relations between the nations of Eastern and Western Europe will always remain tentative and capable of disruption, so long as the instabilities and tensions of a divided Germany are implanted in the centre of the continent. NATO must constantly keep under review the prospects and possible terms of a German settlement, not because it can be expected to materialize in the near future, but because the West must identify itself with the legitimate aim of self-determination for the entire German nation. If Bonn's NATO allies should disavow this goal, or even lose interest in supporting Bonn's efforts to move towards it, the West German bond with NATO will wear thin and then break down completely. The result would be to push Bonn toward unilateral negotiations with Moscow, which could only bode ill for the West.

Moreover, German disillusionment with the West might also place intolerable strains on its institutions of Western democracy. It might be felt that a regime in the autocratic tradition of Bismark could more easily play off East against West for the purpose of achieving German national objectives. If, as happened in the past, Western democracy should become identified with impotence, a turn toward the pursuit of German goals through a policy of unbridled national force could produce cataclysmic results. Among these might be German denunciation of the pledge not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons, which the Federal Republic assumed in 1954 in connection with German rearmament and membership in NATO. For its part, NATO simultaneously pledged itself to support the peaceful reunification of Germany. Abandonment of the Western commitment to

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Bonn would leave open the real possibility that Bonn would feel released from its part of the basic 'contract'.[1]

Ever since Bonn's admission to NATO, the Alliance has been an indispensable mechanism for a collective management of the German problem. The security that NATO supplied to Western Europe against the threat from the East also provided the East with security against stirrings from a resurgent, free-wheeling West Germany. What would be the prospect for Europe of a West Germany that had broken its NATO bond, because it had concluded that it could only hope to overcome its division by its own resources? It could either seek to accomplish this end by coming into conflict or co-operation with the Soviet Union. Either course could bring catastrophe: either a European war, in case of conflict, or the projection of Soviet power into the heart of Western Europe, in case of co-operation on lines set by Soviet policy.

Future arrangements must not cut loose the Federal Republic but seek to pursue its legitimate goal of a reunited German people within the larger policy-making framework of the West. Franz-Josef Strauss, who is frequently considered one of the most assertive West German political figures, has nevertheless cautioned against German initiatives that would set the Federal Republic adrift: 'What we can do is to help to create a framework, a European architecture in an Atlantic Community in which the German problem can be absorbed, in which the Germans become predictable because they are no longer in a position to be unpredictable.'[2]

OVER time the West German approach to reunification has changed radically, and it would seem that, in some quarters at least, the concept of reunification itself has been basically transformed. The rigid assumption of the Adenauer era that any movement toward East-West *détente* must be made conditional upon progress toward reunification was gradually undermined by the hard fact that no progress on reunification was made; nor would it be, on terms acceptable to the West, so long as the communists adamantly rejected the principle of national self-determination expressed by a free vote of the German people. Moreover, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 both stabilized the East German regime and shattered any remaining illusions about the ease of reunifying Germany.

The effort to give Bonn's Eastern policy impetus and to work towards reconciliation with East Germany by indirect means led to an explicit reversal of the earlier position by Kiesinger's Grand Coalition. In 1967 Foreign Minister Willy Brandt declared: 'We do *not* make our policy of *détente* dependent on progress with the German

[1] James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 359–60.
[2] Quoted in Max Kohnstamm, 'Utopia in a Nuclear Age', *Interplay*, August-September 1967, p. 13.

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question.'[3] Instead, emphasis was placed on efforts to increase intra-German contacts and to foster liberalization of the GDR in the hope of alleviating living conditions in East Germany.

This policy of 'small steps', undertaken for commendable humanitarian aims, was based on a calculated gamble. Each West German overture to the GDR unavoidably enhanced the political status of the East German regime. Such concessions, which might acquire an irreversible momentum, were made without solid assurance that the desired response would be forthcoming from the East. The hope that an increasingly liberalized East Germany might facilitate reunification has therefore remained unproven. As Professor Melvin Croan has observed, even Ulbricht had introduced significant changes in the GDR, especially innovations that encouraged the operation of a more rational and efficient economic system. 'With the further consolidation of the regime postulated by proponents of the formula "reunification through liberalization", either Ulbricht or his successors might well grant more and more concessions to the population without necessarily sacrificing their own control or proving more pliable on the national issue. On the contrary, such a sequence of events, by enhancing the popularity of the regime at home, might only serve to render it more truculent towards the Federal Republic.'[4]

Furthermore, the greater size and strength of the Federal Republic relative to the GDR may only be an illusory bargaining advantage for Bonn. The obvious vulnerability of the East German leaders in their confrontation with the West has made them acutely aware of the threat to their power positions. Paradoxically, generous West German offers of collaboration stimulate East German intransigence. 'No amount of West German assurance or economic aid is really sufficient on this score. Rather, to the extent to which West German concessions may tend to increase the self-confidence of the East German leaders by lending them a greater degree of domestic consolidation, their propensity to challenge the Federal Republic, far from being diminished, would probably increase.'[5]

Another consequence of a more stable East German regime would be to make it more widely accepted internationally. This development, too, could only solidify the division of Germany into two legally recognized, separate states. Specifically, in the case of Western rights relating to Berlin, the more the GDR became an accepted member of the international community the more easily it might assert its claims over access routes, for example, and so further imperil the tenuous position of West Berlin.

Finally, with an internationally accepted position, the East German

[3] Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, 'Détente over the Long Haul', *Aussenpolitik*, August 1967; reprinted in *Survival*, October 1967, p. 312 (italics added).
[4] Melvin Croan, 'Party Politics and the Wall', *Survey*, October 1966, p. 43.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 43–44.

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leaders could press for their version of reunification, without endangering the basis of their communist regime by subjecting it to the perils of a free vote. They could revive their long-proposed plan for a confederation between the two legally recognized German states, under which they would maintain intact their relatively closed society in the East, while intervening freely in the open democratic processes of West Germany. Even without formal confederation, Croan speculates that an internationally respectable East German regime 'might find its political support sought by the opposition to any existing West German government. The more its support was sought, the higher its demands would probably be. The results might well include the paralysis of West German government and the discrediting of democracy in the Federal Republic, as well as a steady weakening of West Germany's ties to the West.' Should such a confederation finally be consummated, it would continuously offer to the East German leaders numerous possibilities 'to demoralize West German politics and destroy its ties to the West'.[6]

Such a scenario may seem alarmist, but developments along these lines cannot be entirely discounted, especially since official West German policy has continually moved in a direction that might encourage the kind of accommodation with the East that would endanger its ties with the West.

As the Grand Coalition under Chancellor Kiesinger attempted to widen its contacts with the East, this search for *détente* seemed only remotely related to the goal of reunification as traditionally conceived. Herbert Wehner, the Minister of All-German Affairs in the Kiesinger government and a principal architect of Bonn's Eastern policy, stated that Bonn might recognize the East German regime if its communist government became 'democratically legitimized by the people of the German Democratic Republic'.[7] At the beginning of 1967, Wehner speculated: 'I would really go so far as to say that we would start reconsidering the question of recognition, even of a communist East Germany, if it had been liberalized according to the model of present day Yugoslavia.'[8] Theo Sommer, editor of the influential *Die Zeit*, elaborated the rationale for this approach: 'It is of little import whether the two parts of Germany will be united within the borders of a single national state or whether they will be united in a more pragmatic fashion that would permit the Germans to get together without actually living together under one flag.' According to this view, 'what ails the Germans is not so much that their nation is divided: It is rather than 17 million of them have to live under an oppressive regime. If that regime became less oppressive, if it were democratized and liberalized, though remaining communist, partition

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 45. On the dangers of 'small steps' see also Wiilliam E. Griffiths, 'The German Problem and American Policy', pp. 110–13.
[7] *New York Times*, 15 December, 1966.
[8] *Washington Post*, 1 February, 1967.

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would be less unbearable than it is now.'[9] Such a rapprochement between the divided parts of the German people reduced 'reunification' to some sort of an institutionalized or regulated co-existence between two separate but increasingly amicable German states.

This emasculated version of reunification was based upon the sanguine vision of two German states converging upon liberal principles of government. But it soon received a rude rebuff by events in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet-led invasion of August 1968, which forcibly reversed the liberalization process in Czechoslovakia, only strengthened those elements that sought to resist liberalization in East Germany. The West German advocates of 'reunification through liberalization' now had even less reason to expect the East German regime to be 'democratically legitimized', as Herr Wehner had demanded as a condition for its recognition. As we have observed, the East German leaders might, over time, permit limited liberalization in some areas if it proved to be a way of consolidating their rule and enhancing their international acceptability. But there would always be limits to such liberalization so as to avoid sacrificing their own political control. To submit their rule to legitimation by any genuinely democratic process, the East German leaders would have to assume foolhardy risks. This would be true for the leadership of any of the bloc states, whose rule is maintained by reliance on Soviet power, since any valid expression of self-determination would instantly reveal the lack of popular support and the fragility of the political regimes that have been imposed on the various peoples.

This general condition is aggravated in East Germany by the special fact that the East German people look longingly toward union with their more numerous, more powerful and more prosperous West German brothers, who at the same time live in a condition of political freedom. All attempts of the communist East German leaders to generate loyalty to a separate East German state must therefore remain shallow. By the same token, the broader the contacts and the greater the freedom of movement which are allowed between East and West Germans, the more the communist leaders expose themselves to odious comparisons. A genuinely popular East German regime that could withstand the test of free and easy contacts with West Germany is not the kind of regime that felt compelled to build the Berlin Wall. When the East Germans tear down the Berlin Wall, the West German partisans of 'reunification through liberalization' will have a more reasonable basis for their policy.

[9] Theo Sommer, 'Will Europe Unite?' *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Winter 1967–1968, p. 557. Sommer subsequently reformulated this view: 'The object is not to move borders but to change their nature; it is not to annul the division of Germany but to make it tolerable for human beings; not to reduce Soviet power in Europe but to break down barriers between East and West. The rest must be left to the course of history. The final stage could be the division of Germany if it appeared bearable to the Germans, or reunification if it was acceptable to the Europeans.' (*Die Zeit*, 28 March, 1969; reprinted in *Survival*, June 1969, p. 194.)

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THE Soviet assault on Czechoslovakia did, however, decisively confirm the other half of the vision of 'reunification' as relations between two separate German states. The rationale for sanctioning the unlimited right of Soviet intervention in bloc states was authoritatively expounded by Soviet Party chief, Leonid Brezhnev, in his speech to a congress of Polish communists on 12 November 1968. But the essence of the Brezhnev Doctrine, as Chancellor Kiesinger recalled, had already been formulated in a letter of 15 July 1968 to the Czechoslovak Communist Party sent by the Soviet Union and its four Warsaw Pact allies who were to join in the armed intervention. 'We shall never permit imperialism to force a breach in the socialist system,' the letter warned, 'either by peaceful or unpeaceful means, or from inside or outside, and thus change the balance of power in its favour.' [10]

Following the invasion, Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin called upon the West German Chancellor on 2 September and delivered a harsh statement which related the German question to the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. Explaining that the invasion had been undertaken to preserve the solidarity of the socialist commonwealth, which was supposedly threatened by counter revolutionary forces that had been encouraged from abroad, the Soviet note asserted: 'Nobody would ever be allowed to break as much as a single link away from the community of socialist countries.' Since Moscow considered East Germany to be a member of the socialist commonwealth, the Chancellor asked whether this doctrine was meant 'to infer that a new element had been introduced into Soviet foreign policy, i.e., that the Soviet Union regarded the division of Germany as definitive and considered every attempt to end that division by peaceful means as a hostile policy against the Soviet Union?' To this query, 'Ambassador Tsarapkin replied that . . . the present situation in Europe . . . would have to be recognized by the Federal Government'.[11]

The day after Kiesinger reported this exchange to the Bundestag, *Pravda* published a detailed doctrinal elaboration of this tough assertion to intervene, by force if necessary, in any communist state where the 'socialist gains' were presumably endangered by creeping counter revolutionary influences. Arguments that have been raised about the sovereignty of the states of the socialist commonwealth and their rights of national self-determination, *Pravda* asserted, are 'untenable primarily because they are based on an abstract, non-class approach to the question of sovereignty and the right of nations to self-determination'. In exercising the power to govern socialist countries, communist parties 'must neither damage socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide

[10] Quoted in Address by Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger to the Bundestag, 16 October 1968, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, 22 October 1968, p. 2.

[11] Address by Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger to the Bundestag, 25 September 1968, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, 1 October 1968, pp. 4–5.

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workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism'. This view of sovereignty 'means that every communist party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire communist movement. Whoever forgets this by placing emphasis on the autonomy and independence of communist parties lapses into one-sidedness, shirking his international obligations.' Each ruling communist party must be reminded that its country 'retains its national independence thanks precisely to the power of the socialist commonwealth—and primarily to its chief force, the Soviet Union—and the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries, and they cannot be indifferent to this.[12] Peking's acid refutation of this Soviet verbiage nevertheless contained an element of refreshing candour. 'The Soviet revisionist renegade clique', Lin Piao said, 'trumpets the so-called theory of "limited sovereignty", the theory of "international dictatorship" and the theory of "socialist community". What does all this stuff mean? It means that your sovereignty is "limited", while his is unlimited.'[13]

When Foreign Minister Gromyko echoed the Brezhnev Doctrine before the United Nations General Assembly,[14] East German Party chief Walter Ulbricht interpreted it as a pledge of Soviet protection for the separate status of East Germany into the indefinite future. 'We welcome the statement of the Soviet Union,' Ulbricht said, 'that never and nowhere will it be permitted to tear off a state from the commonwealth of socialist states'.[15] Assessing the impact of Brezhnev Doctrine nearly a year after it had been developed, Chancellor Kiesinger bluntly told the Bundestag: 'It is evident that according to the intentions of the Soviet Union and the overlords in the other part of Germany, our countrymen separated from us would have to remain against their will within the communist camp for ever. Under this doctrine, the reunification of Germany could not become a reality unless the Federal Republic, too, would be included in the socialist camp.'[16]

When Willy Brandt became Chancellor in October 1969, he pledged to continue the search for German unity, but 'without illusions'. Consequently, he spoke realistically of the existence of 'two states in Germany' which are nevertheless members of one German nation and

[12] S. Kovalev, 'Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries', *Pravda*, 26 September 1968.

[13] Lin Piao, 'Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China', 1 April 1969, *Peking Review*, 28 April 1969, p. 27.

[14] Address by Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 3 October 1968, 4 October 1968.

[15] Address by SED First Secretary Walter Ulbricht, marking the 19th anniversary of the GDR, East Berlin, 7 October 1968, *Neues Deutschland*, 8 October 1968.

[16] Address by Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger to the Bundestag, 17 June 1968, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, 24 June 1969, p. 2.

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therefore 'are not foreign countries to each other'.[17] This new realism also led to a change of vocabulary. When asked, 'Why don't you talk about reunification any more?', Chancellor Brandt explained: 'The term "reunification" stems from the time directly after the Second World War. Until somewhere in the mid-1950s, it seemed still to be possible on the basis of free elections to reunite the parts of Germany that had been separated from each other by the occupation powers. That would have required an agreement between the three Western powers and the Soviet Union. Such a happy solution to the German question was not achieved. . . . Since then, years have gone by, and the world has changed. In Germany two states with quite different political and social systems have come into existence, systems that do not easily lend themselves to unification. Nor is there any prospect today that the world powers would be able to agree about such a reunification. . . . We must recognize that the reunification of Germany in the original sense is no longer possible. And a Chancellor has the duty to tell his people the truth, even when it is bitter.'[18]

THE ultimate goal of reunifying the German nation within a single state will doubtless linger on, although its realization would require a restructuring of the alliance systems that divide Europe. At present reunification of the German nation within a single state would only be conceivable upon two contingencies: either a collapse of Soviet power and with it the East German regime, so that reunification would come on Western terms, or a collapse of Western unity, emptying NATO of its meaning if not ending its existence, so that reunification would come on Eastern terms. If neither of these contingencies seems likely, the German problem will have to be lived with within the existing alliance systems. On the Western side, NATO must continue to be an instrument for collective management of this problem in which the West Germans would be expected to take the lead in evolving relations with the East that they could find tolerable, but always with the feeling that their difficulties are understood by their NATO partners who would co-ordinate supporting policies.

The *Ostpolitik* of the Grand Coalition that actively sought *détente* with the East was thought to be consistent with an Atlantic alliance, although the West German sponsors of this policy did envisage the possibility of NATO's dissolution in the distant future. In March 1968 Chancellor Kiesinger held that 'the Alliance is not in contradiction to our peace policy, on the contrary; it is this very Alliance which gives us the possibility of pursuing a policy of *détente* without carrying

[17] Address by Chancellor Willy Brandt to the Bundestag, 28 October 1969, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, 4 November 1969, p. 3.

[18] Interview of Chancellor Willy Brandt in *Welt am Sonntag*, 1 February 1970; quoted in *The Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, 3 February 1970, pp. 21–22.

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any unacceptable security risks'. At the same time he did not want the Federal Republic to be tied so tightly and exclusively to NATO that it would negate the long-run aim of reunification. Picking up the Gaullist image of NATO, Kiesinger asserted that 'strong as our links in the Atlantic Alliance, as our relations with the United States may be, we should not seek our own future and, we believe, that of united Western Europe within the firm framework of a North Atlantic imperium. Such a solution would turn the demarcation line dividing Germany and Europe into a permanent frontier wall.'[19] Since NATO had continually and repeatedly, though perhaps unconvincingly, pledged itself to pursue German reunification, such a statement revealed how long-term German aims and those of NATO might diverge. It might also serve as a warning that if NATO is to remain relevant to the Germans, it must in good faith seek to help the Germans overcome their division.

Brandt, then Foreign Minister, reflected a somewhat similar ambivalence about NATO in 1967. 'Our policy of *détente* must not be interpreted as underestimating or neglecting the role of the Alliance.' The value of NATO was not only military but diplomatic. 'Nothing could be further from the truth than to assume that we now believe in an isolated settlement of the German question.' Instead, 'we have warned against bilateralism in East-West relations being allowed to prevail'. As to the future when the basis for a firm *détente* might hopefully be laid, Brandt speculated that 'a European security system could be based on one of two different patterns: either the present alliances continue and are brought into some relationship with each other, or the pacts are gradually abolished and replaced with something new'.[20] This statement was unobjectionable, since NATO was never intended as an end in itself. The problem was one of priorities; namely, that NATO not be replaced *before* some new arrangement could come into being that could dependably provide for European security.

The effects of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia only gave renewed emphasis to the abiding nature of the Kremlin's commitment to hold on to the Warsaw Pact states. It also caused to recede into an even more distant future the prospect of the disappearance of the alliances that divide Europe, and to dampen premature expectations about the restructuring of European security arrangements.

Although Chancellor Brandt was willing to tell his people the bitter truth about reunification, his accession to power also intensified the active search for better relations with the East that had been begun under the *Ostopolitik* of the Grand Coalition. The openly acknowledged limitations upon a successful resolution of the German problem were thus combined with a more active, independent West German policy,

[19] Address by Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger to the Bundestag, 11 March 1968, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, 19 March 1968, pp. 3–4.
[20] Brandt, 'Detente over the Long Haul', op. cit., p. 312.

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and this held potential dangers both for the Federal Republic and its NATO allies. As an outcome of Bonn's initiatives toward the East, Moscow and East Berlin would be pleased to gain recognition for the existence of a separate East German state that was an inseparable part of the Soviet bloc, while Bonn might only find disappointment and frustration in its attempts to foster liberalization within the GDR and ease contacts among Germans so as to prevent the two parts of Germany from drifting even further apart. 'There is a risk of failure in any "policy of movement," either the failure to ease tense relations with the East, or the lesser (but no less frustrating) failure of better relations that merely consecrate the division of Europe at a lower level of hostility.' The result, as this commentator observed, could be a crisis in West Germany's relations with its allies. 'West Germany, treated as and having behaved as a dependent for so many years, might be persuaded to blame failure not on an impossible situation, but on allies that failed to keep their promises.' Should this occur, the Federal Republic could become unhinged from NATO and set adrift toward the East. 'The Soviet Union might try to tempt West Germany into what would be, in effect, a disguised recognition of the East European status quo and a disruption of the West European one; West Germany, disappointed with its allies, might be lured out of the Alliance, in exchange for some vague offer of German confederation.' Thus, 'West Germany's excessive reliance on the United States yesterday and its growing self-reliance today mean, paradoxically enough, possibly excessive dependence on the Soviet Union tomorrow'.[21]

Thus it is quite conceivable that a Soviet stance that at first appeared to have the defensive aim of consolidating a divided Germany into the Soviet bloc would be transformed into a Soviet political offensive which would fundamentally alter the political balance in Western Europe. An Atlantic alliance which had suffered the defection of the Federal Republic would likely be in no position to resist further Soviet pressure aimed at pushing Western Europe toward a pro-Soviet 'neutrality' and driving the United States and Canada out of Western Europe. The key to preventing this chain of events from being set in motion is to reinforce the political mechanism of NATO so as to provide the close and continuous association of the Federal Republic's *Ostopolitik* with the policies of its NATO allies. Only in this manner can one hope to avoid the estrangement of Bonn from the West and the disintegration of the West itself.

Chancellor Brandt was obviously alive to these dangers when he proclaimed: 'The Federal Republic of Germany is not "wandering between two worlds". Without the background and the security afforded by proven friendships and proven alliances there could be no active German contribution towards the policy of *détente* at all.' The nub of the problem is to translate policy declarations into the formulation

[21] Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles* (New York, 1968), pp. 434-38.

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of compatible policies between Bonn and its NATO partners. This problem becomes infinitely more difficult because it must be conceived in a very long time frame. The solution of the German problem, in effect, means the solution of the problems of a divided Europe and the complete reordering of the existing political and security systems that span the continent. Chancellor Brandt clearly recognized this when he said that Bonn's dealings with the East must be based upon 'the striving for national unity and freedom within the framework of a European peace arrangement'. And to the question: 'How can these objectives be achieved today by German policy?', he replied: 'They cannot be attained any longer by the traditional means of the nation state, but only in alliance with others. In future there will be no political settlements of significance any more outside of alliances, security systems or communities. In future German problems of importance can be dealt with not in terms of the nation state and in traditional fashion, but only through gradual endeavours for European peace arrangements.'[22] Until its dissolution into some new European peace arrangement, NATO has before it a long term and indispensable role. Since moves toward German unity automatically involve basic changes in the international system, this inevitably requires the closest collaboration among the NATO partners and the summoning of their collective wisdom.

[22] Address by Chancellor Willy Brandt to the Bundestag, 14 January 1970, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, 20 January 1970, pp. 5–6.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Robert Legvold

AFTER having virtually abandoned their efforts to call an all-European security conference two years earlier, Soviet leaders suddenly and surprisingly returned to the idea in March 1969. Although the reason for its partial eclipse in 1967 may seem as something of a puzzle, once revived, the proposal has undergone an interesting evolution. As a result, a year after Budapest, its place in Soviet calculations appears considerably different from that of March 1969. This is due largely, of course, to developments in the Federal Republic and to the impediments major Western powers have put on the conference.

No one would dispute, I should think, that when Soviet leaders reactivated the campaign for an all-European conference in March 1969 their objectives were basically changed from the previous campaign of 1966. Their preoccupation then was offensive—to accelerate the dissolution of NATO and to accentuate trends loosening the Western alliance; by 1969 it had become essentially defensive—to prevent the further erosion of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and to permit the Warsaw powers to erase the remaining effects of the Czech revolution. This is not to say that at any one time the Soviet leadership has been concerned solely with the condition of the Western alliance or solely with the condition of its own alliance; rather that in the last five years, in the balance between both concerns, one has prevailed over the other. Significantly, the balance had begun to shift toward a more defensive concern a year before Czechoslovakia, perhaps even before Karlovy Vary. The irony of the Grand Coalition's new *Ostpolitik* was its frightening success in Soviet eyes at a moment when it was being judged a disappointment by the Germans.

Thus, when Soviet leaders revived the idea of a security conference in March 1969, their considerations were of the same nature, though in somewhat more compelling form, as those which two years earlier evidently impelled them to back off efforts to convoke the conference. Surely it did not take Soviet leaders two years to discover that the conference could be as congenial a component of a policy seeking recognition for the Eastern status quo as of a policy seeking to transform the Western status quo. Since 1954, if they were accustomed to view the conference in any particular light, it was as a defensive tactic. Nor was it that Soviet leaders were now less distracted than they had been in 1967–1968 with the June war, the internal debate over strategic arms talks, the opening of Vietnam negotiations, and developments in Czechoslovakia. To begin with, Soviet interest in the conference had

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cooled before the first of these events occurred; and, in any case, the battle on the Ussuri,[1] the impending international conference of communist parties, and the prospect of a rapprochement with the United States must have been equally diverting. Nor can I see that the danger of Rumania exploiting negotiations with West Europe to strengthen its own independence was much diminished. (Marshall Shulman suspects that this may have been a factor accounting for the Soviet Union's dwindling interest in the conference.) Instead by 1969 Rumania's stake in the conference had grown as it sought to offset the 'Brezhnev doctrine' by mobilizing the support of both communist and non-communist countries behind its independent policy.

Only the Czech crisis constitutes an adequate explanation for the shift in Soviet attitude. At one level, the more superficial level, the Soviet leadership needed to damp down the bitter, though passive, West European reaction to the military occupation—not the least to reduce the anger of West European communist parties.[2] But more important, Soviet leaders had conceived the intervention in Czechoslovakia to be their only recourse in averting a grave threat to Soviet power. The shock of Czechoslovakia made them appreciate how much and how soon they needed to secure Western recognition for the East European status quo. This helps to explain, not only their reason

[1] In *Europa-Archiv*, Folge 19/1969, Marshall Shulman argued that the Soviet Union urged the security conference as a means of advancing *détente* in Europe in part because it wanted to quiet 'the European political front at a time when Soviet relations with China had become a source of anxiety'. That the conference was designed to promote *détente* there can be no doubt. And certainly Shulman is right when he says that *détente* was intended to pressure the Federal Republic to recognize the GDR and, second, to ease 'external pressures while the Soviet Union "normalized" the situation in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe'. Using the conference to stabilize the Soviet Union's back while it dealt with the Chinese seems more questionable. In doing nothing during the Czech crisis, the West had already demonstrated dramatically that it had no plans to make mischief in Europe. Second, if the Soviet leadership wanted to secure the Western front it could seize the hand extended by the new American administration. Third, except as it helped to consolidate the Soviet presence in East Europe, a general, particularly an atmospheric *détente* with the West undermined Soviet efforts to rally East Europe behind its struggle with the Chinese—the other task Soviet leaders strenuously sought to fulfil at Budapest. The crusade featured after the April 1968 Central Committee plenum against an intensifying imperialist effort to infect the socialist countries with bourgeois propaganda served this purpose better. Generally I do not agree with those who argue that the Sino-Soviet conflict promotes arms control with the United States or helps to account for Soviet policy in West Europe. More often it seems to me, the exigencies of the quarrel with China compete with, rather than complement, the demands of Soviet policy elsewhere.

[2] On 25 November 1968, *Pravda* carried a statement attacking not merely the 'left-wing splitters', but the 'right-wing opportunists'. It indicated that 'right-wing forces' within the communist movement were now included among the enemies against whom the forthcoming international meeting of communist parties would be directed. In this same period the East Germans began to hint of the possibility of reconstituting the Cominform. At the time it was tempting to conclude that some in the Soviet leadership preferred to carry the Soviet Union's retrenchment to its conclusion, to excommunicate all the recalcitrants—right and left—and to withdraw into a narrower, more cohesive alliance system as a necessary means for solidifying what remained of the Soviet empire. If there was such a viewpoint, it had been rejected by the time of the Political Consultative Committee meeting at Budapest.

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for reproposing the conference, but the urgency of the appeal. Third—despite the indisputable prophylactic effect of the Czechoslovak decision throughout Eastern Europe—and short of the threshold that produces armed intervention, the status quo in this area would soon resume its evolution. Soviet leaders no doubt were all the more anxious to regulate its course and pace. The ideal and the priority of policy was to secure Western recognition of the status quo; the more practical and dynamic aspect of policy required that the West be induced to strengthen the Soviet hand in dealing with its evolution. The first would acknowledge Soviet preponderance in East Europe, including the legitimacy of loyal East European regimes; the second would facilitate the elaboration of institutional ties, including greater interdependence within Comecon and an integrated military organization among the Warsaw Pact countries.

IN choosing to resuscitate the security conference, the Soviet leadership's attention remained, as always, fixed on the Federal Republic. Presumably it hoped that a number of West European countries, especially the Northern tier and the neutrals, would accept the conference as a useful step toward normalizing the situation in Europe; second, that the West European countries most committed to 'bridge building' would find it difficult to resist East Europe's eagerness to underwrite the status quo; and third that, after Czechoslovakia, many in the West, including the United States, could no longer refuse to come to terms with reality. Added together, these responses would serve to isolate West Germany. In this sense the security conference becomes the Soviet Union's counter strategy to those aspects of the *Ostpolitik* designed to pressure the Soviet Union by isolating the GDR. The Soviet leadership still considered the Federal Republic the principal obstacle to a satisfactory European settlement and hence the pressure-point of its policy. Secondarily, they continued to look upon the United States as the major source of support for German inflexibility.

The Budapest appeal specified what Soviet leaders wanted, especially of the Germans: acceptance of the postwar boundaries, full-recognition of the GDR, and the FRG's renunciation of the claim to represent all the German people, of access to nuclear weapons, and of a special relationship to West Berlin. These were the conditions for European security. They were not, however, the conditions for holding the conference. To have set them as such would have made it impossible for the most susceptible West European governments to fall in behind the Budapest initiative, and the scheme would have automatically failed in its objective of isolating the Federal Republic. The same applied to the question of United States participation. Soviet leaders doubtlessly wished to exclude the United States from the conference because of the crucial reinforcement it would give German policy. But they could scarcely insist on exclusion because this too would reduce

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the attractiveness of the conference.[3] So they merely made known their preferences and left it to events to decide.

Significantly, Soviet leaders did not renew the 1966 offer to dismantle the Warsaw Pact organization on the condition that NATO also disband. Their reluctance had little to do with an increased sense of military vulnerability (the Warsaw Pact Organization has never been indispensable to Soviet military power in and with East Europe); rather it stemmed from the different political uses assigned the Warsaw treaty structure. In 1966, as a means of expediting the decay of the NATO alliance, Soviet leaders willingly proposed its sacrifice. In 1969, as a means of consolidating Soviet influence in East Europe, they refused to barter with an institution which they had decided to transform into an easily manipulated integrating device.

IN the next few months, several developments affected the status of the conference proposal. First, despite a generally unfavourable reception at the April ministerial session of NATO, the idea eventually caught on among a variety of West European states, including Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Norway, Switzerland, Italy, and Finland. It was the Finns' offer in May to contribute to the preparation of the conference and to have it held in Helsinki that focused this interest. The visit of Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel to Moscow in June added further momentum to the process. By early summer the accumulating support for some version of the conference forced the principal members of NATO to treat the Soviet appeal more seriously. (There is every indication that the Americans and French initially discounted the Budapest appeal as a half-hearted ploy in atmospherics.) As a result, Soviet spokesmen intensified their efforts on behalf of the conference and, in the process, further clarified the ground rules, acknowledged the possibility of American participation and underscored a limited agenda.

Second, the French referendum, de Gaulle's defeat, and the June elections rekindled Soviet concern over developments in Western Europe and compelled a partial shift in the purposes Soviet leaders assigned to the conference. De Gaulle's disappearance and the problems confronting his successor opened the way for a broadening and a deepening of the integration process in West Europe. Weak though it was, the all-European conference offered the Soviet Union its only counter to this trend. After June, and particularly after the December Hague summit, Soviet leaders betrayed mounting anxiety over the likelihood of British entry into the Common Market and over the sudden strengthening of the community's integrated structures, particularly the Strasbourg Assembly. By early 1970, *Pravda's* senior commentator, Yuri Zhukov, had begun to warn that developments in

[3] French officials told me in January 1970 that Soviet represenatives had urged them to join in working against American participation in 1966–67, but they had not resumed these efforts after March 1969.

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West Europe were working against a European security conference.[4] Once again Soviet spokesmen warmed up the argument that West European integration imperilled a European settlement, a settlement whose best hope at the moment resided in the security conference. This, however, was a somewhat unexpected and involuntary use to which Soviet leaders were forced to put the idea of the conference.

By far the most portentous development in 1969 and the one which most fundamentally influenced the position of the European security conference in Soviet strategy emerged from the Federal Republic's September elections. Brandt's advent to power crucially altered the Soviet view of the German question and with it the importance of the security conference. No longer was the conference's basic purpose to isolate and pressure Bonn; no longer was the conference the Soviet Union's primary, let alone exclusive, means for seeking a consolidation of the status quo. The new government's willingness to make substantial concessions on the key issues of frontiers, inter-German relations, its claim to represent all the Germans, and nuclear arms aroused expectations that at last the Soviet Union could achieve an important part of its objectives in bilateral negotiations. If it were successful, the benefits would be direct and specific. The prospect of arriving at a settlement with Bonn, without intermediaries and without indirect strategies, must have long appealed to the Soviet leadership in those moments when it shook free of the Ulbricht mentality. Thus the conference became a complement to a second, in some ways more hopeful, avenue for securing the status quo.

Nevertheless, at this point, the security conference retained considerable significance for the Soviet leadership: first because it afforded advantages missing in a bilateral arrangement with the Federal Republic. It would lend broad legitimacy to the status quo where, by its nature, a German-Soviet deal would yield only a single country's, albeit a critically important country's, adherence. Moreover, if Soviet leaders were naïve enough to believe that the NATO countries might accept the limited agenda they were about to urge, they presumably also expected that the conference would demonstrate for restless East Europeans the little support they had in the West. Second, whatever happened in the talks with Bonn, the Soviet Union still needed the European security conference to impede plans for enhancing the Common Market's cohesion. Third, the conference represented, not merely an adjunct to the bilateral negotiations with the Federal Republic, but an integral part of the negotiations. That is, on the one hand, Soviet leaders wanted to prevent the West Germans from using the conference against them by making progress in the bilateral talks a prerequisite for its convocation; and, on the other hand, they fully intended to use the conference to wrest concessions from the Germans in these talks.

[4] *Pravda*, 3 March 1970.

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Brandt's triumph at the polls, therefore, made it imperative that the Soviet Union press ahead with the conference, even though its purposes were now partially changed. It also made it possible for the Soviet Union to modify further (or clarify) the character of the conference. On 31 October, three days after Brandt formally affirmed his government's new foreign policy before the German Bundestag, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries issued a remarkably modest draft agenda for the security conference. Only two questions were included—the mutual renunciation of the use of force or threat of its use and the expansion of trade, economic, scientific, and technical relations among European states—progress on which would pave the way for a later discussion of more substantive problems. Admittedly, therefore, the conference had been reduced to an instrument for affecting the political atmosphere. If held on the basis of the new Warsaw Pact proposal, it would leave for another day the negotiation of Europe's central problems.

The reduction had not occurred overnight. Many rumoured that a draft version of the October Prague communiqué had been sent around East European capitals even before Brandt formed his government. Hints of the Soviet Union's willingness, perhaps desire, to water down the agenda of a European security conference can be found in the Soviet press even sooner, weeks before the German elections were held. But by then the Soviet press had also begun to shift ground in its analysis of German politics.[5] It seems unlikely that the nearly simultaneous appearance of an adjustment in the treatment of the security conference and speculation about the consequences of an SPD victory were mere coincidence. In July and August, representatives of the SPD and the FDP had already held conversations with Soviet officials in Moscow.

THE German opening complicated the terrain on which the Soviet Union manoeuvered to arrange the security conference but it did not directly threaten the project—barring a successful effort to subordinate the conference to the talks. The challenge to Soviet ambitions came from the opposition of key NATO members, particularly the United States, to the conference as such. These governments were unwilling to join in an enterprise whose likely effect—indeed purpose—would be to confirm the division of Europe and Soviet domination over its Eastern half. Without rejecting the Soviet proposal outright, therefore, they introduced a series of conditions, presented variously as tests of the other side's good faith and as means for insuring that the conference be productive. For more than a year NATO members had been urging the mutual reduction of force levels in Europe. This

[5] See the dispatches filed by *Izvestia's* staff correspondent S. Tosunyan beginning early in September. Compare these with V. Matveyev's article on the European security conference in *Izvestia*, 18 September 1969.

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they hinted would serve as an appropriate agenda item and, if Soviet leaders appeared amenable, they would then find it easier to accept the conference. Similarly, most of the reluctant governments insisted that any conference could only come after careful preparation. The demand for careful preparation soon blended into a requirement that the Soviet Union supply some evidence of its genuine desire to reach a compromise settlement. As the NATO ministers put it in their declaration following the December Brussels meeting: 'The members of the alliance remain receptive to signs of willingness on the part of the Soviet Union and other East European countries to discuss measures to reduce tension and promote co-operation in Europe and to take constructive actions to this end'.[6] From there it was a natural step to suggest that the bilateral and multilateral discussions already under way and particularly those scheduled with the Germans yield some success before the conference meet. Soviet leaders, however, need not have been exceptionally perceptive to realize that these official preconditions represented only a portion of the demands NATO powers intended to make of the conference. The French, especially, resisted a conference that would only serve to reinforce the two hegomonies in Europe and in this they had the sympathy of the British, American, and German governments. These countries expected a security conference to condemn the use of force or the threat of its use within, as well as between, the blocs. To the Warsaw powers' suggestion that the conference promote economic, scientific, and technical co-operation, they would add cultural co-operation, and that smacked of heightened bridge building—the imperialists' euphemism for the bourgeois ideological offensive in Eastern Europe.[7]

Hence, although Soviet leaders had good reason for persevering in their efforts to convoke the conference, the price established by the other camp made it unlikely that it could be held. The immediate consequence of NATO's effective indifference to the blandishments of the October Prague memorandum was to reduce the prospect of an early conference (the Soviets were recommending the first half of 1970) and to enhance the significance of the negotiations with Bonn. By December 1969, therefore, Soviet leaders must have been taking stock of the situation. The conference had not lost its advantages—provided it could be held on Soviet terms; anything less had very serious disadvantages. Since the conference's basic importance

[6] *New York Times*, 6 December 1969.

[7] In a recent comment on the NATO Brussels declaration a Soviet writer contended that those opposed to the conference 'could not avoid admitting the importance' of building economic, scientific, and technical co-operation. 'The declaration it adopted notes that "economic and technical exchanges . . . can bring mutual benefit and understanding"'. (V. Shakhov, 'How to Solve Europe's Vital Problems', *International Affairs*, no. 1 (1970), p. 13.) Shakhov's use of ellipsis is interesting. The declaration actually said: 'Allied Governments consider that not only economic and technical but also cultural exchanges between interested countries can bring mutual benefit and understanding.' (*New York Times*, 6 December 1969.)

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depended on the reinforcement it lent Soviet interests in Eastern Europe, even the most modest counter proposal—if it involved the least loosening of Soviet control—was unacceptable. The conflict was irreconcilable: in the West those who favoured the conference did so expecting to improve the status quo, if only slightly; those who opposed the conference did so assuming that even a slight change in the status quo was unlikely. The Soviet Union, however, had subordinated everything, including its concern of adjusting the Western status quo, to preserving the status quo in the East. In 1966 the Soviet Union held out for an agenda satisfying its maximum objectives; after Czechoslovakia, the compromise, latent from the start and evoked by the German elections, committed the Soviet Union to refrain from raising serious issues if the other side would do the same. So long as important Western countries refused the compromise, the conference had no chance of convening.

From the dilemma of the conference flowed a double consequence. First, talks with the Federal Republic assumed a greater importance (though the Soviet position was more difficult in them). Second, Soviet leaders appeared to shift their attention from the benefits of a conference to the benefits of the campaign to call a conference.

IT is fairly easy to establish the specific objectives Soviet leaders seek in order to strengthen their position in East Europe. Soviet spokesmen have repeated them often enough. First is recognition of the GDR—recognition that will confirm the division of Germany and, in more than symbolic terms, the division of Europe. Second is recognition of frontiers, the most explicit confirmation of the postwar changes in East Europe. This is true, of course, only because the Soviet Union and regimes amenable to it have demanded this recognition and Western nations have withheld it, in part, as a sign of their opposition to these regimes and to Soviet domination of them. Therefore, it is not only the reluctance to concede a bargaining counter that causes Western governments to draw back from an acceptance of boundaries. Third is simply persuading Western powers to embark upon unconditional negotiations with the Soviet Union, say, on a non-aggression treaty.[8] By divorcing negotiations from the need to revise the East European status quo, Soviet leaders may argue, their Western counterparts are conceding the normality of the East European political order.

After the NATO powers met at Brussels in December, Soviet leaders must have viewed their talks with the FRG (announced the same week) as the best means of pursuing these objectives. True, they would have preferred that a security conference accomplish the same, for this

[8] The Soviet Union had not earnestly negotiated the Federal Republic's 1966 proposal for a non-aggression treaty because Bonn still attached too many conditions and refused too many Soviet conditions. That is, the Germans had not proposed unconditional negotiations.

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would grant a far broader legitimacy to the status quo, but the price was too dear. Better less for a price which Soviet leaders could still hope would be tolerable. Compared with either a renunciation of the 'Brezhnev doctrine' or the sanctioning of bridge building, giving up the right to intervene in Germany under the UN Charter, allowing Bonn to normalize relations with East European states, and settling for something less than *de jure* recognition of the GDR must have seemed an acceptable price if, in exchange, Bonn would come to terms with the GDR—moving that much closer to full recognition—and agree to the Soviet Union's postwar revision of the European map. Soviet leaders would want to be careful that the opening towards Germany remain within narrow limits: that it stop before Polish dependence on and East German faith in the Soviet Union were jeopardized, before anyone began seriously discussing a modification of West Berlin's status, or before the Soviet Union had lost all leverage on the evolution of the NATO alliance. Certainly in December Soviet leaders had little idea of how far the negotiations with the Federal Republic might proceed. It was only clear that they would be approached with caution by both sides and, once underway, that they would advance slowly and arduously. Yet, the Federal Republic was a key member of the Western alliance; its attitudes deeply conditioned others', including the United States, European policies; and concessions secured from it would make it more difficult for these other countries to resist similar concessions.

At the same time that the Soviet Union embarked upon negotiations with the Federal Republic, it continued to press for the all-European security conference. Even after the NATO ministers made it apparent that they found little appeal in the Prague communiqué, Soviet spokesmen devoted a great deal of attention to the conference, still maintaining that it could be held in the first half of 1970. In addition, plans moved ahead to call a conference of European peoples. In January representatives of twenty-eight European communist parties, including the Yugoslav, met in Moscow and discussed the importance of bringing together leaders from various mass organizations in both East and West Europe who would help to generate popular support for a security conference. All of this activity, however, seemed strangely unrelated to the conference's real prospects. Indeed, by early 1970 the campaign for the conference only made sense if Soviet leaders were pursuing the advantages of the campaign itself rather than those of an unlikely conference.

There was no possibility the conference could meet in 1970; but, more to the point, there was no reason the Soviet Union should want it to meet so long as certain countries challenged its right to rule its own security system by force. In 1970 no Soviet leader could really have expected the United States and other NATO members to sweep the Czech intervention under the rug and formally make themselves party to the semantic manipulation of such notions as non-interference

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in the internal affairs of others and respect for the political and territorial integrity of all nations. Nor could the Soviet leadership have relished the prospect of Rumania and Yugoslavia using a broad forum to strengthen their independence. If these two governments had been difficult to discipline in the closed meetings of European communist parties, how much more difficult they would be to control when the meeting was not Soviet-dominated.[9]

The same consideration, however, did not apply to the *campaign* for the conference. It would not be the first time the Soviet Union had taken a general initiative in the name of world peace and security and then labelled those who resisted as opponents of international stability. Soviet leaders knew that a number of countries inside and outside NATO were more receptive to the conference than the United States. As long as they could make it appear that the United States stood in the way of the conference, the chance existed of adding to the irritation of states already impatient with Washington's conservative attitude toward peaceful engagement in Europe. It illustrated as well as anything a dominant characteristic of the whole conference scheme: the Soviet Union sought to benefit from the tension an American position (earlier a German position) might introduce into inter-allied relations and relations with the neutrals, though Soviet interests were better served by that position. And so the Soviet Union played up to the Finns, the Danes, the Austrians, and the Italians while guarded against the danger of their ambitions by American policy.

IN the autumn of 1969 the Soviet press began to compare the opposition of Western powers to the security conference with their part in the failure of collective security during the 1930s. In both cases, went the Soviet argument, the Western countries obstructed efforts to solve the problems of European security with tragic consequences in the first instance and the risk of equal unhappiness in the second. When the argument was first revived Soviet writers still portrayed West German revanchism as the overriding threat to European security and the reason for swiftly convening the security conference. This, of course, made the parallel with the situation in the 1930s more natural. But once negotiations with the FRG started and they persisted with the charge while falling silent about the threat, one had the right to suspect that their motives had changed. Following the events of December 1969, the Soviet press accused the United States and Britain of being

[9] In the February 1970 *Interplay* Michel Tatu argued that on the contrary, 'under the vigilant eye of the Soviet representatives, the other delegates of the bloc will hardly be able to depart from common positions adopted in advance'. But one need not believe that Rumanian representatives would go out of their way to challenge the Soviet delegates to envisage their support for a compromise agenda and the most unequivocal affirmation of every nation's sovereignty. Nor is it far-fetched to see them simply absenting themselves from preparatory meetings of the Warsaw Pact countries. It is, in any case, difficult to argue that any conference with more than the Prague agenda would enhance the discipline of the bloc.

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the main culprits blocking attempts to reinforce Europe's security. But what was the significance of comparing the British dissimulation on the 1934 Eastern Pact with its alleged dissimulation on the security conference if there was no immediate German threat? If there was no German threat, or if the German threat had been reduced to the ambitions of a few revenge-seeking circles (not the ruling circles), what then threatened European security? And if there was no threat to European security, why was the conference so urgent? Perhaps the conference was not so urgent, only the campaign which made it so.[10]

By the first anniversary of the Budapest appeal, the circumstances that originally prompted a return to the idea of an all-European conference had changed and consequently, so it seems, had the place of the idea in Soviet calculations. Moreover all signs indicated that these circumstances were to grow even more complicated. In the course of the year, an initiative undertaken to secure Soviet influence in Eastern Europe by insuring, above all else, against the pernicious Eastern policy of the Federal Republic had been subordinated to attempts to protect that influence by capitalizing on Bonn's altered Eastern policy. And an initiative undertaken with little regard for developments in Western Europe was more and more being transformed into the Soviet Union's principal response to the resurgence of interest in a broader Common Market. The decisions of the December summit meeting of the EEC members, opening the way for the negotiation of British entry, had aroused the concern of Soviet commentators, and their concern mounted visibly after the EEC Council of Ministers' meeting in early February agreed to transfer modest budgetary powers to the European parliament. If proponents of West European integration considered the agreement small reason to celebrate, in marked contrast, Soviet writers judged it a critical precedent paving the way for supranationalism. Talk of a movement towards economic and monetary union in Western Europe accentuated fears of an increasingly cohesive and separate 'little Europe'. Begging the question of how vibrant Soviet leaders really believe the integration process is in Western Europe, the depth of their sensitivity over any reinforcement of the Common Market appears genuine. Presumably, therefore, the spectre of either its expansion through the adherence of Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries or its deepening through closer Franco-German collaboration causes them considerable worry. Developments at both levels explain why the context of the European security conference is now further complicated.

A year ago Soviet hopes for the conference may have partially depended on the anticipation that within the northern NATO countries,

[10] Soviet plans for a European Peoples Conference reinforced this impression. The Yugoslavs, for one, feared that the Soviet Union planned to control the conference very closely. If so the project began to look more like a substitute for the security conference than part of its preparations.

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Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, the desire for a more independent foreign policy would continue to grow. Instead, by the spring of 1970, powerful forces in two of these countries, as well as in Sweden, were pushing them towards membership in the EEC. Far from strengthening the sentiment for independence, Soviet commentators were convinced that this development would significantly increase NATO's hold over them. Thus, it is no accident that the Soviet press has treated with alarm the prospect of the Scandinavian countries entering the Common Market.[11] Nor, by the same token, is it an accident that, while the Soviet press now speaks less about the enthusiasm of these governments for the conference proposal, it is again pointing to their difficulty in resisting American plans for NATO.[12] Yet, this makes the conference appear all the more important. For, if the fragmentation of Europe into narrow economic groupings is to be avoided, then all European governments must begin working for greater international economic co-operation, and at what better place than an all-European security conference.

Similarly, the shift in French attitude on the issue of British entry causes Soviet leaders concern. Although Pompidou has hardly reversed de Gaulle's previous opposition to supranational schemes of co-operation, he has apparently taken down the barrier to an expansion of the Community's membership. This, together with France's deference to Brandt in his pursuit of the new *Ostpolitik*, has vastly improved Franco-German relations over what they were late in 1968 following the invasion of Czechoslovakia and during the crisis of the franc. Thus, again it is no accident that articles devoted to the security conference have begun to recall the disastrous consequences of the ' notorious policy of " reconciliation " of French and German imperialism '.[13] Here too the Soviet response is the security conference. Yet, Soviet leaders know that its short-term prospects are jeopardized because the Federal Republic prefers that progress first be achieved in the bilateral talks and France follows the German lead. If France's relations with Germany make it less likely that the conference can convene in the near future, then its continuing opposition to the negotiation of mutual troop reductions at such a conference helps to ensure that it will not be held on American terms. Meanwhile, Soviet policy remains committed to securing the advantages of the campaign to call a conference and to denying the same to the United States.

[11] See P. Krymov, *Pravda*, 3 June 1970.

[12] See Y. Goloshubov, ' The Northern Countries and European Security ', *New Times*, no. 18–19 (9 May 1970), pp. 37–38.

[13] Charles Haroche, ' Europe: Split to Cooperation ', *International Affairs*, no. 4 (1970), p. 64. Haroche, an editor of *France Nouvelle*, goes on to specify these consequences: ' Under the demagogic slogans of " new Europe " and " new order ", Hitler plunged the world into a devastating war.'

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Before 22 June, 1941

STALIN THE APPEASER

Maury Lisann

ONE of the puzzling and still controversial questions of Soviet politics is the apparent blindness of Stalin to the clearly imminent German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The usual Soviet defence of the 1939 non-aggression treaty with Germany has been that it won time for the Soviet Union, permitting it to meet the inevitable German attack with far stronger armed forces than were available in 1939. However, if it is argued that Stalin refused to believe the many warnings of the impending German attack, or thought that he could avoid it by his last-minute policy of appeasement, the rationale of the 1939 pact appears in a different light, which accounts for some of the difficulties Soviet historians have in dealing with this period.

To assert that the treaty was entered into solely for the purpose of winning time, makes it virtually impossible to explain the catastrophes of the German invasion without convicting the Soviet rulers of the grossest ineptitude in wasting the two years gained. Since the entire Soviet system cannot be indicted, it was necessary to put all the blame on Stalin's mistakes, which has become awkward with the waning of de-Stalinization. On the other hand, the disaster could be explained by the suddenness and 'treachery' of the German attack. But this leaves the unpleasant implication that the semi-alliance was intended by Stalin to be permanent or very long-term and that he thought the two partners to be quite compatible. Additional difficulties for the Soviet historian arise from the chronic tension between the Party and military in the Soviet Union. Heavy emphasis on the first explanation means that the military must share a major portion of the blame, while the second makes the errors mostly political and therefore the responsibility of the Party. A. M. Nekrich's violently denounced *June 22, 1941* fell victim to this conflict. Nekrich seems to have taken his conclusions, as well as most of his facts, from Soviet military sources, and therefore portrayed Stalin, and by inference the Party, as simple-minded and incapable of understanding the situation.

It is easy enough to show that Stalin miscalculated the situation, but despite the wealth of material now available, the underlying premises which motivated Soviet policy in 1939–1941 are still a source of dispute. The U.S. Ambassador, Lawrence Steinhardt, whose analyses and recommendations make an impressive record, summed up his conclusions thus: 'My observation of the psychology of the individuals who are conducting Soviet policy has long since convinced

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me . . . that they will always sacrifice the future in favour of an immediate gain.'[1]

The popular impression that Stalin ignored the warnings he received and was more or less paralyzed into inaction is not correct. He seemed to have accepted the evidence as valid and his policies were certainly based on rational calculation, even though they proved disastrous. Ironically, the misjudgments turned out to be more closely related to what was happening inside the Soviet Union than to international events.

There was no insufficiency of intelligence reaching Moscow. L. I. Pankratov, Deputy Chairman of the KGB, is one of the many Soviet officials anxious to show this.

> In the prewar years, our Chekists actively fought against the agents of the German-fascist intelligence service. They obtained timely information not only on the attack which was being prepared by Hitlerite Germany on the USSR, but even on the dates when the war was to begin. Thus, in April 1941, we learned of a conversation between Hitler and the Yugoslav Prince Paul, in which the Fuehrer disclosed his intention to begin military operations against the USSR in late June. On 6 June, data were made available on the concentration of some four million fascist troops at the Soviet-German border. The gifted intelligence agent, Richard Sorge, and other daring Chekists reported the date of the Hitlerite invasion of the USSR, the operational-strategic plans of the German Command, and the structure and strength of the fascist armies.[2]

Pankratov was claiming too much for his Chekists in the case of Prince Paul, whose conversation of 18 March with Hitler was related directly to Molotov by the Yugoslav ambassador on 5 April 1941, after Prince Paul was overthrown. Molotov replied 'we are ready'.[3] Furthermore, Hitler could not have told Prince Paul the actual date of the attack because that was not determined until after the Yugoslav coup of 27 March brought on the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April, which set back the date of the invasion of the USSR by almost six weeks. Molotov did not need to place much value on such talks by Hitler because that could just have been bait to bring Paul into the Axis Pact, but Pankratov's list of items was only a tiny part of the information that was available, even if the KGB could not claim the credit for the information on the Hitler-Prince Paul conversation.

FROM 1939 to 1941 Germany and the USSR were what might be called 'semi-allies'. The non-aggression and mutual consultation pact of August 1939 was public. Its secret protocols laid down in

[1] Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 17 June 1941, *FRUS*, pp. 764–66.
[2] *Trud*, 19 December 1967.
[3] Gavrilovic told all this to the U.S. Embassy in Turkey after his expulsion from the Soviet Union in May. Memorandum of Kelley (Ankara), *FRUS*, pp. 312–15.

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advance the division of Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union. The economic agreements established what turned out to be a virtual Soviet foreign aid programme in raw materials and food for Germany. In addition to supporting Germany in its propaganda and neutralizing the communist parties abroad, Moscow granted base facilities in the Arctic to the Germans (discontinued in the summer of 1940 after the occupation of Norway made them superfluous).[4] Besides giving Germany one-sided credit terms for a huge quantity of raw materials, and transit rights to evade the British blockade, the Soviet Union undertook to act as a secret buyer in world markets for Germany in order to nullify economic boycotts.[5]

Until the fall of France the arrangement worked well. The numerous problems involved in straightening out the affairs of the newly acquired territories were settled in a business-like manner. Even the major difficulties resulting from the Soviet desire to exchange Lublin province for Lithuania were eventually settled with a Soviet payment of $7,500,000.[6] The collapse of France was unexpected by Moscow and it hurried to carry out the agreed annexations before Hitler could have second thoughts. But Stalin overreached himself when he tried to grab Bukovina, which was not covered by the secret protocols of 1939 and which had never been part of the old Russian Empire. Hitler flew into a rage.[7] German pressure forced Stalin to settle for only half of Bukovina, but, more important, Hitler decided that he had better take care of the Soviet Union with minimum delay. By the end of July 1940, Hitler had directed that planning for a 1941 attack should begin.[8]

After the Vienna Award of 30 August 1940, carving up Rumania, and the subsequent German guarantee of the Rumanian rump against the Soviet Union there were really serious disputes between Moscow and Berlin. Molotov came to Berlin on 12 and 13 November 1940 to see if there was a basis for a general settlement and to divide up the spoils on a broader scale than had been foreseen in 1939. Ribbentrop expatiated on the benefits of dividing up the British Empire, but Molotov kept returning to the more mundane matters of Finland and the Balkans. Ribbentrop acknowledged that Germany had assigned Finland to the Soviet sphere, but claimed that German troops must remain there because otherwise Britain and the United States would use Sweden and Finland for airbases from which to bomb Germany. Molotov in turn refused to promise that the Soviet Union would not attack Finland again.[9] Nevertheless Ribbentrop produced a draft of

[4] Foreign Office to Schulenberg, 5 September 1940, *NSR*, p. 185.
[5] Schnurre Memorandum, 26 February 1940, *NSR*, pp. 131–34.
[6] Secret Protocol, 10 January 1941, *NSR*, pp. 267–68.
[7] Ribbentrop memorandum to Hitler, 24 June 1940, *NSR*, pp. 157–58.
[8] Col. Gen. Franz Halder's Diary, 31 July 1940, quoted in History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, *Grand Strategy*, vol. III (London, 1964), p. 52.
[9] *NSR*, pp. 217–54.

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Soviet adherence to the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan, with secret protocols promising India to the Soviet Union.[10] Molotov departed without giving a definitive answer, because, as the Germans recorded it, he had to ascertain 'the opinion of Stalin and of his other friends in Moscow'.

On 25 November 1940 the Soviet Union agreed to join the Axis Pact. The acceptance had four conditions attached, of which, abandonment of German interest in Finland, Bulgaria, and the Straits, were certain to be unacceptable.[11] Hitler took them as such, and on 18 December he signed the directive to attack the Soviet Union.[12] It appears, however, that the Soviet proposal was not meant as a refusal, but was intended to be the beginning of the usual prolonged bargaining process. On a number of occasions, at least up to the German occupation of Bulgaria on 1 March 1941, Moscow prodded Berlin for an answer to its proposals. The Germans kept putting off a substantive reply, using as a pretext the need for consultations with Japan and Italy.[13] Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka's puzzled questioning of Ribbentrop is a fair indication that no such consultations were ever initiated,[14] a fact that must have been known to Moscow, considering Sorge's strategic placement in Tokyo. There were no serious German demands of any sort made on the Soviet Union between the Molotov visit to Berlin and the invasion the following spring.

The massive German build-up in the east could not be concealed, and by May was a staple of world press commentary. By January, the details of the attack plan had been passed on to the Soviet Union by the United States.[15] Additional specific warnings came from the U.S. in March and from Churchill in April.[16] These were confirmed by the Soviet Unions's own intelligence as noted by Pankratov above and by Khrushchev, among others.[17] The only important detail that was lacking was the exact date of the attack, owing to the postponement from 15 May to 22 June necessitated by the improvised Yugoslavia-Greece campaign in April.

It seems probable that the German ambassador, von Schulenberg, also told the Russians about the forthcoming attack. This, at any rate, is what one group of Soviet historians believes.[18] Schulenberg was known to be opposed to the war and was later to be executed for

[10] *NSR*, pp. 255–58.
[11] *NSR*, pp. 258–59.
[12] *NSR*, pp. 260–64.
[13] Ribbentrop to Weizäcker, 21 January 1941, *NSR*, pp. 271–72.
[14] Schmidt Memorandum, 31 March 1941, *NSR*, p. 284.
[15] Memorandum of Sumner Welles, 26 June 1941, *FRUS*, pp. 769–72.
[16] Secretary of State to Steinhardt, 1 March 1941, and 4 March 1941, Memorandum of Welles, 20 March 1941, *FRUS*, pp. 712, 714, 723; Winston Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston, 1950), pp. 358–61.
[17] N. S. Khrushchev, Secret Speech to 20th Party Congress, 25 February 1956, in *Current Soviet Policies II*, New York, 1957, p. 180.
[18] Discussion at Department of History of Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Moscow, 16 February 1966, *Survey*, no. 63, April 1967, p. 175.

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his alleged participation in the 20 July plot in 1944 against Hitler. He was to have been foreign minister in the post-Hitler government for the express reason that he was considered best placed to negotiate peace with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet archives are closed, but what traces of his conduct Schulenberg left behind are consistent with this supposition. As early as the beginning of April 1941 he began passing out warnings through intermediary diplomats in Moscow, using first the Swedish ambassador and later, in early June, the Rumanian minister, who was practically an auxiliary of the U.S. and British embassies.[19] After Schulenberg saw Hitler on 28 April 1941 he returned to Moscow, and told his assistant, Hilger, that war was definitely decided and that Hitler had lied to him.[20] He then began spreading rumours about his depressed frame of mind, that he was packing, etc., and he covered himself by sending a dispatch complaining that travellers from Germany were reporting the attack plans.[21] Nevertheless word of Schulenberg's activities got back to Berlin, resulting in a severe upbraiding from his superiors.[22] Schulenberg blandly denied all,[23] but obviously it hardly made any difference if he had told everything directly to Molotov, and Schulenberg at that point had little to lose by doing so.

BY January 1941 Moscow had noted the change in its relations with Germany, and its first reaction was a stiffening of attitude, as exemplified by its slowing down of deliveries to Germany in January and February, whereas before it had not retaliated for the virtual cessation of the promised German deliveries of machinery and arms.[24] The Armed Forces Day order of 23 February designated Germany as the next probable enemy and on 3 March orders were issued to shoot at German planes, now overflying Soviet territory about three times a day. However these orders were cancelled by Stalin on 1 April.[25]

Stalin was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, he had to evaluate the credibility of the information concerning Hitler's plans, while, on the other, there was no appropriate response.

The weightiest consideration in Stalin's mind against a German attack was the fact that Britain was not yet defeated. Stalin himself would not have deliberately accepted a two-front war and he probably found it difficult to believe that Hitler would. His close associate, A. A. Zhdanov, conveyed this point of view to the Soviet armed

[19] Steinhardt to Secretary of State, 12 April 1941, *FRUS*, p. 138; 2 May 1941, *FRUS*, p. 25; 12 June 1941, *FRUS*, p. 755.
[20] *DGFP*, p. 669.
[21] Schulenberg to Foreign Office, 2 May 1941, *NSR*, p. 334.
[22] Woermann to Schulenberg, 10 May 1941, *DGFP*, p. 751.
[23] Schulenberg to Woermann, 12 May 1941, *DGFP*, pp. 789–90.
[24] Schnurre Memorandum, 5 April 1941, *NSR*, pp. 318–19.
[25] N. Kuznetsov, 'Before the War', *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 2, 1967, p. 98. Kuznetsov was Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy.

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forces.[26] Stalin's contempt and hatred for the British, and his somewhat lesser animosity toward the U.S., often expressed to his intimates, would also have led him to devalue the credibility of the warnings received from them. Rudolph Hess' flight to Britain on 10 May, and the almost simultaneous, but purely coincidental, cessation of German bombing of Britain, were probably regarded by Stalin as part of a deal to facilitate the German attack.[27]

Stalin must also have felt that the tremendous size of the Soviet army was a deterrent. But Soviet secretiveness worked too well and the Germans grossly underestimated the size of their opponent's forces. German intelligence credited the Soviets with a total land force of 213 divisions and the General Staff allocated 141 German divisions for the campaign. Within seven weeks of the attack the General Staff ruefully noted that it had already identified 360 Soviet divisions in action.[28]

Nevertheless, Stalin's actions, from April, 1941, at the latest, are best explained by concluding that he thought that a German attack was probable. He even allowed his ambassador in Washington to inform the State Department, unofficially, that the Soviet Union and the U.S. were prospective allies,[29] a remarkable statement in view of the extremely bitter relations between the Soviet Union and the United States at that time. The Germans also intercepted Soviet diplomatic correspondence warning of war with Germany.[30]

The first visible Soviet response, aside from the revocation of the order to shoot at German planes, was the logical one of taking out insurance against the possibility of a two-front war. Stalin dropped his previous objections to Japanese conditions and the Treaty of Neutrality with Japan was signed on 13 April 1941 allowing the movement of troops from Asia to Europe. When Matsuoka left Moscow that afternoon, Stalin went to the railway station, publicly embraced the German ambassador and the military attaché, and said: 'We must remain friends and you must now do everything to that end'.[31] Despite the mocking threat implied in his use of the word 'now', Stalin found the situation still almost irreparable in terms of readiness for an early war.

Stalin's appeasement policy of this period was highlighted by Soviet recognition on 3 May of the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali government in Iraq, a country with which the Soviet Union had never before had diplomatic relations, and in mid-May by the expulsion from the Soviet Union of the diplomats of the exile governments of Norway, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. On 6 May, Stalin added to his title of general secretary of the Party the unnecessary, for the purpose of internal authority,

[26] Kuznetsov, op. cit., no. 1, 1967, p. 100.
[27] A. M. Nekrich, 'June 22, 1941', quoted in *Survey*, op cit., p. 172.
[28] Halder's Diary, 21 June 1941 and 11 August 1941, quoted in *Grand Strategy*, op. cit., pp. 91 and 100.
[29] Memorandum of Loy Henderson, 18 April 1941, *FRUS*, pp. 740–42.
[30] Ponschab (Harbin) to Foreign Office, 13 May 1941, *NSR*, p. 339.
[31] Schulenberg to Foreign Office, 13 April 1941, *NSR*, pp. 323–24.

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post of prime minister, in order to emphasize to the Germans that he was personally responsible for all Soviet governmental acts of appeasement.

Stalin explained his reasoning in an unpublished speech to the graduates of military academies the day before he assumed the post of prime minister. There are at least three separate accounts of Stalin's speech. All three agree that Stalin told the officers that war with Germany was approaching. According to the most detailed, that given to a pro-Soviet British journalist after 22 June, Stalin said that at the time of the non-aggression pact of 1939 Soviet armament plans were based on the assumption that the Soviet Union would be ready for war in 1943. It was now obvious that war with Germany would come much sooner, but the later it came, the better prepared the Soviet Union would be. Germany was already at peak strength while the Soviet programme, belatedly started and only reaching full speed in early 1941, was certain to reduce the disparity of military strength as time progressed. Therefore, it was supremely important to do everything to delay the German attack. If this could be done until late August 1941 it would be too late to start a campaign that year, on account of the well-known Russian winters. In such case, war was absolutely certain to begin in 1942 as soon as the spring campaigning season arrived. However, that was far preferable to war beginning any time in 1941. Therefore, strict orders had been issued throughout the armed forces to avoid any act or even gesture that could be used by the Germans as the slightest pretext for war.[32]

The Germans in Moscow also learned, although in considerably less detail, that the main point of Stalin's speech was an admission that Soviet forces were still unprepared for war with Germany and that time must be gained by 'taking into account the balance of power'.[33] A captured Soviet officer also told the Germans that Stalin had proclaimed the end of peaceful relations with Germany, and had said that Soviet boundaries would be extended, but differed in claiming that Stalin had not admitted Soviet weakness, but instead upbraided his officers for fearing German arms.[34]

Stalin adopted a passive policy of playing for time and pretending there was nothing wrong, even though some conventional military precautions were possible. He could have, for example, given open warning of the German threat and withdrawn the bulk of his forces back from the new frontier so that they would not have had to take the initial shock, until the Germans had made a lengthy advance against delaying actions. The Germans would still have penetrated deeply into the Soviet Union but total Soviet losses would have been much less. From Stalin's point of view such actions were probably unacceptable, because it would

[32] Alexander Werth, *Russia at War* (New York, 1964), pp. 122–23.
[33] Schulenberg to Foreign Office, 4 June 1941, *DGFP*, pp. 964–65.
[34] Gustave Hilger and Alfred Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies* (New York, 1953), p. 330.

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have been an admission that his basic foreign policy had been mistaken and that the newly acquired territories were not defensible. This could have meant a threat to his political power, and even if he could have foreseen the military costs of the German invasion, Stalin would probably have preferred that alternative. It was, after all, not so much more costly than his purges and agricultural policy. At this late date, even knowing German intentions, there was little else that could be done. Soviet armed forces were already larger than the German forces and the quantitative mobilization of more raw recruits was no longer particularly productive, although the Germans did not know the true size of Soviet forces. In material the Soviet forces were not so badly off as appeared. Soviet artillery was ample in quantity and better than the German. The newest Soviet airplanes and tanks were as good as or better than the German, but were still in short supply. They had not been produced in quantity after they had been developed and mass production began only late in 1940, as the following table shows.[35]

Planes			Tanks			
	1940	1941 (first half)		1939	1940	1941 (first half)
MIG-3	20	1,946	KV	0	243	393
YAK-1	64					
LAGG-3	—					
PE-2	2	458	T-34	0	115	1,110
Il-2	—	249				

By 1941, presumably as a result of orders issued after the collapse of France, plane and tank production was reaching a high rate and knowledge of the impending German attack could not help but improve the supply situation. Actually, on the eve of the German attack, before actual experience of the Second World War scale of combat, the Soviet command seemed to feel that its equipment situation was relatively satisfactory, and the only major weapon in which the Soviet Union admitted a deficiency in the early days of the war was in small-calibre portable anti-aircraft guns to protect troops in the field.[36]

In terms of personnel and weapons, almost all that could be done from Soviet resources was being done by the time German intentions were clear. Germany was the Soviet Union's only outside supplier of industrial and military equipment and nothing further could be expected there. The only non-belligerent power capable of supplying equipment

[35] *Istoria Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voini Sovetskovo Soyuza, 1941–1945* (History of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945), vol. I (Moscow, 1960), pp. 414–15.

[36] Memorandum of Hopkins–Stalin conversation, 30 July 1941, *FRUS*, pp. 802–05.

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was the United States, and the United States was refusing to sell anything significant to the Soviet Union because of the latter's close relationship to Germany.

THE most serious weakness of the Soviet armed forces was its leadership. Because of the purges, about 75 per cent of the divisional commanders and higher ranks had in 1941 been at their posts less than a year.[37] Most of these had little experience or advanced military education. A few of the old commanders like Rokossovski and Gorbatov were recalled directly from prison camps to high posts, but most of them were in their graves, from which not even Stalin could order them. This again was a situation which Stalin could do nothing to remedy. It is not surprising that Stalin tried to gain time by any means available.

Stalin personally called attention in May 1941 to the fact that the appeasement policy was based on his personal and deliberate decision; it cannot be seriously considered as deriving from ignorance of the risks involved in the situation. But, without gaining additional time, he saw no way to repair the damage caused by his policy of 1939 and 1940 which so facilitated Hitler's conquest of the continent and placed the Soviet Union in the unfavourable situation of 1941.

Stalin's attempts to delay the German attack were unsuccessful and had additional undesirable consequences. It turned out to be impossible to publicly deny the possibility of war with Germany, privately order the avoidance of all actions and deployments that might be considered provocative, and at the same time maintain the armed forces on an effective combat alert. Initiative was stifled, fear paralysed the capacity to act, and the general concern at all levels for self-preservation led to the avoidance of all responsibility. Even the most explicit orders were carried out only with delay.

For example, General Golikov, the head of military intelligence, carefully marked all messages and evidence showing that Germany would attack, including Sorge's as 'from doubtful sources', and everything showing that Germany was still concentrating on invading Britain as 'from reliable sources'. Golikov purged from the security apparatus his 'doubtful sources' and their supporters, and, according to some Soviet historians, was responsible for the arrest of Sorge and several of the best agents in Germany.[38] Gnedin, the liaison between Golikov and Stalin, reported, however, that Stalin did not worry about Golikov's estimates of reliability, but on principle was interested only in information classed as 'doubtful'. The 'reliable' information was simply sent off to the press in various forms.[39] Since none of this was known to the armed forces, including even the Minister of Defence Marshal

[37] A. M. Nekrich, 'June 22 1941', in *Survey*, op. cit., p. 171.
[38] G. A. Deborin and Dachichev in Discussion, *Survey*, op. cit., pp. 173 and 176.
[39] *Survey*, op. cit., p. 175.

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Timoshenko and Chief of Staff General Zhukov (according to Zhukov), the confusion must have been multiplied.[40]

The demoralising effect on the armed forces of the notorious 14 June TASS communiqué, which called absurd, false, and provocative all the rumours which were by then appearing daily in the world press about the forthcoming German-Soviet war, has also been reported.[41]

The paralysis was particularly evident at the time of the attack. On the basis of information on German ship movements, last-minute border-crossers from the German forces, Stalin decided at 5 p.m., 21 June, that the war would begin that night and ordered a full combat alert.[42] The order was sent out in a haphazard manner and did not reach many units for over 12 hours, after the war had begun. Even where received, it seemed to have little effect. The Black Sea Fleet commander refused to allow his units to fire on approaching German bombers, finally telling them only to 'act according to instructions', although the only instructions they had were to avoid all provocations.[43] His Chief of Staff finally took responsibility, although meeting resistance from his subordinates.

Hours after the attack Minister of Defence Timoshenko was still not allowing the Western Front commander, General Pavlov, to use artillery.[44] Timoshenko was honorably retired, Pavlov was executed. The tactical air force was almost completely destroyed on the ground in the first few hours.

Even in Moscow, despite the alert order issued by Stalin in conference with his associates, there was refusal to believe that the war had actually begun. Malenkov checked personally to see if the Commander of the Navy was lying when he relayed the first report of the German attack to the Kremlin.[45]

IF the 1939 treaty with Germany was regarded by the Soviet Union solely as a means to gain time and space, the record of 1939–40 cannot easily be explained. Until the latter part of 1940 there do not seem to have been any urgent Soviet preparations for war with Germany, nor were there any serious complications in Soviet-German co-operation. Before the unexpected collapse of France and German domination of the continent, Stalin acted as if he expected his friendly relations with the Germans to be lasting and undertook a quite leisurely build-up of Soviet military strength and rearrangement of Soviet defences to incorporate the newly acquired territories.

[40] Anfilov, *Survey*, op. cit., p. 175.
[41] Vice Admiral I. Azarov, 'Beginning of the War in Sevastopol', *Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal*, no. 6, 1962, pp. 77–83.
[42] Kuznetsov, op. cit., no. 3, p. 91.
[43] N. Rybalko, 'The First Day of the War on the Black Sea', *Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal*, no. 6, 1963, pp. 63–66.
[44] Col. Gen. I. V. Boldin, *Stranitsy Zhizni* (Pages from Life) (Moscow, 1961), p. 85, quoted in R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, 1967), p. 66.
[45] Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 94.

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On the other hand, Stalin had few illusions by the end of 1940 and the rapid increase in Soviet arms production in 1941 almost certainly resulted from decisions taken before Moscow could have received information on Hitler's military plans. The material deficiencies which subsequently appeared were probably related as much to concepts of military doctrine as to purely political decisions.

The initial German successes were not the result of surprise, for there was none, except in the most narrow tactical sense. Probably a greater responsibility for the Soviet disasters should be assigned to Stalin's policy in 1941 of denying the possibility of war, which amounted to a psychological disarmament of the Soviet armed forces.

Stalin's policy throughout was one of sacrificing the future for an immediate gain. In 1939–40 he casually sacrificed the communist parties of Europe and incurred the enmity of the western industrial countries, thus making the development of the Soviet arms industry dependent on German supplies. In 1941 he devoted his main efforts to delaying the German attack, without regard to the effects on the preparedness of the armed forces.

Of more general interest, not so closely related to a particular historical period, is the nature of Stalin's misjudgment. Stalin was relatively well informed about the international situation, and he acted determinedly, even if wrongly, on the basis of this information. His mistakes were rooted in ignorance and disregard of his own society, and he unknowingly weakened the Soviet Union's defence capability by attempting to carry out a public policy which was contrary to his private knowledge. Not only were the various components of the Soviet defence establishment isolated from each other, uninformed, and confused, but Stalin and the Politburo were isolated from their own society, and none dared tell them what was happening in contradiction to the official line. Thus, the closed nature of the society, and the lack of information circulating between the various levels of authority, turned out to be as important an influence on Soviet policy as Moscow's analysis of the international situation. Since 1941, the interaction of domestic public opinion in general and international affairs has become more and more evident. The Soviet case is a dramatic example of how a closed society can unintentionally alter the conditions of its own participation in world politics.

Abbreviations

FRUS—Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 1, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 1958.

NSR—Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 1948.

DGFP—Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D (1937–1945), vol. XII, Washington, D.C. 1953.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LIBERATION OF DENMARK

Mary Dau

DENMARK was occupied by Germany on 9 April 1940. It was necessary for the Germans to occupy Denmark in order to establish a link to Norway, but the intention was only to make Denmark a 'model protectorate'. Resistance to the invaders on 9 April was virtually impossible since the country had no natural defences, and the armed forces were by no means prepared to cope with an invasion. The first years of the occupation were relatively easy, and the Danish government was allowed to function with a semblance of normality. To the Danes, maintaining Danish institutions in Danish hands became an aim in itself throughout the occupation. This to the occupier would indicate to what extent the Danes were willing to compromise.

As the war wore on, however, resistance began. The clandestine communist party was among the first to call for action, beginning around the middle of 1942. However, not until August 1943, when the government under popular pressure refused to meet further German demands and fell, did resistance really get under way. From this period until the liberation, Denmark was without a government; but a regime led by the heads of department in the various ministries functioned until the end of the war. About a month later the Danish Freedom Council, a co-ordinating body composed of members of the various existing resistance groups was established. This clandestine body gained tremendous status and prestige with the population by the end of the war.

The resistance was geared to the Western Allies. Operating in close contact with the British Special Operations Executive, the Danes felt their resistance (acts of sabotage, strikes, etc.) to be linked with the war outside. An SOE representative came to Copenhagen and worked closely with the Freedom Council.

With the Eastern ally, relations were at their worst. Under German pressure relations with the Soviet Union had been broken off in 1941. Together with Finland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Nanking China, Denmark had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact; and the Soviet Union, in what few remarks were made made officially with respect to Denmark, made it clear that the country was considered to be collaborationist. Individual Danes were concerned with this state of affairs from the very beginning, and tried in various ways to remedy it. However, not until April 1944, when the Freedom Council made a *démarche* to send a representative to Moscow 'to explain the Danish case' did the Russians listen.

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A DELEGATION from the Freedom Council [1] met with the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Stockholm, Vladimir Semenov, on 18 April 1944. To the Danish plea for establishing relations with the Soviet Union and sending a representative to Moscow, Semenov had only one question: Did the delegation come from the 'old' (i.e. former) Danish politicians? To this the delegation could reply in the negative. They represented the resistance, and they wanted to mend relations with the Soviet Union. These had been broken off, so to speak, against the wish of the entire Danish people. They were aware, of course, that it would not be possible at the present stage to establish diplomatic relations, but the Freedom Council would like to send a man to Moscow who would be able to explain the Danish situation. The delegation had a man in mind, former Director of the Danish Public Libraries, Thomas Dossing, who had been active in the Danish resistance from its very beginning. However, if the Soviet Government preferred, they would also be willing to send a former diplomat, Mr Skov (who had previously tried to go to Moscow on his own). Semenov thought that a non-diplomat would be preferred.

Four days later, to everyone's surprise, the Soviet answer came. The Soviet Government would be willing to receive a man in Moscow. They would not interfere in the question of personalities, but preferred someone who had political influence in Denmark. A joint statement was issued:

> The Danish Freedom Council approached the Soviet Government on 18 April this year with the suggestion that relations should be established between the Soviet Union and Fighting Denmark. Further, the Council asked the Soviet Government to receive a representative of Fighting Denmark in Moscow. A similar request has been made by the Free Danes in London and Washington. In the suggestion of the Danish Freedom Council it was pointed out that the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1941 was done against the wishes of the entire Danish people and under strong German pressure. It has also been emphasized that the adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was also the result of German dictation, created great resentment in wide sections of the people, and produced the first public demonstration under the Occupation. Since the Government and Parliament ceased to function on 29 August 1943 and the King is a prisoner, the Freedom Council is the only organ which can express freely and independently the wish of the people to re-establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. On 23 April, the Soviet Government replied that it agreed to establish immediately relations with the Danish Freedom Council and to receive in Moscow a representative of Fighting Denmark like the one who was already

[1] The source material concerning the activities of the Freedom Council is to be found in the personal archives of the individual members of the Council and of Mr. Dossing. The papers include clandestine letters, notes, and diaries. They have been collected by Dr. Jorgen Hæstrup and are deposited in the Danish Rigsarkiv.

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> in London.[2] As authorized delegate of Fighting Denmark in the Soviet Union with ministerial privileges, the well-known Danish personality, Thomas Dossing, has been named according to the decision of the Freedom Council. Mr Dossing is now on the way from Denmark to Moscow.

The statement was published simultaneously in Sweden, in England and in the USSR on 10 July 1944, when Dossing was in London, the first step on his way to Moscow.

Why did the Soviet Government find it propitious to recognize 'Fighting Denmark' at this point? There had been a marked change of attitude in the Soviet press reflecting events in Denmark in August 1943. Denmark wanted war now, it said, just as Norway had wanted it.[3] Interest in Danish affairs continued until well after Dossing was established in Moscow. In addition, all during the fall of 1943, European resistance movements were given a dominant position in the Soviet press, following the recognition of Tito's partisan movement after the Conference of Teheran. The entire Soviet press printed a commentary from a Swedish paper which stated that by recognizing the Danish Freedom Council the Soviet Government had proved as realistic as when it gave its support to Tito's Yugoslavia.[4] The Soviets, it seems, were intent upon helping the Danish Freedom Council to increase its status as a political factor inside Denmark. This was a corollary of intensified Danish resistance against the Germans.

Once the connexion to Moscow was established, then came the question of implementing the mission. It is well worth looking at the man who was to represent 'Fighting Denmark', at his mandate, at his instructions, and at the available channels of communication between him and the home front. Although Mr Dossing was received in Moscow with the title and rank of a diplomatic envoy, his mission caused any number of problems which normally do not occur in the diplomatic service. Here those questions were of such proportions that they proved fatal to the carrying out of the mission. Mr Dossing had no credentials. Immediately after his arrival in Moscow on 31 July 1944 he sent a letter to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, referring to the joint statement and expressing his satisfaction that the connexion had been established. This letter was duly acknowledged.

Together with a representative of the Freedom Council in Stockholm, Mr Erling Foss, Dossing wrote down a few general instructions for

[2] The person in London was J. Christmas Moller, a leading politician of the Conservative Party, who had gone to England already in 1942, accepting a British invitation to help organize activities among Danes in England. Throughout the remainder of the War he spoke on the BBC to his fellow countrymen at home exhorting them to take up resistance against the Germans.

[3] For example *Pravda* 22.8.43, 27.8.43, 28.8.43, 20.10.43. By the end of 1943 TASS had a correspondent stationed in Göteborg, Sweden, for the specific purpose of covering Danish resistance.

[4] *Göteborg Handels- och Sjöfartstidning* 12.7.44, *Izvestiia* 14.7.44.

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his mission during a visit there before his departure for Moscow. The instructions were short and trite: general information about Denmark and about Russia, confidential information about the political position of the USSR, and acceptance of Denmark as an Allied nation by Moscow. Dossing was soon to be faced with problems of a political nature not foreseen at the Stockholm meeting, and for which the instructions provided no answers. What they could not know either was that communication would be well nigh impossible.

There were five possible sources of communication with Dossing operating independently of each other: the Freedom Council through Mr Foss; the Danish envoy in London, Count Reventlow; and in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann. All these men had declared themselves 'free' of occupied Denmark and had been recognized as such by their host countries. They communicated with Dossing by way of the American and the British foreign service; the State Department and Foreign Office (through the Danish envoys); the Danish politicians (who had no connexion with the Freedom Council).

Communication between these various sources was almost as scarce as communication with Dossing. A letter from Stockholm took months before it reached Dossing, and telegrams were few, mainly because the Swedish telegraph office refused to take coded messages. The safest and quickest way was by means of the British diplomatic bag, but this meant going through the Foreign Office.

In this situation Dossing himself had no way of participating in the making of the policies which he would later present to the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. However, at the same time nobody could force Dossing to support a policy which came from a source he did not trust. It must be remembered that Dossing was not a member of the Danish diplomatic corps, but a freedom fighter, who of his own free will had undertaken a certain assignment with respect to Danish relations with the Soviet Union.

THE picture of Dossing's mission as we are able to delineate it is drawn from a combination of Dossing's personality, his isolation and the impossible working conditions in Moscow, and his illness. In the autumn of 1944 he kept a diary, and nearly every day there is an entry indicating ill health. Towards the end of November he caught pneumonia, which lasted until Christmas, when his wife was finally able to join him.

Much of his time was spent complaining to Burobin, the office in Moscow which gave provisions to diplomats. He needed everything —from a secretary to paper. The Canadians had taken over the house of the former Danish legation, and Dossing had to establish himself in a hotel together with the many newcomers from countries which had never had diplomatic relations with the USSR. He was given a secretary, but was under the impression that her most important job was spying.

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He found paper in the former Danish legation. But communication could not be improved—nor the isolation when for long periods Moscow was without electricity. No radio. No light.

He saw the British Embassy Counsellor, Thomas Barman, quite frequently; and he saw his colleagues from the other Scandinavian countries, especially the Norwegian ambassador. However, the overall impression is that of a 'loner' in Moscow—perhaps because he was a novice to diplomatic service, probably because he was faced with financial difficulties for many months until the question of his pay was finally settled, and because he was ill. And, in the end, perhaps it would not be strange if the diplomatic corps viewed this new man, who represented the vague notion of a 'fighting' nation, with certain forebodings and doubt. Especially in view of what they saw happening to representatives from countries which were split as a result of the war, and who were being used for tactical manoeuvres by the Soviet authorities.[5]

In view of the circumstances Dossing's own mood determined his approach of his surroundings and in the end also to the men who had chosen him to represent 'Fighting Denmark'. Dossing was a resistance fighter, and he could not undertake to represent anybody outside of the resistance movement. 'Fighting Denmark' was to him something very tangible, and it was that Denmark which would join the Allies in victory. Dossing never denied that another 'official' Denmark existed, but to him there was a deep cleavage between the two; and although he might try to explain the attitude of official Denmark, he could not condone nor represent it. His definition of 'Fighting Denmark' was not static. In London, before going to Moscow, he claimed to represent 'all Danes who have the will to live in a free and independent Denmark, in a democratic world'. However, later, when Dossing had to present to the Russians the fact that the resistance movement had taken up contact with 'official' Denmark, he grew increasingly bitter, and his definition of 'Fighting Denmark' was narrowed considerably. 'I came to Moscow as representative of the Danes at home and abroad who by their actions disassociated themselves from the collaboration policies of the government and parliament.' Out of loyalty to the Freedom Council he continued to forward the messages he received from it to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, but he did not do so without rancour.

Being a person of total devotion to a cause, Dossing was not able to distinguish sharply within himself between the envoy and the private person. This obviously led to unhappy consequences for his mission, as developments at home took a turn which he did not approve. The Russians unfortunately confirmed Dossing's own ideas, and the Soviet Government had an interest in strengthening Dossing's line of total

[5] For example the fate of the Czech envoy, Mr Fierlinger.

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support for the resistance in so far as they thought Dossing would still be heard at home.

IN terms of foreign policy the aim of the resistance movement was to efface the impression of 9 April 1940 when Denmark had let herself be occupied without resistance. The means to this end was to see Denmark recognized as an Ally. They did not succeed during the war, in the end because of a formality which the Soviets used as an excuse for their reluctance to recognize Denmark as an Ally. Not until the San Francisco Conference did the Soviet Government change its attitude, and acceptance to the United Nations gave Denmark the recognition she had earned during the war.

One might ask to what extent the Soviet reluctance to recognize Denmark as an Ally during the war was the result of a specific policy towards Denmark. Moscow insisted obstinately that it only recognized 'Fighting Denmark' under the leadership of the Freedom Council. This was part of a general Soviet design towards the occupied countries of Europe. Everywhere the importance of resistance movements was emphasized, for military, but also for political reasons. That there was an inherent connexion between the military and the political motives was stated in the first issue of *Bolshevik*, which appeared 1 January 1943: '. . . to neglect the demands of politics for purely strategic interests is fraught with dangerous consequences, a fact which the Patriotic War again underlines.'

However, none of the people in the resistance, who fought so hard to see Denmark recognized as an Ally, could know that Denmark was a victim of a teleological design. And pressure from the Danes was not in vain, mostly because wartime diplomacy was after all a subject of compromise between the three big Allies. The Danish quest for recognition came at a time when the rift between the Allies was growing wider and wider, and the problems of preparing peace were becoming staggeringly difficult.

From the end of 1943 until July 1944 the Danes had hopes for a tripartite declaration recognizing the country as an 'associated power', but the plan stuck fast on Soviet opposition. The text of the proposed declaration, which was similar to the words Eden used in an address to the Anglo-Danish Society in January 1944, read:

> But the whole Danish people were united behind the King in their determination to refuse the new and humiliating German demands provoked . . . by their stubbornly growing resistance. . . . There is no Danish Government which can give expression to the feelings of Denmark by adhering to the UN declaration. The Governments of Great Britain, the USA, and the USSR recognize, however, that the Danish nation has placed itself side by side with the United Nations.

In comparison, the declaration issued on 10 July 1944: '. . . since the

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King is a prisoner the Freedom Council is the only organ which can express freely and independently the wish of the people'.

What mandate did the Freedom Council have to speak for the Danish people? Did 'the Danish nation' and 'the people' in the two declarations express the same thing?

Since a joint declaration had not been possible, the British and the Americans issued two separate declarations on 12 July 1944, two days after the publication of the joint statement from the Soviet Government and the Freedom Council. The American text followed the original joint declaration draft, whereas the British added a sentence about the Freedom Council and its contribution to the fight against the occupier, thus indicating a concession to the Russians.

In Denmark disappointment at the failure was great—not least among the politicians. They were most unhappy about the relations which had been established between the Freedom Council and the Soviet Government, and a joint declaration admitting Denmark to the status of associated power with the Allies would at least have obliterated the impression that only a fraction of the population had established the relationship with Moscow. Not only did they not like the relationship, but they had no faith in the representative. They remembered Dossing as an early, radical spokesman of resistance. Their first thought when they failed to get a tripartite declaration was that Dossing's mission must somehow be 'legalized'. For this purpose they persuaded the King to send a message to the Soviet Government in which he expressed his satisfaction that a connection had been established. They asked the British to transmit the message to the Russians, and Foreign Office agreed to do so on condition that Mr Dossing personally would deliver the message and that the message would contain a reference to his mission. The message was duly presented to the Russians, but they never replied.

The Soviet position was made clear during the autumn of 1944: only those whom the USSR had recognized were allies; the rest of the population were enemies. However, Denmark was no Greece or Czechoslovakia, and by the end of 1944 the opposing parties in Denmark, after having acted independently without result, agreed on a joint plea to the Allies:

> Denmark's Freedom Council and the leaders of the country's four largest political parties request that the governments of Great Britain, the USA, and the Soviet Union recognise Denmark as a fighting Ally. We base this request, following the statements previously made by His Majesty King Christian, upon a clear desire on the part of the whole Danish people, upon the contribution to the War which Denmark has already made through sabotage and upon the partisan war which has been prepared, and which will begin when the Allies deem it the proper time. For the Danish people the recognition as an Allied country will be an encouragement and a further strengthening for the last decisive battle. We emphasize that this request is agreed upon and that

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> we also agree upon seeking to maintain the spirit of co-operation among the Danish people also after the war by forming the first free government and its basic program jointly.

The text bore obvious reference to the Anglo-American insistence upon unity inside the occupied countries. However, the Soviet insistence upon recognition of the resistance movement had also been taken into consideration in the framing of the text. A liberal interpretation would be able to see the unity which had been brought about among the Danes as a sign that the Danish people were united behind the resistance.

The message was badly timed, reaching the Allies just before they met at Yalta. The Russians were on their way to the Oder, and the Western armies had just overcome Hitler's last desperate assault at the Ardennes. The question of dividing Europe into spheres of influence became more acute than ever before, and Churchill had conceded this point, when, in October 1944 in Moscow, he made his famous agreement with Stalin on the division of British and Soviet influence in the Balkans. The Lublin Committee loomed. Under such circumstances there was a need for clear agreements regarding the fate of occupied countries. However, this was a perspective of a three-dimensional nature, including a, albeit differently motivated, British and Soviet involvement in Europe, and increasing American reluctance to remain in Europe beyond the end of the war.

The U.S. Acting Secretary of State Grew wired Secretary of State Stettinius at Malta on 3 February 1945 regarding the Danes[6]: 'In view of our lukewarm attitude on the proposed tripartite statement recognizing the Danes as Allies, and probable Soviet refusal to participate in it, the British may refer the matter to the Big Three for decision. . . .'

The subject of Denmark was brought up at Yalta, although not by the British, but by President Roosevelt. It had been agreed that all who had declared war on Germany by the end of February 1945 would be invited to the Preparatory Conference on the United Nations Organization in San Francisco. President Roosevelt asked what to do about Denmark, pointing out that the country had been overrun. 'Stalin thought', according to the American stenographic report from the meeting, 'that Denmark should wait, and Roosevelt and Churchill agreed. Churchill added that once liberated Denmark would certainly have the right to join the organization. Stalin remarked, however, that Denmark had let the Germans in'.[7] Denmark was *not* an Ally, and it was not at this time clear into which sphere of interest the country would fall. Stalin's laconic remark presaged the degree of freedom of

[6] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: Conferences of Malta and Yalta.* Washington 1955, p. 949.

[7] ibid. p. 775. Fifth Plenary Meeting, 8 February 1945 Bohlen Minutes, confirmed in Hiss Minutes.

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action which the Russians would want *if* they were going to be the liberators of Denmark.

To Dossing, the Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Dekanozov declared on 26 April, spelling out the Soviet position: 'If the Danish politicians now agree with the resistance, it is only because they can see that the Germans have lost. They do not become innocent because of that, and the resistance movement cannot co-operate with them'.

Not until it became clear that Denmark would not fall under the Soviet sphere of influence, at the San Francisco Conference itself, did Molotov agree to support the Danes in their demand for a seat in the Allied circle.

ASIDE from the influence which the Soviet Union had in determining Denmark's status as an Ally, it had an indirect hand in the formation of the Danish liberation government. It became most important that a government be formed, which would be ready to take over when the Germans left the country in order that internal strife might be avoided. The examples of Greece and Belgium were ominous in this respect. When the two main opposing parties, the Freedom Council and the politicians under the leadership of former Prime Minister the Social Democrat Buhl, joined forces in the autumn of 1944 on the question of the recognition of Denmark as an Allied nation, they also took up the question of forming a liberation government. Each side had been forced to admit that it needed the other. The Freedom Council was tremendously popular, and to ignore it would have been to invite trouble. On the other hand the 'old politicians' represented the continuity in Danish democratic values and institutions and could not be dispensed with. The Freedom Council demanded both a 50/50 representation and that certain ministers who had participated in the last government during the occupation be excluded from the new one. The politicians conceded a great deal in the autumn of 1944 when they accepted the idea of communist representation in the government, which was a *sine qua non* to the Freedom Council, but the negotiations proved long and arduous.

From Dossing reports began arriving just as the negotiations got under way. He stressed the Soviet attitude that only the Freedom Council was recognized and that the Council must, if it did not entirely comprise the post-war government, at least play a predominant role in it. At this time, when they were introducing their demands, the Freedom Council had good reason not to want to change Dossing's line of reporting from Moscow.

The role which the Soviet attitude played in internal Danish affairs became clear: it was accepted as an instrument of pressure. If we accept that the extreme Soviet attitude was that the Freedom Council should constitute the post-war government, it is clear that none of the parties at any time admitted to such an aim. The politicians had

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to assume, gauging by the support which the Soviet Union gave the Freedom Council, that if the Soviet Government were to recognize the first Danish government after the war, that government must be acceptable to the Freedom Council.

Even if the Freedom Council eventually doubted the objectivity of Dossing's reports, they could not question messages emanating from Stockholm, from the representatives of the Freedom Council there, who had contacts with the Soviet Legation. And in December 1944, the newspaper *War and the Working Class* published a vicious attack on the Danish politicians.

By the time the joint message to the Allies was despatched, the two parties had agreed that the Freedom Council must be represented in the future government, but nobody knew as yet with how great a percentage. After the turn of the year the possibility of a liberation from the East became real, and people began discussing what would happen 'if the Russians come first'.

In the beginning of February the Council had before it a report from a conversation which Dossing had had with Dekanozov on 14 January. Dekanozov had questioned him in detail regarding the 'old' politicians and the Council's willingness to co-operate with them. He had asked if the Freedom Council had switched from a 'fighting programme' to a 'programme of negotiation'? And he had stressed that the Soviet Union had recognized the Freedom Council because it had led the fight against the Germans and alienated itself from the Danish government, which in the Soviet view collaborated with the Germans. Dekanozov had added that the Soviet Union might accept a few of the 'old' politicians whom the Freedom Council had confidence in, but the entire Scavenius Government was a German government.[8] He had ended with a remark to the effect that the Soviet Union would be a Baltic power after the war and that Denmark ought to take its neighbour to the east into consideration.

This report had a tremendous impact. From Stockholm Foss wrote home supporting the view that members of the Scavenius Government must be kept out. And from notes from the meeting of the Freedom Council we know that the Council felt that this was not Dossing, but the 'Russians speaking through the Dekanozov report'.

In Stockholm, in February–March 1945, a big meeting of the members

[8] Erik Scavenius, Danish Foreign Minister, 1909–10 and 1913–20 and 1940–42. Prime Minister 1942–43. He was the Danish politician who went farthest in seeking German goodwill during the Occupation. He was convinced that since Danish neutrality had proved to be a fiction it was his duty at all cost to see the country through the Occupation as smoothly as possible. He had no feeling for public opinion, and was generally disliked for going 'too far'. As Foreign Minister 1940–42 he sanctioned among other things the creation of a voluntary corps of Danes to be recruited for the German army, and he signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. When he took over as Prime Minister this was the consequence of his sharp criticism of the existing Danish Government headed by Vilhelm Buhl for not meeting its obligations to the Germans. When the final breakdown occurred in August 1943 he stood alone in wanting to meet German demands.

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of the resistance took place. Dossing came from Moscow, Christmas Moller from London, Frode Jakobsen and a communist member of the Freedom Council, Alfred Jensen, from Copenhagen. In addition the local representatives of the Freedom Council participated. The purpose was first of all to explain to Dossing and Christmas Moller what had happened at home and secondly to sound out the views in the various diplomatic representations of the Allies. Mme Kollontai, the Soviet ambassador, received individual visits from Christmas Moller, Dossing, Frode Jakobsen and Alfred Jensen. All the reports concur: the Soviet Union would not interfere in internal Danish affairs, but the treatment which Denmark would receive after the war would naturally depend upon the composition of the government which was formed. There was no attempt to conceal the Soviet view that the resistance must play a predominant role in the formation of the government.

The members of the Freedom Council returned from Stockholm convinced of the good will of the Big Three towards the resistance, and this view also penetrated to the politicians. Whereas they coolly anticipated that the men of the resistance would be political novices and that the movement would fall apart after the Liberation, they realized that at the moment this was of no consequence because of the forces that stood behind the resistance—the Allies, the King, the population.

The final phase of the negotiations was extremely difficult. Three people were kept out of the government by the Freedom Council's demand, and to the individual party leaders this was a delicate affair as each of the three had more or less been forced to participate in the Scavenius Government by his respective party. The politicians were not convinced either that the attitude of the Soviets was as intransigent as the Freedom Council said it was.

The politicians had their reasons for so thinking. They had information regarding the Soviet attitude from channels which were not of the resistance. A Dane, Mr Leo Feigenberg, who was Russian-born, and who during the thirties had been among the initiators of the establishment of Danish-Soviet trade relations, was now in Stockholm as a refugee. Here he took up relations with the Soviet Legation in the hope of preparing the resumption of trade after the war. He was a friend of the official Danish envoy to Stockholm, and partly by way of the latter, partly by way of Danes legally travelling to Stockholm, he sent messages during the last phase of the war to the Danish Social Democrats, whom he knew from trade negotiations prior to the war, about the Soviet position as it was reported to him in the Soviet Embassy. His contact was a Secretary of the Legation, who does not figure among the people with whom the representatives from the resistance had any contact. According to his reports the Soviet Union desired a more friendly Denmark, that is, more oriented to the left. It should show less dependence on England and more reliance upon the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet representatives were fully

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aware of the strength of Danish democratic traditions. They relied upon the Social Democratic Party, although they would like to see it freed of fear of the Soviet Union. The support which the Soviet Government had given the resistance by receiving Mr Dossing should be seen as an attempt to promote leftist tendencies. But they did expect the resistance movement to dissolve itself after the end of the war.

The Danish envoy kept a diary from which we can follow some of the messages as they went to the Danish politicians. During the period when the big meeting of the resistance people was held in Stockholm, a courier from the politicians arrived and received messages from the Russians transmitted by Mr Feigenberg and Mr Kruse, the Danish envoy, which stated that it was not at all their wish that the resistance should form the government. The courier came several times during March and April, at the time when negotiations between the Freedom Council and the politicians were almost at a dead-end. These reports, about which the Freedom Council knew nothing, inevitably contributed to the complication of the negotiations. Only the conviction of both sides, that there must be a government ready for the Liberation now that turmoil was the order of the day in liberated countries, and the awareness that Denmark might well be liberated from the east, finally saved the issue. On 20 April Buhl forced the conditions made by the Freedom Council through at a meeting among the politicians. By the end of the month the list of ministers was ready: fifty per cent were from the resistance—there were no names from the Scavenius Government.

Why did the Soviet Government say one thing to representatives of the Freedom Council and something else to representatives of traditional Denmark, and why did they even establish any contact with the latter? Not having any Soviet answer to date, we might take a brief look at conditions in Denmark as compared with other liberated countries. There was no split within the Danish resistance as in other countries. There was no Danish government-in-exile 'out of contact with events at home'. There were no religious or cultural factions. And the only latent possibility for any unrest was that of preventing co-operation between the Freedom Council and the politicians. The formation of the Liberation Government was foreign policy in the sense that it showed agreement between the two parties. This was, both in relations with the East and the West, a Danish achievement compared with the unhappy events which in other countries followed liberation.

THE Soviet interest in Denmark was a limited one. As the war wore on the Soviet armies moved along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea, the possibility of Denmark's being liberated by the Soviets became real. What the Soviet Union was doing politically, by not recognizing the Danes as an Ally and by the attempts to help

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pave the way for a 'people's front' government, was laying the foundation for political action following a possible liberation by the Soviet Army. That this possibility was real was confirmed by the eleventh-hour race in the end between Field Marshals Montgomery and Rokossovski to Lubeck, from which point Slesvig-Holstein (and the entry to Denmark) could be sealed off. Rostock and Warnemunde were taken by Rokossovski on 2 May when Montgomery reached Lubeck, only a few miles away. The Soviet troops did, however, land on the island of Bornholm, which is located so far to the east of mainland Denmark that it is opposite Poland, which was clearly within the Soviet sphere of influence.

Behind the Soviet drive to reach Denmark was the possibility of gaining influence over the exits from the Baltic Sea. Already in November 1940, at the time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, when Hitler and Ribbentrop met with Molotov and Dekanozov in Berlin to negotiate the so-called 'Three Power Pact', Molotov raised the question of passage through the Danish Straits, demanding a regime similar to the one set up by the Donau Commission, i.e. an internationalized zone, where the Soviet Union as a signatory power would be party in determining the rights of passage in and out of the Straits.[9]

A year later, when the Soviet Government had switched allies, Stalin brought up the question during his talks with British Foreign Minister Eden in Moscow. In his proposals for an agreement on post-war Europe, Stalin wanted a secret protocol about European frontiers. He wanted to be guaranteed the right to establish bases in Finland and Rumania, and a safeguarding of the exits from the Baltic Sea. In return he would permit England to establish military bases in Denmark and Norway.[10]

Such demands, made at a time when the position of the Soviet Union was precarious, indicate their absolute character. Moreover, the Baltic Sea itself must not fall into the hands of any single nation, unless this be the Soviet Union. In 1935 the British had signed a naval agreement with Germany, which permitted the Germans to build a fleet of a maximum of 35 per cent of that of the British. The British concluded that power over the Baltic Sea would henceforth fall to the Germans since the Soviet fleet was insignificant. The Russians felt the consequences when it proved that the leaders of the Third Reich considered the Baltic Sea a *mare clausum*.

In the spring of 1945, as the Soviet armies swept over the plains of Poland and Northern Germany, the newspaper of the Soviet Navy, *Krasnyi Flot*, carried a campaign concerning the Baltic Sea.[11] A theory was developed according to which the Baltic Sea and the areas bordering

[9] Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie (eds.): *Nazi-Soviet Relations. Documents of the Archives of the German Foreign Office 1939–41*. Washington 1948, p. 252.
[10] The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Avon: *The Reckoning*, London 1965, p. 290.
[11] Beginning 16.2.1945 with I. Ermashev: 'Borba na baltiiskikh kommunikatsiakh'. Articles on this subject appeared frequently until May 1945.

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on it along the southern shores had in reality been taken from the Russians, to whom they rightly belonged. Along these shores the Soviet armies were now sweeping, and they would soon penetrate into Denmark and Norway, thus liberating these countries from the Germans. In later articles the Baltic Sea was divided into two parts. The one was the triangle: Bornholm–Bay of Pomerania–Kiel, and the other the area to the east of this triangle. The eastern part fell clearly within the Soviet sphere of influence. As for the western triangle, the situation was uncertain. The main writer, I. Ermashev, minutely described this area, emphasizing that it had been the German fleet's basis of operation, the centre being at the naval base of Kiel. He mentioned all the Straits, pointing out that they, as well as Bornholm, were Danish. There could be no doubt that the fight for the liberation of Denmark would be severe, he concluded, but the Soviet advances opened 'new and favourable perspectives for operations in the Baltic'.

Russian solders landed on the island of Bornholm on 9 May 1945, after having bombed its two main towns. This act of war was caused by the fact that the German commander on the island had orders not to surrender to anybody but the British. His orders were finally revoked, but too late. The Soviet liberation of Bornholm was in no way planned by the Allies. It was a military decision made by the Soviet Command, operating from the Bay of Pomerania just opposite Bornholm. The British commander who liberated the rest of Denmark on 5 May, General Dewing, wired the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces, who in turn asked the Soviet High Command if sending British troops to Bornholm would conflict with Soviet plans.[12] Without answering, the Soviet troops acted on their own. It has often been surmised that Bornholm was simply overlooked by the Allies, both in the East and in the West. We know, from the *Krasnyi Flot* articles, that this was not the case on the Soviet side. But nothing indicates that Bornholm was part of a political design. There was no mention of the Baltic strategy outside the newspaper of the Soviet Navy.

Soviet troops remained on Bornholm for almost a year.[13] No one was able to find out exactly how many were there, but the Danish guess was 8,000, later reduced to 6,000. The troops were obviously instructed to avoid friction of any kind, and co-operation with Danish authorities went smoothly. In the beginning a certain amount of fraternization took place between the Danes and the soldiers, but this gradually stopped. And towards the end of the period the troops were literally confined to their quarters which they had built in the woods

[12] Based on conversations with the representative of the SOE in Copenhagen at the end of the War, Ole Lippmann. (Confirmed by a member of the Freedom Council in a press interview in 1966.)

[13] Information regarding the Soviet troops on Bornholm is based on the memoirs of the local prefect. P. Chr. v. Stemann: *En dansk embedsmands odysse*. (The Odyssey of a Danish Civil Servant.) vol. II Copenhagen 1961, and on conversations with various individuals who at the time had daily contact with the troops and their commanders.

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of the island. They had brought their own supplies in war booty from Germany, but an agreement was made with the Danish Government for a certain payment towards the maintenance of the troops, similar to the agreements made between the Danish, and the British and the American governments.

The commanding officer Colonel Strebkov declared upon his arrival on 10 May that the Russians would not remain one day after the last German soldier had left the island. This had happened three days later. The islanders had made all private boats and fishing vessels available for the purpose. However, even the first ships which left for Colberg (Germany) on 12 May came back the following day with more Russian troops. In July supplies began arriving which made it obvious that substantial quarters would be built for the winter. When finally in March 1946 the news came that the troops were leaving, this was a surprise to the islanders, and, one surmises, to the Russians as well.

The Russian authorities, however, never ceased to insist that the sojourn would be a temporary one. They issued a declaration in May 1945 which was taken up by the world press: 'The island of Bornholm is part of Denmark, and it is only occupied by our troops because it is behind our German zone of occupation. The island has been temporarily occupied by the troops of the Red Army, until the issues in Germany arising from the war have been solved'.

Izvestiia pointed out [14] that there was no difference between the stationing of Soviet troops on Bornholm and British and American troops in the rest of Denmark, and the press repeatedly published all statements from Danish politicians and officials expressing gratitude at the Soviet liberation of Bornholm.

Shortly after New Year 1946 the commander General Jakushev told the local prefect that he thought the Soviet troops would have left Bornholm before the end of 1946. His words proved true on 4 April 1946.

It is not possible to discern anything but a military occupation, following a military action which was the liberation of Bornholm. Compared to the events which followed in the wake of Soviet occupation in other countries the occupation of Bornholm was exemplary. There is no evidence of Soviet interest in internal Danish affairs at any time during the occupation.

The questions which remain are: why did the occupation last until April 1946, when the excuse regarding German troops long since was non-existent? Was it a matter of tactics? Or was it merely a military question, depending on the movement of troops? Why did the Russians leave the island without trying to obtain any guarantees with regard to the future of the island? This could after all have been expected, since Bornholm would have meant an advance toward the Straits?

[14] 24.5.45, 29.5.45, 31.5.45.

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There will be no answer to such questions until the Soviet archives are opened. For the present, attempts at hypotheses must do.

Northern Norway, Northern Persia and Bornholm were the only points of Soviet withdrawal in this period. The conditions of the Soviet occupation of Northern Norway, whence the troops were withdrawn in September 1945, were similar to those of Bornholm. (Although formally the Soviet action in Northern Norway was in keeping with an agreement with the Norwegian Government in exile.) The withdrawal from Denmark and Norway may be viewed as a Soviet pattern with regard to Scandinavia, as opposed to that towards the Balkans, with which the Soviet Union dealt in a far more decisive manner in 1945–46. Apparently there was felt to be no need for a 'Malta' in the Baltic Sea in 1945–46.

In one of the last articles of the *Krasnyi Flot* campaign,[15] the subject was communication between the Baltic and the North Sea. The North Sea ports of Germany and the Low Countries were clearly viewed as Western spheres of interest, the eastern, Baltic ones, as Soviet. It was necessary to eliminate the German threat at sea, the article read, as a warrant for the independence of countries like Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium. The German threat had been great in the North and Baltic Seas, but even greater in the strategically and commercially important waterways connecting the two. One recognizes here the Soviet demand for free access to the open sea, together with a recognition that the open sea itself was not a Soviet sphere of interest. The grouping of Denmark together with Belgium and Holland—definitely not within Soviet sphere of interest—would tend to indicate that the Soviets would be content provided that the Straits were kept neutral, i.e. out of the dominance by any great power, if this power were not the Soviet Union.

This view is confirmed if we take a look at the attitude of Britain—the other interested power—to the occupation of Bornholm. Time and again members of the British Government said in Parliament that the question of Bornholm was a matter for the Danes and the Russians to settle among themselves.[16] Bevin declared in February 1946 during a debate in the House of Commons[17]: '. . . I agree that as long as Germany is defeated there is no need to do anything as far as the Skagerrak is concerned. It is an open, free waterway to all nations entering or leaving the Baltic. In that case that is the policy of the British Government'.

The Danes themselves tried to convince the Russians that as an independent country Denmark could take over its own military obligations and as a proof of this all foreign troops should leave the country. In all matters regarding foreign policy the Danish Government made a conscious effort to show its independence of the Great Powers, both

[15] 21 April 1945 'Na beregakh Baltiki i severnovo mora'.
[16] Hansard, vol. 411, col. 191 (30.5.45); ibid. vol. 418, col. 525 (29.1.46).
[17] ibid. vol. 419, col. 1356 (21.2.46).

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at the San Francisco Conference and at the first UN Assembly. The Danish envoy in Moscow handed the Soviet Government a note in the beginning of March 1946, stating the Danish point of view. The reply came promptly: the Soviet Government was willing to withdraw Soviet troops, provided that the Danish Government would immediately send troops to Bornholm and establish Danish administration on the island without foreign interference of any kind. In its reply note the Danish Government repeated the Russian wording, despite the fact, as the Foreign Minister had to admit,[18] that administration of the island had always been Danish. At this time, with Germany defeated, foreign interference could only refer to the West. It seems that to the Russians securing Bornholm in Danish hands would be to guarantee the neutralization of the Straits.

In the short-term tactical view the points of interest in connexion with the withdrawal from Bornholm are the Mediterranean and the question of German unification. The passage to the Mediterranean in 1945–46 meant Turkey. Already in March 1945 the Soviet Government began making demands upon Turkey for a revision of the regime of the Straits, demands which eventually provoked the Truman doctrine in the spring of 1947. If we compare Turkey with Bornholm, which offers a certain geopolitical parallel, it can only be ascertained that Soviet interest in the two areas for access to the open sea was decisively different.[19]

In the Mediterranean in 1945 the Italian colonies and the administration of Tangier were points of interest to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government looked to each of these as possible footholds in the Mediterranean, but did not pursue the matter when obstacles proved too great. By way of Persia there was an attempt to get to the Indian Ocean, which was foiled in the end with the aid of the UN. However, all during the autumn of 1945 when the Soviet Government was pursuing its interest in the Southern area, its policies in the Baltic were lenient. Even Sweden, which until then had been a *bête noire* of Moscow's, now shared in the *détente*, and Finland was given more favourable terms in the allocation of payments for war damages.

[18] At a press conference 16.3.46, during which the withdrawal was announced.

[19] This is confirmed if we compare the status of the Black Sea with that of the Baltic in terms of the Soviet interpretation of international law at the time. In the various notes to the Turkish Government the closed nature of the Black Sea and the Straits leading to it was emphasized, and a work of international law, which appeared in 1948 confirmed this view. (B. A. Dranov: *Chernomorskie Prolyvi.*)

Nothing of the sort was stated concerning the Baltic Sea until May 1950. The view then expounded in *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* by S. V. Molodtsov has since been sustained. Before the war the Baltic seems to have been categorized with the Mediterranean, as distinguished from the Black Sea.

See *American Journal of International Law*, July 1947, pp. 727–747, Cemil Bilsel: 'The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence'.

Max Planck Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht: *Beiträge, Heft 30.* Hans Albert Rinkemeyer: 'Die Sowjetische Zwölfmeilenzone in der Ostsee und die Freiheit des Meeres', chap. VIII. Cologne 1955.

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As far as Germany was concerned there are indications that the Soviet Union hoped for the unification of Germany on communist terms. If this had happened the question of access to the open sea would have been solved with the Kiel Canal (and virtual Soviet domination over Denmark). There were also plans for an internationalization of the Kiel Canal, which the Soviet Union supported (whereas it rejected internationalization of the other great waterways of Europe, which was a condition).

In the end, however, it must be concluded that the stabilization of the Baltic Sea area meant to the Soviet Union acquisition of the Baltic States, peace with Finland, and Konigsberg in Soviet hands. Since they did not succeed in reaching Denmark in May 1945, any further advance in the Baltic seems to have been of negligible interest. This vacuum as far as a policy in the Baltic is concerned existed until 1950, when an authoritative article in *Sovetsko Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Soviet State and Law) stated that the Baltic was a closed sea, of interest only to its bordering states. This change of attitude was concurrent with an expansion of military forces in Poland and in the East German zone along the Southern shores of the Baltic. However, it was a reaction to quite a different situation from that of 1945–46, when no one had yet thought of NATO.

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THE WARSAW UPRISING REVISITED

Andrzej Korbonski

THE first of August 1969 marked the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising. Except for a small group of people throughout the world the anniversary was likely to pass unnoticed. Amateur historians of the Second World War could hardly be expected to remember an event, which, however, dramatic, took place in the final year of the war while monumental battles in Europe and the Pacific monopolized the world's attention. Nevertheless, for some people at least the occasion reopened wounds that a quarter of a century has not healed, bringing back accusations and counter-accusations and adding fuel to a number of lingering controversies.

In the broad context of military operations and political negotiations in the Second World War the Uprising proved to be insignificant and politically it amounted to simply another chapter in the so-called 'Polish question' which was rapidly becoming the thorniest issue facing the 'Big Three'—Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. And yet, it was Stalin's reaction to the Warsaw Uprising which moved George F. Kennan, probably one of the most astute observers of the war, to describe it as 'the most arrogant and unmistakable demonstration of the Soviet determination to control Eastern Europe in the postwar period'.[1] A German writer, Hermann Teske, writing eight years after the Uprising, stated flatly: 'Here—and nowhere else—began the Cold War between East and West'.[2] In the minds of some historians at least, the Uprising proved more important than sheer casualties (lat least 200,000 dead) and destruction could indicate.

Today, after 25 years there is still a good deal of controversy surrounding the Warsaw Uprising. Most of it concerns the role of the Soviet Union in the event, which means that the world is not likely to get the full story of what happened in and around Warsaw during August and September 1944 while Soviet archives remain closed. But there is also a lack of agreement among the actors most directly involved with the Uprising—the Polish politicians and military leaders who gave the final signal for the fighting to begin. And there are still some unanswered questions regarding the role of the Western allies and the actions taken by the Germans against whom the Uprising was theoretically directed. The 25th anniversary of the Uprising provides an opportunity to take stock of the existing controversies and disagreements and to throw some additional light on the entire event.

[1] George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston and Toronto, 1961), p. 365.

[2] In Hanns von Krannhals, *Der Warschauer Aufstand* (Frankfurt am Main, 1962), p. 5.

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The event bore all the marks of a Greek tragedy. It was doomed from the beginning, a point that the leading protagonists preferred to ignore. It was full of tragic irony; alongside a multitude of human errors, many of them avoidable, there were innumerable examples of supreme heroism and courage. Many of the participants emerged from it with a sense of guilt of one sort or another about the futility of the enterprise. Seldom in recent history has such an event been shrouded for so long in half-truths and misrepresentations.

The imposition of the Stalinist regime in Poland and the general climate of the Cold War were largely responsible for the delay in removing a number of misconceptions about the Uprising. On the one hand, the new rulers of Poland considered the non-communist resistance movement as one of their major enemies after the war. Consequently, the Uprising eventually became a non-event and, in the heyday of Stalinism, the members of the underground were officially equated with traitors and collaborators.

On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the resistance leaders who chose to remain in the West continued to glorify the Uprising as one of the greatest moments in recent Polish history and at the same time blamed Stalin for letting the insurrection be defeated.

Among the remaining actors only Winston Churchill spoke publicly on the subject and his version also accused Stalin of failing to help the resistance movement in its hour of need.

And yet, despite this seemingly simple scenario, there remained many questions in the minds of those who participated in the Uprising. The whole story, at least in its Western edition, was just too simple and the dividing line between heroes and villains too neatly drawn. Even though there is a general consensus about the sinister role played by Stalin, there were also some persistent doubts concerning the actions of Polish resistance and government leaders.

The arrival of the 'thaw', the dismantling of the Stalinist system in Poland, and the opening of some archives in a number of countries only increased the lingering doubts. It soon became apparent that the story of the Uprising was much less simple than originally thought. While Stalin and Hitler remained the chief villains, the shining image of the heroic Polish leaders became somewhat tarnished and the same was also true to some extent of at least one Western statesman—Franklin Roosevelt.

The publication of the records of the German Ninth Army, which operated in and around Warsaw in August and September 1944, provided an insight into the military situation around the city's perimeter as seen through the German eyes.[3] In addition, a number of Polish historians in both Poland and the West, published for the first time detailed accounts of the events which preceded the outbreak

[3] Krannhals, op. cit., chap. 4; J. Matecki, 'Dziennik Dzialan Niemieckiej 9 Armii', *Zeszyty Historyczne* (Paris), no. 15, 1969, pp. 76–130.

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of the insurrection and which hitherto, for some inexplicable reason, have not been made public.[4] All the evidence has not been gathered yet but in the final analysis, the only real heroes in the Warsaw tragedy are likely to be the thousands of young men and women who gave their lives in fighting for a hopeless cause.

ON the eve of the Uprising Warsaw was inhabited by about 1 million people. The loss of the Jewish population which accounted for roughly a third of the total was partly offset by the influx of refugees from both Western and Eastern Poland. The destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto in the spring of 1943 meant that a large section of the city lay in ruins mostly as a result of deliberate burnings conducted by the Germans. The majority of the population lived in the part of Warsaw located on the left or western bank of the Vistula, which was less than a mile wide within the city limits.

Following the German victory in September 1939 and the establishment of the so-called 'General Gouvernement' in Central Poland which was to serve as a German colony, Warsaw ceased to be the capital of the country as the German occupation authorities were determined to erase all traces of Poland's independent existence. But as far as the Polish population was concerned, the city remained the symbol and focus of all political and military resistance against the German occupiers.

The organization of the anti-German resistance in Poland began even before the end of hostilities in September 1939. Until the end of 1941 both the civilian and military wings of the resistance were monopolized by parties, groups and individuals loyal to the Polish government-in-exile which, following the defeat of France in the summer of 1940, re-established itself in London.

It was only in December 1941 that a new Polish communist party (the old one having been dissolved by Stalin in 1938) made its first appearance in Warsaw. It was organized by a group of Polish communists parachuted from Soviet planes shortly after Christmas. The new party from the beginning proclaimed its outright hostility to the London government and throughout the rest of the war remained outside the mainstream of resistance, attracting only an insignificant number of followers.

By the end of 1943 the military resistance had reached impressive proportions. Despite attempts by the German occupation authorities to destroy all signs of resistance by massive doses of terror, the underground grew from year to year. Hatred of the Germans combined with the proverbial Polish love of conspiracy, and with the tradition

[4] Jerzy Kirchmayer, *Powstanie Warszawskie* (Warsaw, 1959); Z. S. Siemaszko, 'Lacznose radiowa Sztabu N.W. w okresie Powstania Warszawskiego', *Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 6, 1964, pp. 64–116, and 'Powstanie Warszawskie—kontakty z ZSRR i PKWN', ibid., no. 16, 1969, pp. 5–66; A. Skarzynski, *Polityczne przyczyny Powstania Warszawskiego* (Warsaw, 1964).

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of struggle against foreign occupiers going back to the 18th century, to attract thousands of young Poles to the underground. The so-called 'flower of Polish youth' found itself in the ranks of the resistance preparing for the final confrontation with the enemy.

The leadership of the military resistance consisted by and large of pre-war Polish officers, strongly anti-communist. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939, followed by mass deportation of the local population to areas deep inside Soviet territory greatly angered the traditionally anti-Russian Poles. Anti-Soviet feeling reached its peak in the spring of 1943 when the Katyn massacre of Polish officers, clearly perpetrated by the Russians, was discovered by the Germans.

Thus on the eve of the entry of the Red Army into Poland, the leadership of the military resistance was speaking openly of 'two enemies'—Germany and the Soviet Union—especially after the break of diplomatic relations between Moscow and the London government-in-exile. Stalin's determination to retain Eastern Poland as part of the Soviet Union aggravated the situation.

As long as the German army was far inside the Soviet Union the activities of the Polish underground were limited to sporadic sabotage and partisan warfare, with the main emphasis laid on the training of its young troops. When the tide turned at Stalingrad and the Soviet army embarked on its victorious drive toward the West, the time came to make some fundamental decisions concerning the behaviour of the resistance at the time of German withdrawal from, and Soviet entry into, Poland.

Consequently, in November 1943, the London government-in-exile issued a major instruction to the underground in Poland outlining its views on this particular problem. After some changes made by the leaders of the resistance the final version excluded the possibility of an all-out national anti-German uprising and called only for intensified attacks on the retreating German rearguards. Major cities were to be excluded even from this limited action in order to prevent possible German reprisals against the civilian population. The underground army was ordered to make itself known to the entering Soviet troops and to co-operate with them. Nevertheless, the individual resistance leaders were also instructed to emphasize to the incoming Russians that they were entering Polish territory loyal to the London government-in-exile. The instruction was militarily directed against the Germans and politically against the Soviet Union, thus dealing with the 'two enemies'.

The important thing to note here is that Warsaw was to be excluded from any kind of military resistance activities and that the instruction remained in force until almost the eve of the Uprising. The question of why the order was changed at the last minute and why Warsaw was suddenly chosen as the only Polish city in which open insurrection against the Germans was to erupt is still today a matter of controversy.

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ON 14 July 1944, the commander-in-chief of the underground army radioed the London government from Warsaw that despite severe German defeats in eastern Poland there was still no valid reason to stage an uprising in Warsaw and in the rest of the country until, and unless, the German army showed signs of total collapse. One week later, on 21 July, another dispatch contained an entirely new appraisal of the military situation and envisaged the possibility of an insurrection. Finally, on 31 July, the high command of the resistance ordered the Uprising to begin in Warsaw in the afternoon of the following day.

The story of these 17 days is in itself a tale of personal intrigue and misunderstanding in Warsaw and London, of human naiveté and even stupidity, of lack of clear thinking and of willingness to sacrifice lives for a hopeless cause.

As pointed out by the foremost German historian of the Uprising, Hanns von Krannhals, the decision to launch the fighting in Warsaw on 1 August after opposing it 17 days earlier could only have been justifiable if one of the following five things had happened in the meantime: a basic change in the military situation in the area; a basic change in the Soviet attitude vis-à-vis Poland and the London government-in-exile; a basic change in the strategic plans of the Western allies; a sudden increase in the suffering and misery of the Warsaw population (mass killings, arrests, hunger, and the like); and new, unexpected orders from London or Moscow.[5] As it turned out, although changes did indeed take place in nearly all of these categories, none of them could be described as basic except on the basis of wishful thinking, notably on the part of the military resistance leaders.

To begin with, a new Soviet offensive began on 18 July and within a few days it had made considerable progress bringing the Red Army fairly close to Warsaw. The visible signs of rapid German withdrawal could be observed by the inhabitants who watched with glee endless German columns crossing the main city arteries to the West. It seemed to all that the end was near.

Yet only a few days later the panic gave way to renewed German resistance as fresh armoured troops began to cross the city this time in an easterly direction. Despite this obvious reversal the Polish underground leaders steadfastly maintained their belief that the Germans were decisively beaten and that the entry of the Red Army into Warsaw was only a matter of days if not hours. The resistance leaders could not imagine that Warsaw conceivably might not be the main target of the new Soviet offensive. They assumed from the outset that the Polish capital represented the chief goal of the new Soviet drive.

Even today it is impossible to determine with full accuracy the place of Warsaw in Soviet military plans of the summer of 1944. According to information available in Soviet and Polish Communist sources, the seizure of Warsaw played a subordinate role in Soviet

[5] Krannhals, op. cit. pp. 74–75.

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plans, the main target being the creation of bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula south of the city.[6] To be sure, the liberation of Warsaw through a kind of audacious *coup de main* was not excluded, but it did not represent the centre of gravity of the July offensive.

Whether this interpretation is correct we may never know. German Army documents which have recently become available tend to corroborate the Soviet account. Be it as it may, the Polish underground operated on the assumption that the Russians would enter Warsaw around the beginning of August.

What the Poles did not know was that at the very moment the signal for the Uprising was being given, the same Soviet troops which were supposed to liberate the city were being badly mauled by the Germans and forced to retreat eastward. The Poles simply were unaware of this because their intelligence consisted mainly of listening to the BBC and German and Soviet radio stations, as well as to radio dispatches from the London government. This type of second-hand intelligence was supplemented by oral reports of supposedly personal observers which more often than not turned out to be rumours or fabrications. Thus on the eve of the Uprising, the High Command of the military underground had really no clear idea of the military situation around Warsaw and relied almost entirely on assumptions which were no longer valid.

As to the Soviet political attitude toward Poland, the major change that occurred in the period immediately preceding the Uprising was the formation of the so-called Polish Committee of National Liberation which eventually became known as the 'Lublin Committee', Lublin being the first major Polish city west of the Curzon Line to be liberated by the Russians.

Again it is difficult even today to assess the impact of this development on the decision to stage the Uprising. Clearly, the Polish underground and the London government-in-exile interpreted it as a hostile act. But then a state of hostilities between Moscow and the London Poles had existed for quite some time and the creation of the communist-sponsored quasi-government in Poland was not entirely unexpected. There were, after all, other indications of Soviet intentions which tended to make the latest Soviet act seem simply yet another move against the London government. One such indication was that since the spring of 1944 there had been reports of Polish underground units meeting and co-operating with the Red Army against the retreating Germans, only to be disarmed, arrested, and frequently executed.

By the end of July 1944 it should have been abundantly clear to the Polish leadership in Warsaw and London that the Russians meant business and were determined to impose their puppets on the liberated country. In these circumstances it is hard to understand how the Polish resistance leaders could have based a decision to stage the insurrection

[6] Kirchmayer, op. cit. pp. 56–63.

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in Warsaw on the assumption that the Red Army would come to their help if the fighting got tough.

Another possible reason for staging the Uprising might have been some sudden or basic change in strategic plans of the Western powers. But no such change took place. From the very beginning neither the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington nor the Special Operations Executive in London which co-ordinated resistance activities in occupied Europe expressed any serious interest in the Polish underground.[7] Requests of the London exile government for help and advice were by and large ignored on the excuse that Poland lay in the Soviet theatre of operations and that all resistance activities there should be co-ordinated with the Soviet High Command.[8] The fact that in the absence of diplomatic relations between Moscow and the London Poles such co-operation was virtually impossible apparently did not bother the Western military staffs. Still, the British and the Americans were at least honest enough not to encourage the Uprising and not to raise hopes of any extensive aid.

Even though the Western attitude was perfectly well known to the London government-in-exile, the resistance leaders in Warsaw acted on the assumption that massive Western aid could be expected in the event of the Uprising. A few days before its start the commander-in-chief of the underground radioed London about the need to drop on Warsaw the Polish Airborne Brigade stationed in England, and stressed the necessity of bombing German air bases around the city once the Uprising began. This was an example of the striking naiveté of the underground leaders.

The fourth factor which might have justified the decision to start the insurrection could have been a situation in which the Germans committed mass atrocities prior to leaving the city. In other words, the Uprising would be called to prevent annihilation of the city, very much the way the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of 1943 was meant to limit further destruction of the Jewish population. But there is no evidence that the Germans planned such action at that particular time. Even if it had in fact been contemplated there is no reason to believe that the German authorities would have been able to accomplish it. Shortly before the Uprising all Polish civilians 16 years of age and above were ordered by the Germans to assemble in several places to be used in the construction of the city's defences. The order was ignored

[7] Leon Mitkiewicz, 'Powstanie Warszawskie', *Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 1, 1962, pp. 95–156. The author was the Polish Representative with the CCS in Washington in 1943 and 1944. During the entire war supplies dropped to Poland from the West amounted to 600 tons. The corresponding figures for Greece were 5,796 tons for France and Yugoslavia 10,000 tons each. Jozef Garlinski, *Poland, SOE and the Allies* (London, 1969), p. 147.

[8] For example, a British liaison mission was not parachuted into Poland until December 26, 1944, some two weeks prior to the beginning of the Soviet winter offensive of January 1945. Jan Zamojski, 'Misja 'Freston', Polska Akademia Nauk, Instytut Historii, *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski, Materialy i Studia z okresu II wojny swiatowej* vol. IX, (Warsaw, 1965), pp. 212–13.

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en masse and no reprisals took place. With the front line so close and with many German administration and police officials about to be evacuated to the West, the probability of mass atrocities was rather slim.

THE final motive for the Uprising might be sought in some sudden new orders from the London government-in-exile which left the Warsaw underground leaders with no option but to start the fighting. The attitudes of the London government towards the underground and the Uprising is a story in itself and can only be sketched briefly. To put it simply, following the death of General Sikorski in an aircraft accident off Gibraltar in July 1943, the exile government was deprived of the only individual who had both managed to hold it together and who had also enjoyed at least some measure of prestige among the allied leaders, especially Winston Churchill. Sikorski's successor as premier of the exile government was Stanislaw Mikolajczyk whose past experience hardly qualified him for this particular post. Whereas Sikorski, in addition to Premier, was also Commander-in-Chief of all Polish armed forces, including the military resistance in Poland, Mikolajczyk had to be satisfied only with the Premiership, leaving the supreme command of the armed forces in the hands of General Kazimierz Sosnkowski. There is little doubt that this division of responsibility as well as personal animosity between the two exile leaders did not help matters.[9]

Soon thereafter it became clear that political developments were rapidly weakening the position of the London government vis-a-vis both the Soviet Union and the Western allies. Following the Teheran conference, which resulted in U.S.-British agreement to the incorporation of eastern Poland into the Soviet Union, the exile government ceased for all practical purposes to be an independent actor on the international scene. Mikolajczyk's desperate attempt to enlist President Roosevelt's help during the visit to Washington in June 1944 came to nothing.[10]

Gradually, Mikolajczyk came under the strong influence of Churchill who advised him to seek an accommodation with Stalin. Thus at the same time that the resistance leaders in Warsaw were notifying London that they were ready to take up arms against the Germans, Mikolajczyk announced on 25 July that he was going to Moscow to meet with Stalin. Prior to his departure from London he gave the Warsaw leaders *carte blanche* to start the Uprising at any time selected by them.

[9] According to the Chief of Staff of the Polish Forces in the West, the Premier and the Commander-in-Chief met in person not more than ten times between August 1943 and September 1944 and their telephone conversations were just as rare. Stanislaw Kopanski *Wspomnienia wojenne 1939–1946* (London, n.d.), p. 300.

[10] Nevertheless the President authorized the allocation of $10 million from his emergency fund for the Polish resistance. Similar amounts were granted in 1942 and 1943. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers* 1944, vol. III (Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 1363–66 and 1370.

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There is little doubt that Mikolajczyk wanted the Uprising to break out during his visit to Moscow. A successful liberation of the Polish capital by the resistance loyal to his government would have strengthened his position vis-à-vis Stalin. He could then present the incoming Red Army with a *fait accompli*. It was one thing to ignore or disarm Polish resistance units in small towns and villages liberated by the Soviet troops who then installed Polish communist officials. It was another to have the capital freed by the pro-London underground, thereby becoming a tangible symbol of the Polish determination to resist communism.

It was for this reason that Mikolajczyk did not oppose the idea of the Uprising and simply 'passed the buck' to the underground leaders in Warsaw. He did so despite the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army had been strongly opposed to the Uprising. The latter, however, instead of staying in London to make sure that his warnings against the insurrection were heeded in Warsaw, chose the second half of July as the time for an inspection tour of the Polish forces fighting in Italy. From there he tried to prevent the Uprising from taking place but his final radio dispatch sent to Warsaw via London was not received in Poland until several days after the fighting began. Indeed, there are indications that the General's messages advising against the Uprising were deliberately held up in London by those who favoured it.[11] Thus on the eve of the Uprising, the single most important Polish resistance action of the whole war, both the Premier and the Commander-in-Chief, either of whom could have prevented it, were absent from London, leaving the final decision to the leaders in Warsaw.

IN these circumstances what really motivated the leadership to issue the call for the Uprising was apparently a mixture of idealistic, political and military reasons. This is how the decision to fight was later justified by those of the resistance leaders who after the end of the war found themselves in London.[12] In their view some kind of an uprising in Warsaw was inevitable because the thousands of young, patriotic Poles who had been preparing in secrecy for an armed confrontation with the hated Germans would not have passively permitted the latter to withdraw. The tradition of insurrections against overwhelming odds was an integral part of the Polish upbringing, which stressed the duty of all citizens to die for their country in a just cause. There is no doubt that the psychological atmosphere in Warsaw in the closing days of July 1944 was such as to favour some type of a demonstration against the retreating Germans. But whether

[11] Siemaszko, 'Lacznosc radiowa Sztabu N.W. w okresie Powstania Warszawskiego', op. cit., especially pp. 110–13.

[12] *Polskie Sily Zbrojne w Drugiej Wojnie Swiatowej*, vol. III, Armia Krajowa (London, 1950), pp. 659–61.

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this was a sufficient reason for a mass attack against fortified enemy positions with virtually no weapons is highly debatable.

The political justification for the Uprising ran in terms of the need of the non-communist underground to re-assert its strength and claims with regard to both the West and the East. A victory in Warsaw gained in the name of the exile government could not easily be ignored by the Western allies who would then be obliged to defend the rights of the London Poles against the Moscow puppets. Conversely, Stalin, realizing the determination of the non-communist Poles to fight, would be forced to recognize them at least as equal partners in the negotiations concerning the future of the country. What the Warsaw leaders did not fully realize was that some nine months before, at Teheran, the West had essentially agreed to Soviet demands concerning the future eastern borders of Poland, and from then on it showed little interest in helping the London government which it considered as a growing nuisance. Yet the resistance leaders remained unshaken in their faith that the West would come to their rescue in the event of the Uprising. Two days before the beginning of the fighting a courier of the exile government bringing news and instructions to the Warsaw leadership, cautioned against such expectations.[13] Notwithstanding the order to start the Uprising was issued.

The final reason put forward in justifying the decision was military. The Soviet offensive was expected to reach Warsaw at any moment, so the risk associated with the fighting was not considered serious.

These then were the reasons behind the decision to attack the German troops in Warsaw. Not a single one of them could be described as compelling, most were based on faulty or non-existent information, others reflected a shocking lack of logical thinking, and all were avoidable. Even more tragic was the fact that the ultimate order to start the Uprising on 1 August at 5 p.m. was drawn up the previous day at a meeting of the military and political resistance leaders at 6 p.m., which meant that less than 24 hours were available to notify the thousands of resistance fighters in the city. Furthermore, the final order was based essentially on an unsubstantiated report that the Soviet tanks had been seen on the outskirts of Warsaw.[14] It was this flimsy piece of evidence which persuaded the leadership to give the signal for the Uprising in the afternoon after deciding against it in the morning.

The Uprising itself was initially calculated to last three or four days; it ultimately lasted 63. Only about one in ten of the resistance fighters had some type of weapon, mostly pistols. It was assumed by

[13] J. Nowak, the courier of the London government, reached Warsaw on July 26 and saw the Commander-in-Chief of the 'underground' army, General Bor-Komorowski, on July 30. He told the latter that the impact of the uprising in the allied camp would be a 'storm in a teacup'. *Na Antenie* (Munich), no. 17–18, 1964.

[14] For a good account, see Adam Borkiewicz, *Powstanie Warszawskie 1944* (Warsaw, 1957), pp. 21–28.

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the leadership that the element of surprise and the furor of the attack would substitute for the initial weakness and that additional weapons would be acquired from the fleeing Germans. As it turned out the Germans were not really surprised. They managed to retain the most strategic positions in the city and eventually forced the resistance to surrender.

THE reaction of the Germans to the Uprising was in keeping with their previous attitude toward the Poles. On receiving the news of the insurrection Himmler with Hitler's agreement issued orders to shoot not only captured resistance fighters but also non-combatant men, women and children. The whole city was then to be razed to the ground.[15] Consequently, during the first half of the battle thousands of civilians were killed on the spot. In a single day, 5 August 1944, about 15,000 persons were killed by German SS and police units. Detachments, probably the most cruel and vicious in the entire German military machine, were ordered to Warsaw to combat the Uprising. They included a notorious penal SS brigade composed of criminals as well as another SS unit formed out of anti-communist Russians, the commander of which was subsequently executed by the Germans who were themselves shocked by the atrocities committed in Warsaw during the early stages of the Uprising.[16]

Eventually the mass shootings of civilians ceased but the executions of captured insurgents continued until the pressure of the Western allies induced the Germans to accord the resistance members the protection of the Geneva Convention. Consequently, after the collapse of the Uprising in early October the majority of the insurgents were taken to regular POW camps rather than to concentration camps. On the other hand, Hitler's orders to destroy Warsaw completely were carried out even after the surrender. The entire civilian population was evacuated from the city and special demolition squads proceeded methodically, block by block, to destroy all that remained standing. In fact, most of the destruction of buildings and property took place *after* rather than *during* the Uprising.[17] Only the seizure of the city by the Red Army in January 1945 prevented the complete disappearance of Warsaw.

Even though the Western powers were not greatly interested in Polish resistance activities, Churchill, who was largely responsible for sending Mikolajczyk to Moscow on the eve of the Uprising, could not remain wholly indifferent once news of the insurrection reached London. Thus on 4 August he sent a message to Stalin informing him of the fighting and, in a somewhat oblique fashion, asking for Soviet

[15] Krannhals, op. cit. p. 309.

[16] Ibid. pp. 315–20.

[17] Kazimierz Sobczak, 'Warszawa w planach niemieckich po stlumieniu Powstania', Polska Akademia Nauk, Instytut Historii, *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski, Materialy i Studia z okresu II wojny swiatowej*, vol. VI (Warsaw, 1962), p. 189.

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aid. Stalin's response on the following day expressed disbelief in the possibility of the Uprising and made no reference to aid. Following additional messages urging aid, Stalin on 16 August finally acknowledged that the Uprising was underway but at the same time he officially dissociated himself from the 'Warsaw adventure'.[18]

The only way Western aid could be delivered to Warsaw was by dropping weapons and ammunition from the air. Warsaw lay beyond the operational radius of Allied air forces stationed in Britain and only planes based in Italy were capable of making the drop and returning back. Several runs were made but the outcome proved disappointing. Great distance and short summer nights were responsible for the high casualty rate and many planes were shot down before they even reached their destination. Furthermore, the city itself resembled a checkerboard with Polish and German positions interspersed, making the drop areas quite small. Even in daylight this called for pinpoint, precision drops. Since the overflights could only be made under cover of night, a good many drops landed in German hands.

Finding himself under increasing pressure from the London Poles and presumably feeling more and more disgusted with the Soviet attitude, Churchill began to think in terms of larger amounts of aid to be dropped from Allied planes by shuttle flights between Britain and the Soviet Union. This type of operation required Soviet permission to land on Russian soil. The initial Soviet response denied that permission in no uncertain terms. It was at this time that Churchill decided to enlist the help of President Roosevelt and both of them appealed to Stalin on 20 August asking once again for permission to land. Following Stalin's refusal Roosevelt appeared willing to let the matter drop but Churchill was not ready to give up so easily.[19]

Towards the end of August the British Prime Minister suggested to the American President that they send planes regardless of Soviet refusal; Roosevelt demurred although he did not object to Churchill's alone challenging Stalin on this particular issue. It was becoming quite clear that the question of aid to the Warsaw fighters was something that the President did not want to get involved with too deeply. On 5 September, he sent the following telegram to the Prime Minister: '. . . I am informed by my Office of Military Intelligence that the fighting Poles have departed from Warsaw and that the Germans are now in full control. The problem of relief for the Poles in Warsaw has therefore unfortunately been solved by delay and by German action, and there now appears to be nothing we can do to assist them. . . .'[20]

The President's statement appears somewhat premature as the Uprising did not collapse until the beginning of October, almost a month

[18] Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, 1953), p. 134.
[19] Ibid. pp. 139–40.
[20] Ibid. pp. 143–44.

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later. Furthermore, despite his belief that all was over, two weeks later 107 US Flying Fortresses dropped weapons and ammunition on Warsaw, having finally received permission to land in Soviet territory.[21] The massive drop was too late to change drastically the course of the Uprising. The great majority of the containers landed on German-held parts of the city. Nevertheless the psychological impact of the overflight was tremendous and probably helped greatly in prolonging the fighting for another two weeks or so. The sight of hundreds of multicoloured parachutes floating slowly in bright sunshine over the burning city was not likely to be forgotten by the insurgents.

Stalin's denial of landing rights to US planes ferrying aid to Warsaw was undoubtedly the clearest manifestation of his desire to see the Uprising defeated and the city destroyed. In the minds of many observers, it was part and parcel of the overall Soviet policy which sought the largest possible destruction of the country in preparation for the communist takeover.[22] The same argument was also used to explain the apparent sudden stop of the Soviet July offensive at the gates of Warsaw and also the unwillingness to help the insurgents during August and the first half of September.

In the middle of September Soviet troops finally occupied the city on the right bank of the Vistula. On the other side of the river small groups of the insurgents held the river edge while much larger pockets of resistance continued fighting in the centre and on the outskirts of the city. Still no serious Soviet attempt was made to cross the river except for a handful of Polish troops fighting under Soviet command, although such a crossing of the Vistula should not have been more difficult than that of many Russian rivers in 1943 and 1944 when the German resistance was most likely even stronger. The attempted crossings were poorly staged and co-ordinated and were easily repelled.[23] In this case, the German rear was also threatened by the insurgents, making any potential crossing easier than elsewhere.

So far no convincing evidence has been provided by the Soviet side to justify the passive behaviour of the Red Army after the middle of September. While similar inaction prior to that date could be explained by the defeat of the forward echelons of the Soviet army at the eastern approaches to Warsaw in early August and the subsequent need to re-group in order to resume the offensive, no such explanation suggests itself for the period following the Soviet seizure of the right bank of the river. In the absence of evidence to the contrary it must be assumed that the Red Army was in the position

[21] According to an official US Air Force account President Rossevelt ordered that the mission to Warsaw on 18 September 1944 be carried out despite the opposition of the War Department, which regarded it as both costly and hopeless. A second operation was planned but Stalin seems to have refused permission on 2 October 1944. *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. III (Chicago, 1951), p. 317.

[22] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (Boston and Toronto, 1967), pp. 210–11.

[23] Siemaszko, 'Powstanie Warszawskie—kontakty z ZSRR i PKWN', *Zeszyty Historyczne*, No. 16, 1969, pp. 25–55.

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to cross the Vistula and liberate the city at any time after 15 September. Apparently the German Ninth Army which defended the Warsaw perimeter expected a massive crossing after 21 September and felt that it could not prevent it.[24]

Thus it can only be assumed once again that Stalin was hardly interested in aiding the underground. To be sure, Soviet artillery did sporadically fire on German positions in the city and Soviet planes occasionally appeared over Warsaw but the practical effect of both was insignificant. At night, slow flying Soviet planes dropped supplies to the Poles but since most of the weapons were improperly packed, only a relatively small number of them could be used by the resistance.

FROM Stalin's standpoint the Uprising did pose a problem for the Soviet Union. A successful liberation of Warsaw by the underground loyal to the London government-in-exile would greatly complicate Soviet plans. By remaining passive and letting the Germans do their work, Stalin managed to kill several birds with one stone. To begin with, the destruction of the city was to be done by the Germans and not by the Russians, with the latter eventually appearing as liberators. Second, the collapse of the Uprising meant ultimately the collapse of the entire organised military and political resistance in the rest of Poland which tended to be strongly anti-communist. Third, the defeat added greatly to the mental and physical fatigue of a Polish population already badly weakened by five years of German occupation and hardly able to put up spirited resistance against the communist takeover. Finally, it could hardly fail to evoke once again the feeling of many Poles of having been betrayed by the West which, as in September 1939, had failed to come to the aid of their country.

What would have happened had Stalin decided to come to the aid of the Uprising in August or September? There is little doubt that he would have been hailed as a true liberator by the Poles largely willing to let 'bygones be bygones'. On the other hand, however, he would have been faced with the strongly anti-communist underground whose strength would have remained essentially unimpaired. Presented with this kind of a choice it is not surprising that Stalin chose the former safer policy by letting the Uprising run its full course. The rashly improvised, unsuccessful crossings undertaken by the Polish troops under Soviet command could be interpreted as an attempt to impress both the Western public opinion and the Polish population with Stalin's willingness to help the insurgents. Once the crossings failed, as they were bound to in the circumstances, Stalin could then claim that overwhelming odds prevented the repetition of similar efforts.

Thus Stalin's behaviour, however cold blooded, was perfectly rational within the context of Soviet plans for the future of Poland and Eastern Europe as a whole. It is quite possible that this was

[24] Ibid. p. 65.

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not fully realized in London and Washington although Churchill, to judge by his own words, at least suspected Stalin's game but was unable to do anything because of Roosevelt's inclination to look the other way.

As regards the German attitude, the determination to make Warsaw another Carthage was the logical culmination of the long-standing desire to eradicate the Polish nation. Speaking to Hitler on the day the Uprising began Himmler expressed well the feeling of the Nazi leadership: '. . . Historically, what the Poles are doing is for us a blessing. . . . After five, six weeks Warsaw will disappear, Warsaw, the capital, the head of the 16–17 million Poles, a people who blocked the East for us for 700 years . . . standing in our way. Then, historically speaking, the Polish question will no longer present a problem for our children, for us and for all those who will succeed us. . . .' [25]

Only this attitude can explain the senseless destruction and atrocities committed by the Germans. From the military point of view, the Uprising did not present a serious problem for the German commanders in the field. Some have argued that the main reason the fighting lasted 63 days rather than a week was that only second-hand troops, including SS and police, were used in combating the Uprising which was not considered important enough to engage frontline troops.

WHAT then has been learned about the Uprising in the last 25 years? Are the early theories and interpretations explaining the whole event still valid today, and if so, which ones?

Judging by the available evidence it would appear that the 'conspiracy' theory which accused Stalin of allowing the Uprising to be defeated, has withstood the test of time. To be sure, the disclosures contained in the German military records as well as detailed studies of the movements of the Soviet and Polish armies, published in Poland and the USSR, cast some doubt as to the ability of the Red Army to liberate Warsaw in the early days of August, even if such an action were seriously contemplated by Stalin.

However, no such doubts remain with regard to Soviet behaviour in the latter part of the Uprising. As pointed out earlier, the Red Army in the middle of September was capable of crossing the Vistula and saving the Uprising. The unsuccessful landing attempts can be regarded primarily as useful propaganda measures intended for Polish and Western consumption, rather than serious efforts to defeat the Germans and enter the city. The sudden granting of landing rights to US planes which occurred at roughly the same time only strengthens this interpretation.

Secondly, it has now become abundantly clear that the Polish civilian and military leaders in London and Warsaw were guilty

[25] In Krannhals, op. cit. p. 309.

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of serious political naïveté and military shortsightedness, and that their decision to start the Uprising on 1 August, could hardly be justified.

No attempt was made to inform the approaching Soviet Army about the outbreak of the insurrection even though it was assummed that the same army was to come to the aid of the Uprising. This assumption had no rational basis whatsoever. The excuse, frequently put forward by those responsible for the outbreak, that the Soviet-sponsored Polish radio broadcasts had been urging the people of Warsaw at the end of July to rise against the Germans and had promised them help, cannot be taken seriously. Such broadcasts were routine and should have been interpreted as such by the leaders of the resistance. More clear-cut evidence was available to them in the fate of uprisings in Wilno and Lwow, which not only proved to be dismal failures but also demonstrated Soviet unwillingness to treat the insurgents as allies.

Finally, it must also be stated that the criticism of the supposedly passive Western behaviour with regard to the Uprising, still occasionally heard among some of the epigons of the Uprising does not stand close scrutiny. The fact remains that especially Churchill, and to some extent Roosevelt, attempted to help the insurgents and if the aid proved relatively insignificant it was due primarily to Stalin's intransigence and partly to a very high cost of lives and equipment.

WHAT has been the Uprising's impact on the Poles themselves? The collapse of the insurrection proved by and large that Stalin's calculations were correct. Following the defeat of the Uprising the whole resistance movement in Poland disintegrated, paving the way for a quick communist takeover. The young underground fighters who would likely have provided the backbone of anti-communist resistance were either killed in Warsaw or sent into German captivity. Only relatively few of them returned to Poland after the end of the war and even those that did lost their willingness to fight still another enemy. The same applied to the civilian population for whom the failure of the Uprising represented a severe psychological shock. On the other hand, the postwar reconstruction of the destroyed capital provided the new communist leadership with a tailor-made rallying point around which to unite the hostile or indifferent population. The whole country joined in the massive effort to rebuild the city under communist auspices. Next only to the Oder-Neisse Line the reconstruction of Warsaw became a focus of consensus between the communist regime and the non-communist population.

The Uprising has had some more enduring effects on the Polish people. The heavy price paid by the country in this event left an indelible mark on both the old and the young generations. The traditional devil-may-care approach reflected in a series of similar uprisings in the past gave way for the first time in recent Polish history to a new attitude of sobriety and cold logic. This meant that

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in October 1956 Poland managed to avoid the fate of Hungary and did not revolt against Soviet oppression. No doubt, it was also largely responsible for the recent lack of resistance against the new Soviet hard line, in striking contrast to the behaviour of Czechoslovakia and Rumania which in the past could hardly have been described as paragons of recklessness. Prudence is the surviving part of Polish valour, so costly in 1944, and cynicism, ever the refuge of the dislusioned romantic, finds fertile ground in Poland, where the lessons of the Warsaw Uprising have apparently been well learned.

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THE LIBERATION OF PRAGUE: FACT AND FICTION

Ewald Osers

THE liberation of Prague in May 1945 has long been a piece of communist folkore. It has also been the subject of a good deal of argument among historians. It is the more surprising, therefore, that an important and unique body of authentic evidence has never before been systematically examined. I refer to the verbatim transcripts of Czech, German and Russian radio broadcasts, monitored by the BBC's Monitoring Service and available in its archives.

Unlike personal recollections, which are apt to be coloured by later knowledge or hearsay elements and to be unwittingly transformed into first-hand memories, and unlike the deliberate politically-motivated re-writing of history, these transcripts of broacasts, made at the time, are totally untainted by subsequent developments and represent a genuine, authentic hour-by-hour (and often minute-by-minute) record of what happened—or what each of the protagonists said was happening—during those final days of the Second World War, between 5 and 12 May 1945.

It is very easy, in retrospect, to dismiss the Prague Rising in May 1945 as an unnecessary, quixotic gesture. Certainly the course of history would have been much the same without it. All the evidence suggests that, once the German Reich had unconditionally surrendered, the German Wehrmacht and Waffen SS units in Central Bohemia would have tried in any event to be taken prisoner by the American forces in preference to the Russians. But this is an argument from hindsight. We must remember that neither the Germans in Prague nor the insurgent Czechs who took control of the city in the name of the Czechoslovak Government knew at the time, or could have known, that the US Army would be halted short of Prague, between Pilsen and Beroun. We must also remember that, both for political reasons and for such imponderables as national honour or self-respect, the idea of themselves liberating the nation's capital and subsequently welcoming the US Army entering it from the West and the Soviet Army from the East must have seemed exceedingly attractive.

Stalin has now been dead for 17 years. In the heyday of Stalinism, the official version was that Stalin, the wise leader and teacher, personally heard Prague's call for help and immediately ordered the Red Army to liberate the city. What were the facts? The following compilation of the contemporary evidence (i) explodes the myth that the Red Army, in response to Prague's call for help, raced to the city, crushed stubborn German resistance, and thus saved the city from destruction by the Germans, (ii) demonstrates the important, and possibly decisive, part played by the Vlasov Army—a role hushed up both by communist

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and Czech nationalist myth makers, and (iii) attempts to trace the first beginnings of the communist legend.

ON 5 May 1945, at 11.38 local time, the following call for help was broadcast by Prague radio: 'We request the Czech police, all Czech soldiers, all Czechs to come to the radio building immediately. We need help!' This call came, suddenly and dramatically, from the station known as Prague II, which only a few minutes earlier had been carrying the German-controlled Protectorate home service.

Let us recall briefly what the military situation was on that 5 May. The armies of the Western Allies had nearly everywhere reached the line along which they were to link up with the Soviet Army, and German troops were surrendering to the Western armies in their thousands. Along their eastern front, the Germans were falling back rapidly, but still putting up a good deal of resistance to the Red Army's relentless pursuit. On 5 May, then, US forces had reached the western frontier of Bohemia—a distance of roughly 80 miles from Prague—while the Red Army was about half-way through Moravia, in the Ostrava and Olomouc region, a distance of some 150 miles from Prague.

German military resistance in the West has just collapsed. Only the previous evening the act of capitulation of a million German troops in the north-west had been signed at the headquarters of the British Field Marshal Montgomery. The American armies, under Generals Bradley and Patton, had already reached the western frontier of Czechoslovakia, and the Supreme Allied Commander in the West, Eisenhower, had just sent a message to Moscow offering to send the American armies across the Czechoslovak frontier and on to liberate Prague—if Stalin had no objection. But in the East, although the Red Army was already mopping up in Berlin, the German resistance was still determined, and the Red Army was still far from Prague.

The people of Prague did not know then that the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army, General Antonov, had angrily rejected Eisenhower's message as soon as the American General Deane had handed it over in Moscow. Stalin insisted that the Americans must not advance further east than the line Karlovy Vary-Pilsen-Budejovice. In his report about this, which General Deane published in 1947 General Deane noted the official Soviet attitude at the time of the Prague rising: 'Czechoslovakia was to be in the orbit of the Soviet Union, and Czech gratitude to America for the liberation of her capital was not part of the program.'

A Czechoslovak government formed by the fusion of President Benes's government-in-exile in London and the Moscow-sponsored Czechoslovak National Committee, and now recognized by all the Allied and most of the neutral countries, was in Kosice, in eastern Slovakia, waiting for the moment when it could move to Prague. The

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Germans, though increasingly harassed by Czech partisans in the wooded countryside, seemed until that dramatic broacast to be still in firm control of Prague and the other towns in Bohemia.

At 17.35, six hours after the first broadcast for help, a second transmitter appeared to be in the hands of the Czech patriots—the transmitter called 'Böhmen' by the Germans, situated at Melnik, about 15 miles north of Prague. It asked listeners to stand by for a proclamation of the Czech National Council—the first mention of a leadership behind the Rising. At 18.15 the Czech National Council announced its seizure of control in Greater Prague and declared its allegiance to the Czechoslovak Republic. A few minutes later, at 18.26, the station—now announcing itself as 'Prague, Czechoslovakia', called on the population to erect anti-tank obstacles along the road from Benesov to Prague, since German tanks were advancing on Prague along that road. Simultaneously—in English and in Russian—it called for Allied air support, especially by ground attack aircraft, against the German tanks.

By the evening of the first day of the Prague Rising, 5 May, the Prague II transmitter—calling itself 'Station Prague, Czechoslovak Radio'—was calmly and efficiently putting out instructions to hospital staff, factory workers, etc. At 21.27 the newly established Czech National Council broadcast an ultimatum to all German SS units still offering resistance:

> The Protectorate and the German Administration no longer exist. The majority of their representatives are in the hands of the Czech Armed Forces and the Czech National Council. . . .

Three hours later, however, it looked as if the Germans had somewhat regained their grip and as if the situation was taking a dangerous turn for the Czechs.

At 00.53 the call went out in English: 'Prague calling the US Army, calling the Allied Army, calling the Army at Pilsen: Send your tanks—send your tanks and aircraft. Help us save Prague. . . .' An hour and a half later the note was getting more desperate. In English and in Russian, Prague radio appealed to the Allies: 'The Germans have encircled Prague and are advancing on it. Prague needs help. For God's sake help!'

What the Czech National Committee in Prague did not know was that Stalin had just categorically rejected Eisenhower's proposal that the American tanks should push on from Pilsen to Prague on a practically open road. The nearest Soviet forces were three times as far off, in the Ostrava and Olomouc region, and the road was not yet open.

Another call for help, specifically to the Russians, went out at 02.10, addressed to a Lt-Col. Sidorov of the Fourth Department of the People's Commissariat for State Security, in Kiev: 'We ask urgently for parachutist help. Combat aircraft are needed!' Even the

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dropping area was specified, at the Olsany cemetery in Prague. Appeals for help continued to be broadcast by the Czech-controlled Prague II transmitter throughout the early hours of the morning, including one asking, in English and Russian, for confirmation that it had been received. Whereas confirmation was broadcast by the BBC within a very short time, no such acknowledgment was broadcast by the Russians. We shall deal with the Russian reaction, or perhaps one should say 'non-reaction', later.

AT this point a new actor was brought on to the stage—the Vlasov Army—an almost forgotten force which was destined to play an important and possibly a decisive part in the struggle for Prague, even though this story was later to be hushed up and suppressed. In the earlier stages of their war against Russia, when German propaganda still presented the German troops as liberators of the Russian people from their Bolshevik rulers, the Germans had organised an army of Russians willing to fight on the German side. This army was commanded by a General Vlasov. In the course of the German retreat this Vlasov Army, at the beginning of May 1945, found itself in Central Bohemia, in the area of Prague. It was not by then an important force to the Germans, but it had something the Czech insurgents were desperately in need of—it had some armour and it had armour-piercing weapons.

Picture the situation of this Russian force—a satellite of the Wehrmacht which was rapidly disintegrating, regarded as traitors by the Soviet Union whose victorious armies were about two days' march away. If they were captured by the Soviet forces they would not be treated as prisoners of war but executed on the spot. Small wonder, therefore, that an urgent wooing began for the allegiance of the Vlasov Army. At 03.28 the Czech-controlled Prague II transmitter appealed in Russian:

> Officers and soldiers of Vlasov's army! We trust that in this final phase of the struggle against the German invaders you, as Russians and Soviet citizens, will support Prague in its insurrection!

And while appeals for help to the Western and Soviet armies—unfortunately unavailing—continued to be broadcast at frequent intervals throughout the morning, an announcement at 05.20 said:

> Units of General Vlasov's troops, fighting on our side against the Germans, have so far disarmed 10,000 Germans in the area west of Prague.

Throughout that day—6 May—the German and Czech-controlled radio stations in Prague broadcast conflicting situation reports and claims, but from the confusion it gradually became clear that negotiations of sorts were taking place between the Czech National Council and the Command of the German Armed Forces, with the latter visibly giving ground as the day wore on.

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One of the reasons of the German's increasing discomfiture at Prague was revealed in a Czech-controlled broadcast at 22.30 on 6 May:

> To the citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic: Help has come! The Allied divisions are approaching Prague. General Vlasov's units arrived here today.

And while, unfortunately, the approach of the Allied divisions was halted at Pilsen, the news about Vlasov's units was correct. The Vlasov Army had decided to try to save their skins by throwing in their lot with the Czech insurgents.

In a desperate attempt to stop the Vlasov Army from turning their German-supplied weapons against the German troops, the German-controlled Prague I transmitter, at 00.32 on 7 May broadcast in Russian an urgent emotional appeal to the Vlasov Army:

> Officers and men of Gen. Vlasov's Army of Liberation, first allies of the German people in its heroic struggle against Bolshevism, you know better than anyone what would become of the civilised world if Bolshevism, which had enslaved and devastated your Motherland, emerged victorious from the struggle we have now been waging for nearly four years. . . .
> It is true the fortune of war has turned against us German soldiers; we have laid down our arms before the West. But our struggle against Bolshevism shall not cease, and we shall not lay down our arms before it. We expect the same from you, our allies, volunteers who have freely come over to our side.

But it was no use. By 03.51 on 7 May, the Czech-controlled radio announced that: 'General Vlasov's troops are in the area of Unhost-Prague and entered Prague yesterday'. Eventually, at 05.07, General Vlasov demanded the surrender of all German forces in Greater Prague:

> Gen. Vlasov's Army HQ appeals to all German Armed Forces in Greater Prague to capitulate unconditionally. Should these orders be disobeyed, all means will be used until complete annihilation is achieved. Prague has been encircled by us. (Signed) Gen. Vlasov's HQ.

The Germans, it seems, intended one more last-minute appeal to the Vlasov Army, for at 11.20 the German-controlled Prague I station announced: 'In a few minutes the Command of the German troops in Bohemia-Moravia will address officers and men of Gen. Vlasov's Russian Army of Liberation'. But that broadcast, in fact, never went out. The Vlasov Army had turned against its former masters.

Useful though the Vlasov Army's help was to the Czech insurgents in Prague, it was profoundly embarrassing to the Czechoslovak Government which had a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Government and was anxious not to compromise its political alignment. On 6 May Dr. Hubert Ripka, a Minister in the Czechoslovak Government, in a broadcast therefore called on the Czech insurgents not to accept Vlasov's

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help. 'We don't want help from traitors', Ripka said; 'we have only scorn for their offer. Do not stain the clean shield of anti-German resistance by allying yourselves with the Vlasov traitors', he urged the Czechs.

Finding itself cold-shouldered by the Czechs and growing increasingly alarmed at the relentless advance of the Soviet Army, the Vlasov Army took the only course open to it: it disengaged itself at Prague, drove and marched hurriedly towards Pilsen, and there surrendered to the US Army.

But on Sunday 6 May, it seemed that the Americans were also answering the call for help from Prague. They advanced beyond the line laid down by Stalin and entered Klatovy, Strakonice, Pisek, Radnice, Zbiroh, Zdice and Beroun. At 07.48 that Sunday morning, Prague II announced in Czech: 'The British and US tanks are advancing on Prague', adding in English: 'We salute British and US armies who are coming to help Prague'.

Next day, Monday 7 May, the first American light armed vehicles—three of them—reached the outskirts of Prague. But Stalin's anger quickly sent them back again to Pilsen—taking the form of an order from Supreme Headquarters in the West, which not even the headstrong General Patton dared disobey.

About half-way through 7 May it seems that discipline among the German troops was collapsing. Their High Command had unconditionally surrendered—though, as far as they knew, only to the Western Powers—the Soviet Army was relentlessly approaching, and now these irritating Czechs had thrown up barricades throughout the city, making it difficult for them to get away. By midnight all serious fighting was over. At 22.25 the Czech-controlled Prague II transmitter broadcast an announcement by the Military Commander of Greater Prague to the effect that an officer from the staff of the U.S. First Division had just called on him and shown him the divisional orders for 7 May:

> which make it clear beyond doubt that the Germans have unconditionally surrendered to all three Allied Powers, hence also to the Soviet Union. The capitulation was signed on 7 May 1945. On 8 May defensive measures by the Allied Armies may still continue, and at 00.00 on 9 May all military operations will cease.

This visit by an American staff officer on 7 May is interesting because it gives the lie to the official communist version—restated quite recently, in April 1970—that the U.S. forces were quite unable to press on to Prague. It confirms, if indeed such confirmation were needed, that they had been halted in the Pilsen-Beroun area by superior orders and not by German opposition.

By midnight of 7/8 May the Germans in and around Prague had decided, if at all possible, to get out towards the West. Surrender to the Czechs seemed no more attractive to them than surrender to the

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Red Army. The US forces were less than two hours' driving time away. It seemed worth a try.

A number of statements broadcast during the early hours of 8 May make it clear that negotiations between the German and Czech authorities were going on, and that the Germans were using their shelling of targets in the city as a form of blackmail to get the Czechs to agree to let the Germans withdraw without harassment. At 05.04 the Czech radio eventually announced the unconditional surrender of the Germans in Prague, and at 21.00 the terms of the agreement were at last clearly spelled out: the Germans would stop shelling the city provided the Czechs co-operated in letting them pull out fast. The protocol went on to specify arrangements for the departure of German women and children, the release of Allied prisoners of war, the handing-in of German weapons, the removal of demolition charges from buildings and bridges, and ended with the words: 'The Czech population will cause no difficulties in the withdrawal of the German units'. A little later, during the night, a statement by the International Red Cross, broadcast by Prague radio, actually requested the Czech population 'to facilitate the German troops' passage through the barricades' along seven exit routes specified in detail.

IT is perfectly clear from these and other announcements over the radio that—even though sporadic gunfire continued for a few more hours, and even though a number of SS troops went on committing brutal acts of spite, like shooting up civilians in air-raid shelters—the struggle for Prague was over by the end of 8 May. The Germans had been moving out of the city and its neighbourhood since 6 p.m. Prague, in every sense of the word, was in Czech hands. Throughout the night the German withdrawal continued. At 01.10 on 9 May Prague radio announced: 'Prague has held out and emerged victorious'.

While the Germans were getting out of Prague as fast as they could, during the night and the small hours of the morning, the Red Army was now approaching the city. The population who, until 24 hours earlier, had been urged to build barricades and who, only three hours before, had been asked to clear a passage through them for the departing Germans, were now asked to clear a passage through them for the Russians. At 07.05 Prague radio announced:

> Here is an order from the Commander of Greater Prague: 'I order the population of Greater Prague to give all possible help to the glorious Red Army. The barricades will remain. Where, however, the Red Army ask for their removal to make way for tanks, the roads must be cleared with the greatest possible speed.'

A few minutes later, at 07.18, the radio announced: 'The glorious Red Army is entering *free* Prague'. And half an hour later, at 07.43, came another call for assisting the passage of Soviet troops:

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> Soviet tanks, crushing the remnants of German resistance, are rapidly advancing through Prague. The population will welcome them and assist their passage through the barricades.

An hour later, at 08.49, the Soviet entry into Prague was formalized by an exchange of statements:

> Lt-Col. Zaytsev of the Soviet Army called on the Czech National Council and made the following statement: 'Our troops have entered Prague to liberate her brave people, so close to the Russian nation. We have no intention of forcing on you one type or another of administration for the Czechs are good patriots and well able to rule their own land. In the desire to come to your help as quickly as possible our forces proceeded at a speed unparalleled in the history of warfare. I am happy to have had the honour of being one of the first officers of Marshal Konev's Command to come to you. Prague is a very beautiful city worthy of the brave nation whose capital it is. I expected nothing else. Prague is what the Russian people imagined it to be. The Soviet Union has no other aim than to liberate the Czech people. The Red Army will liberate the Czech people from German tyranny'. The Deputy Chairman of the Czech National Council replied: 'We welcome the representative of the glorious Red Army which day and night with a speed unknown in the history of warfare hurried to the aid of the heroic people of Prague. The Czech people welcome their brothers, the Red Army men, and will show in every possible way the love and gratitude they cherish for the glorious Red Army'.

The name of the Deputy Chairman of the Czech National Council, who here pledged his nation's 'love and gratitude' to the Red Army, was Josef Smrkovsky, one of the leading liberalizers of 1968 and the man most viciously reviled by the Russians and the Czechoslovak 'orthodox' communists since. It is ironical that, 23 years later, he should bitterly oppose and condemn another Soviet entry into Prague.

At 10.15 the radio announced:

> The Russian troops have passed through Stare Dejvice, the Chotek Park, and Klarov, where a German tank section put up stiff resistance. After this was broken, the Russians, led by Ensign Devit of the Government troops, crossed the bridge to the Chamber of Deputies. The Old City Square, the Powder Tower and St. Wenceslas Square are already occupied by Russian troops. This report has been issued to reassure our people. This means that Prague is completely cleared of German troops. We call on citizens to take charge of any German subjects in their houses so that they may be prevented from threatening anyone's safety. Ensign Devit.

It is a curious statement, published in the name of a very junior officer, and it is difficult to believe that the operation against a German tank platoon in the Klarov Square, an operation led by an ensign,

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was the decisive battle of liberation into which it was presently blown up. We shall have occasion to come back to it.

At 12.44 the radio announced the following order by the Military Commander of Prague: 'In order to facilitate the Red Army's rapid passage through Prague, the Military Commander of Greater Prague orders the immediate removal of the barricades with the help of the civilian population'. The Russian Army was moving through Prague, chasing the retreating Germans.

At 13.24 Prague radio broadcast the text of two telegrams sent by the Czech National Council—one to President Benes and one to the Czechoslovak Government in Kosice. The text of both these messages is of particular interest. The one addressed to President Benes read:

> The Czech National Council, representing the people who, by their Rising, conquered Prague and broke the power of the German forces—which capitulated yesterday, 8 May 1945, begs to report to you: We know in these glorious days and hours that you have been and are with us in spirit. The people joyfully awaits your homecoming. Signed for the Czech National Council: Professor Albert Prazak, Josef Smrkovsky.

The message to the Government stated:

> By a revolutionary rising of the Czech people in Prague and throughout the country, the liberation of our countries from the German occupier has been achieved. The German forces in Prague and throughout the country have capitulated. The Government has been handed over to the people and its representatives.

It is worth noting that these two official telegrams—just as the earlier message welcoming the Red Army's entry into 'free Prague'—squarely attribute the city's liberation to the Czech insurgents.

It is, of course, entirely possible—especially after Germany's unconditional surrender on 7 May—that the Germans would have pulled out of Prague before the Red Army's arrival even without the Czech Rising. The point here is merely that, apart from some stragglers trapped by the barricades, the German troops had left Prague before the Russians entered the city. But now that the Russians were in Prague—the hoisting of the Soviet flag on Prague Castle was reported by the radio at 16.15—the myth-makers soon got to work. At 21.00 a reportage, made by a recording van accompanying the Soviet troops, declared:

> At this moment Prague is being liberated by the Red Army. On the wide Klarov Square stand the last defeated German tanks. The Red Army dealt with them quickly and effectively. The tanks are burning.

And this was the action led by an ensign! Anyone familiar with the topography of Prague will know that the Klarov Square is a piece of flat ground perhaps 150 yards deep between the river and the steep slope of the hill on which stands the Castle—so steep in fact, that the

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road descending to Klarov Square makes three hairpin turns. The suggestion that a German tank platoon should deliberately choose this spot—with their backs to the river and facing the Soviet formations roaring down the steep slope towards them—for a last stand to hold Prague against the Russians is, of course, absurd. The German tanks, one must assume, somehow did not manage to get away in time, and if they were offering resistance it was not to hold Prague for the Germans but quite simply to resist arrest.

On the morning of 10 May, at 08.00, Prague radio broadcast a message from the Czech National Council to Marshal Stalin:

> On behalf of the entire Czech nation, which rose to shake off the cruel tyranny of the German fascists, we cordially greet you on the day when the victorious Red Army had entered our city, *thus completing the liberation of Prague.*

The message was signed by Prazak and Smrkovsky who, a few hours earlier, in their telegrams to Benes and the Czechoslovak Government, had not yet credited the Red Army even with 'completing the liberation of Prague'.

But subtly the emphasis was shifting. Later in the day, when the Czechoslovak Government arrived by air from Kosice, Prague radio—at 18.12—relayed the following address of welcome by Smrkovsky:

> Brothers, members of the Czechoslovak Government! On behalf of the Czech National Council I welcome you to liberated Prague. On 5 May, after six years of bitter suffering, the Czech nation rose, hurled itself with bare hands on the armed forces of occupation, wrested their weapons from them, and after four days of bloody fighting, routed the occupation troops in Prague, controlled the major part of the city, and after four days, and with the help of the glorious Red Army—which after a legendary march had reached Prague—the last resistance of the fascist hordes was broken. The Czech National Council, as the representative of the Czech people—who have made tremendous sacrifices, fought, suffered and died for six years—welcomes you in the hope that by a united effort we shall build a new, popular and democratic Czechoslovak Republic. We thank you for having come, and we once again thank the glorious Red Army.

HERE one may take a closer look at Smrkovsky's claim of the Red Army's 'legendary march' on Prague, and his earlier statement, when welcoming the Soviet troops on 9 May, that

> 'The Red Army, day and night, with a speed unknown in the history of warfare, hurried to the aid of the heroic people of Prague.'

No one, I think, would quarrel with the statement about the unprecedented swiftness of the Soviet advance. The speed with which the Soviet armies swept westwards across their own frontiers once they had dealt their crushing blows to the German Wehrmacht was certainly

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quite staggering and has been acknowledged by military experts everywhere as being unprecedented on such a broad front. Nor would anybody deny that the liberation of Czechoslovakia would have been impossible without the Red Army's tremendous victories over the Germans. What we want to examine here is whether there is any evidence at all that the Russian armies made any special effort—beyond their general rapid westward drive—to come to the aid of Prague in response to the city's appeals. And the answer to this is quite clearly no.

On 5 May, the day of the Prague Rising, the Soviet radio—which was monitored continuously by the BBC—made no mention whatever of the events in Prague, either on its home service or in any of its foreign language transmissions. On 6 May, when Prague radio repeatedly broadcast calls for help in Russian, including a specific request for parachutists from Kiev, Soviet radio neither reported the Prague Rising to its home audience nor referred to it in its Czech language broadcasts. Only one foreign-language transmission, a news bulletin in German for listeners in Austria, quoted the BBC—I repeat, the BBC—for the news that a patriotic rising had broken out in Prague. On 7 May there was no mention on the Soviet radio, and none again on 8 May.

It is possible that the Russians were displeased with the Czech Rising and that they would have preferred Prague to receive its freedom from the hands of the Red Army. I think it more likely that they just were not too interested. And who can blame them? Infinitely more important things were happening. The greatest war in Russian history, a war which had claimed 20 million Soviet lives, was about to end in total victory. On the day the Prague Rising broke out Soviet troops were battling their way into the ruins of Berlin, the Nazi capital; Hitler had taken poison and the Third Reich was in its death-throes. On the following day, while Prague was calling for help, the Soviet armies took Breslau and swept on through the Silesian industrial region. Goebbels killed his family and then himself. The next day saw the fall of Dresden and Chemnitz, and the German Reich surrendered unconditionally.

Is it likely that, with these enormous events occupying the Russians —as witnessed by their broadcasts—they would interfere with the rapid movement of a vast military machine, that they would change complicated orders or improvise, merely to save a few buildings in Prague from being shelled by German field-guns, when they had left behind them the vast ruined cities of their own country?

The ninth of May, the day the Russians entered the city, was celebrated in the Soviet Union as Victory Day. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the entry into Prague did not figure very prominently on the Soviet radio. That day's broadcasts contained accounts of the signing of the German surrender, a lot of patriotic poetry, a long Victory Day leader from *Pravda*, and a relay of a Capitulation Cere-

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mony in Berlin. Not until 16.45 Moscow time did the Soviet radio broadcast Stalin's Order of the Day No. 368:

> Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the Commander of the troops of the First Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev, and the Chief of Staff of the Front, Army General Petrov.
>
> Troops of the First Ukrainian Front, as a result of a swift night manoeuvre by tank formations and infantry, having broken enemy resistance, today, 9 May, at 04.00, liberated from the German invaders the capital of our ally Czechoslovakia, the city of Prague.

This was followed by the customary list of units which had distinguished themselves in the operation and by the order that 24 salvoes were to be fired from 324 guns. Later that evening the Soviet radio broadcast a victory speech by Stalin. There was no more mention of Czechoslovakia or Prague.

The real nature of the Russian operation which involved the capture of Prague and—as we have seen—their anxiety to pass swiftly through the barricades is revealed very clearly in the Soviet communiqué of 10 May, which dealt with operations on the day before:

> German troops under the command of Field Marshal Schoerner, violating the terms of the instruments of capitulation, refused to stay and lay down their arms. Troops of the First Ukrainian Front therefore attacked Field Marshal Schoerner's troops and in their advance on Czechoslovak territory occupied the towns of Podborany, Beroun, Dobris. . . .

and half a dozen other places not far from Prague. The Germans were on the run, and the Russians were anxious to catch them.

It is important to point out that, just as the Russians took no notice of the Prague Rising or the city's call for help, they at no time claimed that they had hastened to the city's aid to save it from destruction by the Germans. The only exception—as we have seen—was a remark by a Russian lieutenant-colonel, who led the first party of Soviet officers into the city, that 'in the desire to come to your help as quickly as possible . . .' the Red Army had advanced at an unprecedented speed. But this statement was not re-broadcast on Soviet radio, and no claim of any special effort to save Prague was made at that time either on its home service or in external broadcasts. The legend was being manufactured not in Moscow but in Prague. By the evening of 11 May the new version was firmly established. Even an official telegram from the Czechoslovak Government credits Stalin with having personally instructed his forces to go to the assistance of the fighting city. As broadcast by Prague radio at 18.00 it read:

> Marshal: The Czechoslovak Government, after its return to the liberated capital of the Czechoslovak Republic, expresses its deepest gratitude for your magnanimous decision to send the brave soldiers of the First Ukrainian Front to the assistance of fighting Prague. The brave tank divisions of the First Ukrainian Front,

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> led by Col-Gen. Rybalko, contributed after a marvellously speedy advance at the decisive moment to the victorious conclusion of the heroic fight of the people of Prague. The Soviet forces have not only liberated Prague, but have saved this beautiful historic city from destruction by German vandals. We assure you, Marshal, that the people of Prague and the people of the entire Czechoslovak Republic will thank you for ever from the bottom of their hearts for your noble act of liberation. Signed: Premier Fierlinger.

A similar telegram, likewise signed by Fierlinger, thanked Marshal Konev for 'coming to the assistance of the fighting people of Prague and by a determined and rapid advance deciding the liberation and rescue of the city'. That evening the new relationship was further sealed by the hoisting of the Soviet flag at the National Liberation Memorial in Prague. The myth-makers had won the day.

BUT where, one might ask, in all these liberation celebrations was the Czechoslovak Army, that band of a few thousand men who had volunteered to fight for the liberation of their country, who had often escaped from their German-occupied native land to join the Czechoslovak Army in the West or the First Czechoslovak Corps formed in the Soviet Union?

On 12 May, at 06.00, Prague radio announced:

> Last night, at about 19.00, the first unit of the Czechoslovak Army, a special motorised detachment of Gen. Svoboda's First Czechoslovak Corps, arrived in Prague. It had travelled from Zilina via Trencin, Nove Mesto-on-Vah, Piestany, Trnava, Hodonin, Brno, Jihlava and Kutna Hora. It was given a rousing welcome everywhere. On its way through Prague, via the Stalin Boulevard, Narodni Boulevard, the Embankment, the Charles Bridge and up to the Castle, it was joyfully acclaimed by the crowd. Flowers were literally heaped upon the soldiers. . . .

It seems almost unbelievable: 'Last night, at about 19.00'. Two days earlier, when the first units of the Soviet Army arrived, the radio put out what was very nearly a running commentary on their progress through Prague, and a radio recording van—as we have seen—drove along with the Soviet tanks. Yet when the country's own army enters its liberated capital it takes the radio eleven hours to report the event!

Why the delay? We cannot now be sure—but I am inclined to think that the answer can be found in Prague radio's review of the Czech press of 12 May, the first issues of the daily papers since the liberation, in fact the first free papers published in Czechoslovakia for over six years: 'Today's Prague papers carry numerous descriptions of Prague's enthusiastic welcome to the Red Army'. The communists were not prepared to share the limelight. History, it has been said, is written by the victors.

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CEAUSESCU'S LAND

Anthony Stuart

ACROSS the top of the Maramures, through Bucovina and down the river Prut until it joins the Danube at the head of its delta, and so out into the Black Sea. This is Rumania's frontier with the Soviet Union, a long sinister line of fences and watch-towers, strips of finely raked earth and, at night, glittering searchlights. It is daunting enough as a monument to the divisions of history; as a European frontier in 1970 between two allied socialist countries it seems an inhuman anachronism.

Yet less than two years ago, in August 1968, when the citizens of Prague and Bratislava were hurling abuse and cobblestones at Russian tanks, that line of fences seemed a pitifully inadequate protection. In the Rumanian border areas, the peasants were locking themselves in their wooden cottages, cramming their larders with maize flour and white cheese. It was what they had learned to do in the Middle Ages, and nothing had happened since to make them change their ways. For time and time again, foreign invaders had streamed across the Danube, the Tisa, the Dniester and the Prut (the 'accursed river' in popular songs), washed over the rich lands of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania and lapped against the fastness of the Carpathian mountains. The last time the Russians came was in August 1944, 'liberating' the Rumanian people with Soviet guns and Soviet ideology. But they had withdrawn in 1958. Then, in August 1968, 10 years later, few Rumanians believed they were not about to return.

It is impossible to forget the mood in Rumania in the days immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In Bucharest's Piata Republicii, a hundred thousand cheering, waving Rumanians crammed into the open space cleared by the former King Carol to protect his royal palace; and, answering an emotional call by the President and General Secretary of the Communist Party, Nicolae Ceausescu, they promised bloody resistance to the invader. One young couple cancelled their wedding reception rather than miss the occasion. But there was also fear. Older people were reliving the nightmare of 30 years before. A toothless old man grabbed me by the elbow and whispered, 'Many dogs will eat a lone wolf'.

The younger generation shared the feeling of resigned impotence, one student I remember telling me that he felt Rumania had been lucky enough already, with 10 years free from Russian troops. Others acted more positively, filling in forms to enlist in the 'Patriotic Guards'—a reserve unit of doubtful military effectiveness, but considerable psychological force.

Meanwhile, all the time, rumours of troop movements at the frontiers, of fighting between Rumanians and Hungarians in Transylvania, of American, even Chinese, promises of support, criss-crossed

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the capital as fast as the telephone wires could carry them. For the first time in over 20 years of communism, the rulers and the ruled had fused into one patriotic unit with one common cause, resistance to the menacing Russians.

Dramatic times, but of course transitory. For the invasion never came, and bit by bit over the coming weeks and months and years the realities of life reasserted themselves.

THE fact remains that Rumania is a vulnerable land, militarily indefensible, economically weak. The recent floods have, in some estimations, reversed all the progress of the last five to ten years. Even before this disaster, the economy was under stress, with food—particularly meat—far from abundant. Rumania is also in a particularly precarious diplomatic situation, having many friends but no reliable allies. To be a member of the Warsaw Pact, as the case of Czechoslovakia has shown, is only to invite attack in the name of common socialist security or, even worse perhaps, it may mean being called to the Soviet Union's aid in the event of a war against China. These are the constant realities for Rumania, and the freedom gained in the nineteen-sixties in the area of foreign affairs counts for very little in comparison. The one positive gain from the years of astute diplomacy is that Rumania has avoided the fate threatened by Khrushchev of becoming a sort of vegetable garden for the mighty industrial Soviet Union. On the other hand, trade with, and credits from, the west, which was a corollary of the victory within Comecon, have yet to pay dividends in terms of a stable economic growth, free from the possibility of outside pressure.

But the story of Rumanian diplomatic and economic balancing is well enough known. What is less known is the reverse side of Rumania's international front: the cost the people have to pay to permit Ceausescu the freedom of manoeuvre he needs in order to keep east and west evenly balanced on the Rumanian fulcrum; the personal price of the policy of 'independence, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries', which justified Rumania's non-involvement in Czechoslovakia and angered those in the Kremlin who believe in the 'superior' doctrine of proletarian internationalism.

On the plus side—though I admit this amounts to very little—Rumanians have had the chance to let off two decades of compressed anger against the Russians. Although Russians are a traditional enemy, I am convinced that the exploitation of Rumania after the Second World War, the era of the Soviet-Rumanian 'joint' companies, seizures and reparations, and the whole process of imposing a foreign revolution on a naturally unrevolutionary people, did more to exacerbate anti-Russian feeling than any single event in the past. Indeed, in the past, the Russians did not always appear in the guise of an enemy; at the battle of Plevna in 1878, for instance, they fought beside

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the Rumanians and together they defeated the Turkish army and set the seal on Rumanian independence. This is not forgotten even though, at the time, goodwill was soured by the arrogance of the Russian generals and the violence of their troops, and gratitude was undermined by the Russian seizure of southern Bessarabia immediately after Plevna. Today, the Rumanians still regard the Russians as people outside the circle of European civilisation to which they feel passionately that they themselves belong. I am reminded of a story told me one evening in Bucharest, a true story by the way.

A lady from Iasi, in Moldavia, a lady with social pretensions, was instructed to provide a home for an officer of the Allied Forces at the end of the war. A French officer, quiet, respectable and cultured, presented himself and was quickly accepted. After a few weeks, during which the lady and the French officer discoursed on Lamartine and Valery over glasses of exquisite French wine, a Russian officer appeared at the door requesting lodgings. He told the lady that he was no less a personage than General B——. Impressed by the Soviet gentleman's swagger, and by his fur-lined greatcoat, medals and moustache, she pretended to the lower-ranking Frenchman that she needed his room for a long-lost relative, and took in the Russian. A week later, the Russian officer held a party for some of his friends. They broke the house up completely, ruining the lady's antiques, and were found by her the next morning in a smelly, drunken heap on her carpet. When he came to, the general apologised so profusely, and replaced her broken and stained antiques with such promptness and extravagance, that she forgave and forgot. But the next week the same thing happened, and the next, and the next. Meanwhile he had become involved with the lady's niece, who was unable to requite his love. One night, after a drunken party given to try to forget this girl, he shot himself, scattering his brains all over the beautiful wall-paper. No wonder the lady was delighted when the French officer accepted her invitation to return. The civilised heirs to the culture of Rome were re-united. All was well again.

BUT it would be quite wrong to say that Rumania is at present in a state of anti-Russian ferment or anything like it. That may have been a true description of a few days in August and September 1968, but not since. For in Rumania, Party control is absolute. The diplomatic campaign against the Soviet Union—from the fight nearly ten years ago for Rumanian independence within Comecon to the Nixon visit and so on up to the present day—all this has been instigated and controlled by the Rumanian Communist Party. It is no reaction to popular pressure. Not that any Rumanian I met wishes to embarrass the Party in its nationalist role. While the possibility still theoretically exists of a reversion to an old-guard pro-Russian regime (in 1967 there were rumours of an unsuccessful 'palace revolution' inspired by

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Moscow), it is impossible that any bid for power by the extreme right-wing could succeed in normal circumstances. No one wants to encourage the sort of abnormal circumstances in which it could succeed.

I can best illustrate this with two quite different examples. The first is the (apparently unique) student demonstration in December 1968. Accounts of it differ, but it does appear that the original intention of the students was to hold an anti-Soviet demonstration and march to the Soviet embassy in Bucharest. However, the militia heard about it and persuaded (as far as I understand the situation, that is not a euphemism) the students to desist. The students saw the militiamen's point, and allowed the demonstration to peter out harmlessly. The second illustration is a general one: it is the fact that there is seldom a hint from official sources—nor, in my experience, in private—that the Soviet-annexed territory of Bessarabia, which is now the 'Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic' should be returned to Rumania. It is obvious that the Sovietisation of that part of Moldavia which lies between the rivers Prut and Dniester is a constant provocation to Rumanian sensibilities—which are even more offended when attempts are made by the Russians to show that the language the people speak in Bessarabia is not the same as that spoken in the Rumanian Socialist Republic, or that a new batch of happy Moldavian volunteers has left for the sunny pastures of Kazakhstan. Bessarabia is generally agreed, by Party and people, to be taboo, too liable to produce a backlash if ever the issue were opened up again.

Of course it is not only with regard to the Russians that the Party maintains a delicate balance between satisfaction of national pride and non-provocation of an historic enemy. Rumania is beset by a minority problem within the country, and the balance here can be just as delicate. When I was in Rumania immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, one of the most persistent rumours was that Hungarian tanks had 'accidentally' strayed over the Transylvanian border and had been welcomed with flowers and shouts of joy by the Hungarian-born and/or Hungarian-speaking villagers on the other side. The centuries-old dispute over the ownership of Transylvania still erupts whenever there is a military or diplomatic crisis in the region. Not a few Rumanians told me in August 1968 that Hungary's reluctance to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia was only overcome by a promise of a leading role in the next stage of operations—the invasion of Rumania. But of course things were not quite like that and personally I do not believe that a conflict between Rumania and Hungary is a serious possibility. Not that the ties of socialism are too strong. It is more that Hungary could only succeed with the active support of the Soviet Union—and in the framework of a wider Soviet aggression—and that support would not be welcome to the Hungarians; indeed it would also guarantee the unacceptability of any imposed settlement to the Rumanians. Nor do I believe that any but a few

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extreme nationalists in Hungary are seriously planning the re-incorporation of Transylvania—or even a part of it—into their country. There is probably a good deal less cause for dispute than there has been for hundreds of years, given the mildness of the pressures of Rumanianisation in Transylvania and the relatively relaxed atmosphere among the different nationalities today. My impression is that the Hungarian minority—indeed Transylvanians generally—are justified in feeling economically depressed by the union with (and control from) the less-developed 'Old Kingdom' of Wallachia and Moldavia. But Bucharest does appear to recognize that the price for national harmony is an enlightened attitude towards the rights of the minorities, in spite of the fact that many individual Rumanian bureaucrats interpret these rights in the light of their own prejudices.

But there was a dangerous moment in 1956. As the bitter struggle was being fought in Budapest, the Rumanian communists naturally enough feared that the Hungarians in Transylvania would seize the occasion to revolt also. So martial law was imposed, and I heard stories how trains laden with Russian troops passed through Transylvania on their way to Hungary while Rumanian troops gave local shows of strength. But the Rumanian people just looked on. They, with their natural caution and keen eye for a futile gesture, stood aside, praying that no one would be fool enough to blow up the troop trains on Rumanian soil or divert them from their original destination. If they themselves had to put up with Soviet-imposed communism, they did not see why the old enemy, the Hungarians, should not have to put up with it too. That, obviously, is over-simplified and over-cynical. But it does present an interesting parallel to the reactions of the Rumanians to the events in Czechoslovakia.

Rumanians are not pioneers of freedom—unlike the Yugoslavs, the Poles, the Hungarians and, finally, the Czechoslovaks. They have always in history preferred the role of the bending reed to that of the proud oak. While Rumania has gained from the slow process of liberalisation in east Europe which Yugoslavia and then Poland and Hungary set in motion, for reasons of both inclination and geography she has consistently followed the trend, not set it. This explains the double disillusionment that many people have expressed to me after the failure of the Czechoslovak experiment. In the first instance, the Rumanian reaction was one of enthusiasm that yet another country had volunteered to risk its own freedom in the cause of greater freedom in all east Europe. The fact that it did not work this time (too fast, too direct, they say) was bad enough. But now Rumanians fear that the Russian reaction has destroyed the only hope Rumania had of achieving anything in the way of a tolerable life—which is to say a mixture of pride in national independence, a sufficiency of food and a more or less free circulation of people and ideas throughout Europe, east and west. Creeping freedom is no longer a reality, because that

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depended on a quiet inconspicuous advance behind the cover of the pioneers. Now that cover has been removed.

HAVING returned recently from Rumania, I have been able to compare the moods and attitudes in the country today with the situation before and just after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Where once there was a mood of optimism—with an almost unnaturally popular communist leader; an agreed attitude of controlled, rational defiance of Soviet pressures; the prospect of more money and more food as credits and goods came in from the west; the prospect of more passports for more people, and a certain renaissance of the arts in celebration of the death of socialist realism—this mood has now disappeared. The floods have now deepened this pessimism.

On the political side, the realization that communism cannot, or is not allowed to, have a human face and that Soviet conservatism is a reality that shows no sign of change or development, all this has produced a feeling of despair. Nicolae Ceausescu has retained a large measure of the popularity he gained, overnight, as a result of his speeches in August 1968. But it is obvious to one and all that the best he can do is hold on to the position he has gained in the international arena and avoid the drastic consequences of going too far or too fast. As for money and food, one need look no further than the meat queues. Three years ago, although meat was not exactly plentiful, and eggs were erratic (Rumanian eggs were exported to Bulgaria to fulfil the trade plan), a meat shop without meat would have excited angry comment. Now a meat shop with meat —and I mean real meat, not pork fat and salami—would be a rarity indeed. It is available in hotels and restaurants, but with the customary mark-up in price. At the same time, the number of people visiting the West has been reduced to a trickle by new rules and regulations which insist, to give one example, that not only do invitations have to be issued formally to applicants for passports, but they have to be accompanied by the fare as well. The only gain from the 'good old days' in 1967 and 1968 which has remained—so far—is the freedom to paint, sculpt, compose and, within tighter limits, to write according to personal, non-tendentious conviction. The fluid censorship of the Unions, and the fact that the state still has a virtual monopoly as a purchaser, inhibits full freedom, but an artist's political involvement—in the correct manner—is no longer the sole criterion of success as it was in the first two decades after the war.

But artists and writers are not the bulk of the population. The majority are more concerned with food to eat than food for thought. And there is a general feeling in factories and offices and on the farms that a quarter of a century of socialist rule—indeed, of any rule—ought by now to have produced the goods. Political setbacks can be seen with the traditional fatalism and, short of outside intervention, forgotten. But the daily struggle to get to work by seven in the morning

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(and that is for office workers, others start earlier), to buy food and clothes from standardized but low—quality and irregular stock, to lead a private life in overcrowded rooms, is a nagging and ultimately exhausting reality. It is made even worse by having once glimpsed the prospect of a brighter future. Today in Rumania I get the overwhelming impression that everyone is, quite simply, tired.

People are tired in the country and in the towns. The life of a peasant is tough when the weather and the prices are fine, and when he can take a pride in his own achievements. But on the collective farms depression can and has led to a widespread desire not to co-operate. I do not believe that in any country the poles of peasant individualism and collectivization have ever been satisfactorily reconciled—not in Europe anyway, and certainly not in Rumania. I vividly remember walking between two fields in the rich arable country of Oltenia, the first time I went to Rumania. The contrast between the hectares of stunted, weed-ridden maize on one side of the path and the elegant stalks of the private plot on the other was striking—and sad too. For it was the mass of town-dwellers who were going to suffer from the neglect, and the peasant and his family alone who would profit from his proud labours. But years of deliberate discrimination against agriculture, with the low prices for the peasants that resulted, cannot be undone overnight, however much the Party is now trying to divert funds to rescue the situation. It will be a long process, the return to a more rational balance between agriculture and industry.

Fortunately, Rumania is so naturally rich that under any system of management things grow (the harvesting of the crops, however, is not so automatic). More than enough food for Rumania's twenty millions is grown in the country. But the shops in Bucharest, or Iasi or even the more prosperous Cluj, do not reflect the richness of the fields, nor do the markets do justice to the quality of the fruit and vegetables as they come off the farms. For one thing, a huge proportion of Rumania's agricultural produce is exported to pay for machinery, particularly western machinery, and for another the domestic distribution system is riddled with regulations and restrictions, which result in the situation, for instance, that the old and half-rotten fruit must be sold before the fresh supplies can be released on the market. The same principle is the reason for the otherwise inexplicable rarity of fresh bread and milk; it is no one's responsibility to see that the market gets what it demands, nor, besides, is there any financial inducement to do so.

The day-to-day frustration of finding that all the shops in town have run out of apples on the same day, or that a hundred people before you have heard that the little store on the corner had a consignment of fresh eggs, is compounded by the very system of buying in the shops, with queues to buy a ticket, and queues to collect the goods, with the risk that what you paid for in the first queue will have been sold

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out by the time that you get to the head of the second. Again, in the Danube delta, I fished with a bent hook for ten minutes and caught lunch for four; few people have ever seen fresh fish in Bucharest shops. It is a favourite joke that one Rumanian planner has the same destructive power as six American missiles, but it is unfair to put all the blame on the planners. The plain fact is that Rumania is squeezed between east and west, and neither is prepared to help out for nothing. So the price for prosperity is the deprivation of the people. The drawback is that too high a price has been paid for too long. And the people are, as I said before, enervated, exhausted.

Fatigue of course soon leads to apathy, which is what the government dreads. Rumanian independence from Soviet control was only possible because of the economic progress made under the socialist system. This inspired the confidence necessary for the resistance to Soviet pressure, initially in the purely economic sphere, and then in the wider, political context. But now, in a difficult political period, the steam seems to have gone out of the economy. Bad harvests have certainly had a lot to do with this, Soviet obstructionism possibly too (although I found no one who could or would confirm my suspicions), but above all the people have little energy left to work hard—and even less incentive. The state has no money in the coffers to increase wages—a recent widespread bonus scheme is said to have the remarkable and devious effect of reducing wages—and so it is left with political pressure. But on a disillusioned population, even the excellently organized secret police can have little positive effect. Factory workers are tired of being hauled off to 'pep-talks' and meetings, especially as they have to make up for the time thus lost at the workbench. And they are tired of having to look over their shoulders before they dare voice a complaint. This too is all part of the vicious spiral which leads from disillusionment to inertia to economic stagnation to disillusionment. . . .

One factor which makes it especially difficult to break out of this cycle is the bureaucracy. Foreigners are spared the mindless vagaries of Rumanian bureaucracy unless they are there to do business or decide to make a sudden change in their itinerary. I remember once being summoned to a remote police headquarters in the region of the Bulgarian border to register my arrival in the local seaside resort—a remarkably time-consuming and unnecessary performance; I remember too being stopped at one of the red-and-white police control posts which stand every fifty kilometres along the main roads and which exist, as far as I know, solely to check on illegal private use of public vehicles. But for Rumanians, the suffocating presence of the bureaucracy affects their every activity. Although Rumania was always plagued by bureaucrats, it used to be the custom to by-pass it by waving a banknote. If this sort of practical corruption failed to demonstrate Gibbon's definition of corruption as 'the most infallible symptom of constitutional liberty', at least it eased the problems of

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living in a poor country. But today, the bureaucracy, as the instrument for the application of the Party's decisions, is unavoidable. It pays little attention to the wishes of the people, as opposed to the wishes of the Party. There was, for example, a law passed about four years ago by which divorce and abortion (the only available means of contraception in Rumania) were simultaneously and for all practical purposes abolished. The object was in a sense achieved, for the birth rate went up. But the desperate shortage of living space was made even worse—especially as the divorce law was followed soon afterwards by sweeping increases in rents.

THE results of living in a society hemmed in by rules and regulations is that people are called upon to make endless compromises with authority. There is the old story of the candidate for an official position who, when tested for his reliability, answers that on every issue the Party line is entirely correct, but when finally he is asked whether he has any opinions of his own, replies: 'Oh, yes. But I don't agree with any of them!' People are reduced to obeying and evading orders, and avoiding initiative at all costs. They spend a great deal of time and energy soliciting favours, or a position of influence for themselves, from those who have already made it. What is even more sad, they are driven to inform on their friends and acquaintances in order not to fall foul of authority. This is not a situation unique to Rumania, but in the circumstances of external danger and the consequent maintenance of strict internal control by the Party and the bureaucracy, it is especially depressing.

And always in the background is the deadly efficient secret police, the *securitate*. In spite of the amnesties of the great majority of political prisoners in the mid-sixties, and Ceausescu's criticisms of the police apparatus and his sacking of the Stalinist police chief, Alexandru Draghici, the organization remains intact. Purges of the apparatus or no, it still has on its files the names and deeds of all miscreants and social undesirables. Today it is the knowledge of this threat, and the memories of the arrests of, after all, only a few short years ago, which ensure the voluntary obedience of the people.

I wish I could sound more optimistic. I have travelled all over Rumania, seen the incomparable variety and beauty of the country, and its natural riches, and been received everywhere with nothing but generosity and kindness. I have seen something of the nobility of the struggle to introduce a semi-medieval country to the twentieth century—and the contrasts this produces, as wobbling farm wagons dragged by buffaloes, themselves goaded on by peasants in coloured sheepskin waistcoats and thin white trousers, creak by along the perimeter of the giant steel complex at Galati; as schools and hospitals spring up in remote places and electricity wires thread their way across deserted landscapes. Not all the claims of the regime are propaganda by any means. (Nor yet are all the apparent benefits so

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fruitful, however: hospitals and schools, as well as new industries, need many more skilled and dedicated men and women to run them than they are getting at present.) But the struggle for progress has been a genuine one, and battles have been won. The trouble today is that a great many Rumanians are starting to feel that, however many battles are won, the war, inevitably, will be lost, that the outside forces are too great, that those who hold the power within the country, though often unfitted, will never relinquish it, that Rumania is, and always was, cursed by fate.

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R & D IN BUCHAREST

*Lloyd Jordan**

IN the summer of 1965 the Rumanian regime launched an all-out drive to upgrade and expand its scientific and technical effort. This campaign can be divided generally into two major phases. The first phase was inaugurated at the Ninth Congress of the Rumanian Worker's Party (RWP), held in July 1965, and dealt primarily with the overhauling of the national science policy and planning procedures and institutions. The second phase was set in motion at the RWP's Central Committee plenum in October 1967 and resulted primarily in reforms in the administration and financing of scientific research and education.

The reasons for Rumania's drive to improve its scientific and technical effort are political and economic and must be sought within the context of both its foreign and domestic policies. This article will discuss the reform measures being implemented by the regime and then consider the two major developments which are shaping Rumania's new national policy on scientific research and technical development, which are: (1) scientific and technical integration schemes sponsored by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and (2) Rumania's determination to pursue a comprehensive economic development programme.

SINCE 1948 the Rumanian communist regime, following the Soviet model, has sought to harness the scientific and technical resources of the nation to support national economic plan goals. This effort has been pursued through the formulation of scientific policy and plans by the Party and the government.[1]

Although the RWP establishes the broad policy guidelines for scientific research and technological development for a given plan period through its directives on research, complaints voiced at the Ninth Party Congress and in the press attest to major shortcomings in establishing specific scientific and technical research priorities. Ceausescu has blamed the neglect in Rumania of certain fields of science, such as automation, electronics, and the chemistry of macromolecular compounds, in large part to the absence of an effective institution at the national level to establish scientific research priorities and co-ordinate planning.[2] Moreover, recent press complaints reveal that in many cases research plans of institutes and laboratories do not conform to national plan directives and are not tied into support of economic plan goals. Apparently, a considerable amount of work is

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not in any way be construed to reflect the official views of the U.S. Government.

1 Traian Savulescu, 'The Academy of Sciences of the Rumanian People's Republic', *Rumanian Review*, November–December 1948, p. 16.

2 *Scinteia*, 21 December 1965.

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conducted purely on the basis of the interests of the individual scientists. Duplication of research by institutes under the Academy, economic ministries, and higher educational institutions and the concomitant waste of scientific and technical manpower and material resources was also blamed, in large part, by Ceausescu on the absence of a rigorous and systematic review of the research plans emanating from the three main sectors of the country's research effort.[3]

To improve the co-ordination and planning of the nation's scientific and technical effort, Ceausescu proposed, and the Party Congress approved, the establishment of the National Council for Scientific Research. This high-level body, established in December 1965, is directly under the Council of Ministers and is headed by Gheorghe Buzdugan with the rank of minister. Designed to improve the co-ordination of scientific and technical policies of the three major sectors of the Rumanian research effort, the Executive Bureau of the Council includes *inter alia* top-level representatives from all sectors of the scientific community.[4]

The Council has been granted wide powers. To mention only a few of its most important functions, the Council has the authority to: (1) work out a single national plan comprising priority scientific research problems drawn from the plans drafted by the Rumanian Academy, institutions of higher education, and the ministries; (2) control the implementation of the national research plan; (3) co-ordinate Rumania's foreign scientific and technical relations; (4) co-ordinate the activities of the scientific and technical publishing houses; (5) study various facets of Rumania's scientific and technical effort and make appropriate recommendations to the Party and government leaders; and (6) survey the nation's requirements for scientific and technical manpower as well as educational policies and make recommendations to the government concerning these subjects.[5]

THE administrative structure within which Rumania's research effort was conducted between 1948 and 1968 was a result of a *gleichschaltung* of the organization of R & D by the communist party carried out in 1948. The USSR's organization of research and development was used by the Rumanian regime as a model for organizing its own effort. As a result, scientific and technical activity is conducted in three groups of institutions; 53 institutes of the Rumanian Academy, 164 research units and 48 large laboratories under the economic ministries, and in the four universities and a number of specialized higher education institutions.[6] Despite much pressure exerted by the communist leaders on the Academy to conduct more applied research, it has remained the major centre in Rumania for carrying out basic research. The bulk of applied research has been carried out in the

[3] Ibid. 20 July 1965.
[4] *Agerpress News of the Day*, no. 313, 31 December 1965.
[5] *Scinteia*, 21 December 1965.
[6] *Contemporanul*, 1 August 1969.

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institutes and laboratories under the economic ministries while the education institutions perform both applied and basic research. This vertical institutional structure has fostered compartmentalization of the scientific and technical personnel working in the three systems. This in turn has resulted in poor communication among the scientists and technicians; a waste of scientific manpower and resources through duplication of research; and a serious lag in the transformation of research results to new technology.

Major reforms in both the management and financing of Rumania's scientific and technical effort were launched at the plenary session of the Central Committee in October 1967. They are intended to help solve a number of the problems mentioned earlier. These reforms are an integral facet of a broader reform of the administration of the entire economy. Rumania is the last of the European communist countries to embark upon a more pragmatic approach to the management of its economy. Preoccupied with its programme of rapid industrialization and its drive for economic and political independence, the Rumanian regime appears to have paid less attention to the efficiency of its economy than the other European communist regimes. By mid-1966, however, the Rumanian press reflected the increased concern of the regime with improved economic management and planning. The directives issued by the Central Committee at the close of its October 1967 meeting revealed the regime's acute awareness of the need for reforms in both the R & D and economic sectors to support its current programme for industrialization.

As a result of the October 1967 plenum resolutions, the economic ministries, which have hitherto exercised highly centralized control over even the most minute details of R & D administration, were relieved of much of their administrative authority. In turn, the ministries have been directed to concentrate on the formulation of policy, monitoring of plan implementation, the provision of scientific and technical information services to the units under them, and the formulation and co-ordination of R & D policy within their respective sectors. They are also responsible for conducting international relations in their respective spheres of responsibility. A new type of institution—the industrial centre—has been placed between the ministries and the enterprises. These centres have assumed many of the operational administrative responsibilities formerly vested in the ministries. They administer scientific research and planning institutes except in those cases where institutes serve a number of industrial centres. In the latter case such institutes have been placed directly under the ministry which is responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the centres. The industrial centres are responsible for: the planning and co-ordination of the scientific and technical activities of the enterprises under their jurisdiction, providing scientific and technical support to the enterprises, keeping abreast of scientific and technical developments on a world-wide basis directly connected with their respective fields of

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activity, and the planning and development of new production technologies. The industrial centres have been organized in two ways, horizontally and vertically. The horizontal-type industrial centre administers a number of enterprises and R & D institutions that are engaged in one type of production, while the vertical-type centre administers such organizations working in different but closely related production and R & D activities. The enterprises are under the direction of the industrial centres and in some cases administer laboratories and pilot-plant facilities.[7] The operational administrative authority of the enterprises over R & D and production has been strengthened under the reform.

Following the general pattern established in the other European communist countries in recent years, the Rumanian regime has embarked upon the implementation of new methods of financing scientific research and technological innovation. These reforms are intended to bring about a more efficient use of research facilities and manpower, to tie the research activities of institutes more closely to the needs of the economy, and to improve the application of research results to production processes. In general, research activity is now financed in three ways: from the state budget, from the funds of the research institute, or from both the state budget and the research institute's own funds.[8] Special emphasis is being placed on contractual arrangements between research institutes and production organizations in which the institutes will strive to cover the expenses of their research and make a profit. All research activity, however, is not placed on the contractual or cost accounting basis. A number of priority research activities receive their funds directly and totally from the state budget.

Another important factor hindering scientific research and particularly technological innovation is the inadequacy of Rumania's scientific and technical information system. Despite a 1964 reform which resulted in a centralized information service at the national level under the Central Institute for Documentation and the publication of three new scientific and technical abstract journals, much remains to be done to create an effective information service.[9] Information facilities at factory laboratories and research institutes in most cases are not staffed with trained information specialists. In some cases information units do not even exist to process scientific and technical information for research institutes and laboratories under the economic ministries, and interministerial contact among existing documentation centres is frequently poor.[10] In an attempt to remedy some of these defects, current plans call for a greater use of modern means for the storage and retrieval of scientific and technical information, e.g. the use of computers and

[7] Ibid. 8 October 1967.
[8] Teodor Brates and Dan Kesisian, 'Orientari si tendinte in finantarea cercetarii stiintifice', *Finante si Credit*, no. 4, 1968, pp. 40–52.
[9] *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta*, 25 July 1964.
[10] *Munca*, 13–14 May 1966.

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automated processes; increasing the number of professional documentation specialists; and the organization of additional documentation centres in the economic ministries.[11]

Another important objective of the regime in its programme to improve the research effort is to increase the research activity of scientists and engineers in the higher educational institutions. The science faculties of these institutions have tended to concentrate on teaching at the expense of research.[12] At the same time, these scientists have little contact with the research institutes and plants of the economic ministries where their talents could be profitably utilized. To bolster the research activities of the higher educational institutions, the regime has announced plans to expand their research facilities and to furnish them with more up-to-date equipment.

Approximately 80 per cent of Rumania's research institutes are concentrated in Bucharest, while a number of industrial enterprises in other regions of the country do not have adequate scientific research laboratories and institutes to support their activities. The unequal territorial distribution of research establishments hinders both Rumania's technological and economic development. Of the seven billion lei allocated for the development of scientific research during the 1965–70 Five-Year Plan period, 1·5 billion were earmarked for the construction of new research institutes and laboratories, and for equipment.[13] A significant portion of these funds was to go toward the construction of new research facilities in cities other than Bucharest. The tendency of the Rumanian scientists to gravitate towards the more cosmopolitan life of the capital will impede the development of research centres outside Bucharest, but a number of the young scientists and engineers may be attracted to the new centres by better opportunities for more rapid advancement than is possible in the well-established institutes in Bucharest.

AT present, Rumania has approximately 23,000 scientific workers distributed throughout the network of its research establishments. The Five-Year Plan directives called for increasing this number to 30,000 by 1970, with a special emphasis on training personnel in technical sciences to help strengthen the application of research results to production.[14]

The regime also inaugurated a crash programme in 1966 for training technical specialists on the secondary level to help supply the technical manpower which will be needed in the drive for developing and rapidly introducing new technology. One hundred and fifty specialized secondary schools were scheduled to be established by

[11] *Scinteia*, 21 December 1965.
[12] Ibid. 8 February 1966.
[13] Ferenbac, 'Reflectorea statistica a activitatii da cercetare stiintifica', *Revista de Statistica*, vol. XV, no. 1, 1966, pp. 29–34.
[14] *Scinteia*, 21 December 1965.

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1970. Fifty of the schools were scheduled to train technicians for industry and 59 schools were to train agricultural specialists. The training was to place emphasis on practical work and range from four to five years, depending upon the requirements for a given speciality. Attendance at the industrial, agricultural and economic schools in the 1966–67 school year was planned to be over 15,000 in day classes and 3,500 in evening classes. Between December 1965 and the end of 1967 184 specialized secondary schools were reported to have been established. Thus the number of schools exceeded the original target by 34 and probably reflected an upward shift in the regime's anticipated needs for intermediate-level technical personnel. Initially these schools used the laboratories, workshops and other facilities of existing vocational, technical and general culture schools until permanent facilities were constructed. While this programme held promise for meeting Rumania's increasing demand for technicians over the long term, its results are being felt probably only now and on a modest scale. It is not yet clear how successful the programme is in achieving its goals.[15]

In April 1968 the Central Committee of the RWP undertook a review of the country's educational system and set in motion an educational reform that is intended to supply the sorely needed professional and technical manpower required by the industrialization programme.[16] The Central Committee's directives have resulted in the passage of a law extending compulsory general education from eight to 10 years. After completing the first eight years of schooling the students may elect to attend: (1) a general education high school, (2) a specialized high school for training in industrial production processes, agriculture, etc. or (3) the 'superior cycle' (the last two years of the general school required for all students not attending a high school).[17] This reform is designed not only to improve the educational level in general, which will be increasingly required for continued industrialization, but it is also specifically intended to increase the number of intermediate-level technical specialists for industry and agriculture. An increase in the number of well-trained technicians would release a significant number of professionally trained engineers who are presently holding jobs that require only a relatively low level of technical expertise.

THE relations between the scientists and the regime have gradually improved during the past seven years as the RWP adopted an increasingly nationalist and independent posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This improved rapport was highlighted in 1962 when two eminent scientists, Horia Hulubei and Miron Niculescu, applied publicly

[15] *Agerpress News of the Day*, no. 154, 1 July 1966, and *Scinteia*, 14 December 1967. Forty one schools were to specialize in economics.
[16] *Scinteia*, 25 April 1968.
[17] *Scinteia Tineretului*, no. 5819, 16 February 1968.

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for and were granted membership in the RWP.[18] But the RWP's courting of the scientists and engineers in connexion with the current drive for scientific and technical progress is unprecedented since its coming to power. The RWP's effort to muster the scientific community's active support behind its drive to improve the country's research effort actually began at a meeting on 7 May 1965 between Ceausescu and the scientific and educational leaders. At this meeting Ceausescu invited the scientists to put forth their views concerning the direction the scientific and technical effort should take and the needed reforms in its management. At least three additional meetings between the Party and government leaders and the scientists took place between May 1965 and July 1966.[19] These frequent and continuing close consultations by the RWP leaders with the scientists are an integral facet of the RWP's broader effort to establish closer contact with the people and to benefit by the increased involvement of the various *élites* of society in the national policy decision-making process.

RUMANIA'S reservations about scientific and technical integration and specialization schemes sponsored by CMEA have been, and remain, an important factor underlying the Party's emphasis on the need for a stepped-up national programme for scientific and technical progress, and it is against this background that the current programme to improve Rumania's scientific and technical effort takes on its political significance. In his report to the Ninth Party Congress Ceausescu warned that Rumania 'could not neglect . . . [its] own scientific research activity: lagging behind in this sector can only have negative consequences . . . and lead to dependence on foreign countries'.[20] This theme was again hammered home six months later in his December 1965 speech to the Grand National Assembly in which he declared that the neglect of scientific research and not keeping abreast of scientific and technical progress '. . . harms . . . the ensurance of national independence and sovereignty, the flourishing of the Homeland'.[21]

Khrushchev in a speech to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 called for specialization and division of labour among the members of CMEA. He declared that 'today it is no longer necessary for each socialist country to develop all branches of heavy industry. . . . Now, when there is a powerful community of socialist countries . . . each European People's Democracy can specialize in developing those industries and producing those goods for which it has the most favourable natural and economic conditions'.[22] Specialization in scientific research and technical development was to

[18] *Scinteia*, 18 November 1962.
[19] See *Agerpress News of the Day*, no. 292, 7 December 1965; no. 126, 28 May 1966; and no. 166, 15 July 1966.
[20] *Scinteia*, 20 July 1965.
[21] Ibid. 21 December 1965.
[22] *Pravda*, 15 February 1956.

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accompany the division of labour in economic activity among the CMEA countries. In 1956, at the first sessions of a number of the newly established Permanent Economic and Scientific-Technical Commissions, a start was made in the co-ordination of research work in several fields.[23] Rumania apparently had no major objections to this scheme for specialization among the CMEA countries. The revolts in Poland and Hungary in the autumn of 1956 interrupted CMEA's efforts to co-ordinate research work and the national economic plans. But, even more important, these revolts further emphasized to the Soviet leaders that the Soviet Union's hegemony in Eastern Europe was seriously threatened and new adjustments in its relations with the People's Democracies would have to be undertaken to bolster it.

In his attempt to create greater unity within the bloc, Khrushchev adopted a policy in 1957–58 which stressed both closer bilateral and multilateral co-operation in scientific and technical affairs.[24] Whereas before the 1956 revolts this collaboration had been confined primarily to the exchange of scientists and specialists for study tours and the exchange of scientific and technical documentation, the new approach beginning, in 1957, called for a more integrated bilateral co-operation. Jointly prepared scientific research plans between specific institutes were put into effect for the first time and longer periods of study and closer and more frequent contacts were established between the Soviet institutes and those in the People's Democracies.[25] Indeed, Rumania's enthusiasm for such collaboration was reflected in the fact that in 1957 39 of its scientific research institutes were conducting joint research work with 33 institutes in the Soviet Union.[26] Next to Czechoslovakia, Rumania had the largest number of research institutes of all the People's Democracies working jointly with institutes in the Soviet Union.

At its ninth session in the summer of 1958 CMEA adopted the decision to draft and co-ordinate long-term national economic plans for 1960–75.[27] The period to be covered by these plans was extended to 1980 by the thirteenth session of the Council which met in Budapest in July 1960.[28] In accordance with this decision the CMEA countries were supposed to draft long-term plans for scientific research. Moreover, CMEA appears to have adopted a resolution which called for the revamping of the existing institutions for planning science and

[23] K. Vinogradov, 'Sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran v razvitii mashinostroeniya', *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, no. 2, 1960, p. 22.

[24] See *Pravda*, 30 January, 30 March, 18 April and 14 August 1957.

[25] S. Stepanenko, 'Krepnet i razvivaetsya nauchno-tekhnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran', *Kommunist*, no. 13, 1959, p. 78.

[26] F. Kleimenov, 'Nauchno-tekhnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo: vazhny faktor ukrepleniya mezhdunarodnikh ekonomicheskikh svyazy', *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, no. 11, 1957, pp. 224–34.

[27] G. Karkhin, 'Socialist Community: Possibilities and prospects', *International Affairs*, no. 8, p. 16.

[28] Stanislaw Skrzypek, 'Soviet-Satellite Economic Developments: New Trends Toward Supranational Planning', *Polish Review*, Autumn, 1961, p. 108.

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technology in the member-countries, as well as procedures for such planning. Although Rumania began work on a long-term plan for science and technology, it did not reorganize its science planning structure. Meanwhile, between 1958 and 1963 all the other CMEA members created agencies at the national level which were made responsible for drafting national science plans and co-ordinating the plans with other member-countries. That the end result of CMEA's recommendation was clearly intended to facilitate tighter integration of the scientific and technical efforts of the CMEA countries was borne out later by D. Gvishiani, Chairman of the CMEA Permanent Commission for the Co-ordination of Scientific-Technical Research, who stated that 'a very important feature for successfully co-ordinating scientific and technical research is the presence in all of the socialist nations of long-term national . . . plans for developing science and technology.' [29]

As for multilateral collaboration and specialization of labour among the CMEA countries, Khrushchev had shifted away from the policy he had enunciated at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 and was now emphasizing mutual interdependence of the socialist nations. Some evidence of Rumania's growing coolness towards the policy of mutual interdependence in the field of scientific research and technological development was reflected at Rumania's Third Party Congress where emphasis was placed on a broad programme of scientific and technical development to support comprehensive industrialization. Although Gheorghiu-Dej expressed appreciation for Soviet technical assistance, he made only one statement about the need for scientific and technical collaboration with the socialist countries; he made no reference to the importance of a division of labour in scientific and technical research among CMEA members.[30]

Khrushchev's boldest and frankest statement of his policy on how the scientific and technical efforts of the CMEA countries should be integrated was contained in an article published in *Kommunist* (no. 12, 1962), in which he declared that 'Evidently the time has come to go over to planning scientific and technological development at the international level, to conduct research of joint interest according to a uniform long-term plan'.

This proposal for supranational determination of the direction in which a member country's future scientific and technical development would take was not in keeping with Rumania's many-sided industrialization programme which had been already outlined and implemented in the Five-Year Plan for 1961–65. The Rumanian regime was undoubtedly aware that a narrowing of its already modest scientific research

[29] D. Gvishiani, 'Puti dalneishego razvitiya nauchno-tekhnicheskogo sotrudnichestva', *Kommunist*, no. 14, 1962, pp. 73–80.

[30] For an excellent discussion of the evolution of Rumania's attitude towards CMEA, see J. F. Brown, 'Rumania Steps Out of Line', *Survey*, October 1963: See *III sezd Rumynskoi rabochei partii* (Moskva, Gospolitizdat, 1961) for Gheorghiu-Dej's speech and directives on scientific research.

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and technological base envisaged by Khrushchev's proposal would also limit substantially what could be done in industrial development in the future. With this proposal Khrushchev had struck at the vital base of Rumania's programme for many-sided industrialization.

Despite Rumania's growing opposition to the supranationalist and interdependence tendencies in CMEA, the June 1962 conference of Party First Secretaries of CMEA countries approved the somewhat ambiguously defined concept of international division of labour and called for: (1) 'specialization and co-ordination of research and design work' and (2) the creation of joint research and design organizations.[31] A permanent Commission for the Co-ordination of Scientific and Technical Research Work was established under CMEA. The creation of this organ was probably envisaged by Khrushchev and the leaders in Poland and East Germany as a first step towards supranational planning of selected fields of scientific research and technical development by CMEA. This, however, was not to be. Khrushchev's proposed supranational planning of research died with the defeat of his proposal for supranational economic planning in July 1963, which was brought about primarily as a result of Rumania's vociferous objections.[32]

With the defeat of supranational planning of scientific research, the CMEA members resorted to the multilateral co-ordination of scientific research plans in selected fields. Under this system each country retains the right to determine the research problems for which it will assume responsibility and which of its research institutions will work on the task. Rumania apparently had no major objections to this scheme where its national sovereignty and independence are not violated by outside intervention in the management and allocation of its scientific and technical resources. Rumania participated in the first CMEA co-ordinated one-year research plan which was approved at the eleventh session of the Executive Committee in March 1964.[33] For example, in the field of chemical engineering related to agricultural problems, Rumania's Savulescu Biological Institute of the Academy of Sciences was assigned responsibility by the Rumanian government to study the absorption, transfer and retention of certain chemicals in plants.[34] Rumania is also participating in the current five-year research plan which has been co-ordinated by CMEA and which covers the period 1966–70.[35]

The establishment of jointly sponsored research and design organizations by CMEA countries is another bone of contention between Rumania and CMEA. The creation of joint institutes was to be accompanied by the abolition of scientific research and design institutions which were duplicating work in all or several of the CMEA

[31] *Pravda*, 17 June 1962.
[32] Robert S. Jaster, 'The Defeat of Khrushchev's Plan to Integrate Eastern Europe', *The World Today*, December 1963.
[33] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, 28 March 1964.
[34] *Izvestia* (Weekly) no. 21, 17–23 May 1964.
[35] *Rude Pravo*, 3 January 1966.

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countries. Khrushchev declared that 'big advantages would flow from the abolition of the unjustified parallelism in technological research and designing methods which at present results in dispersal of manpower and money'.[36] The Rumanian leaders' opposition to the setting-up of 'technical-productive inter-state unions' which was declared in a 1964 issue of the Rumanian journal *Economice Viata* appears to apply to the organization of joint scientific research and design institutions.

To date, only three CMEA-sponsored institutes have been created: the International Institute for Standardization and the International Scientific and Technological Information Centre, both located in Moscow and the International Technical and Scientific Information Centre for Agriculture and Forestry located in Prague.[37] Rumania is a participant in the International Institute for Standardization, but the absence of its representatives at the signing of the protocol on the draft-statute of the International Centre for Agriculture and Forestry in December 1963 was probably a result of its decision not to participate in this joint venture. This continuing opposition is further manifested in Rumania's absence from membership in four other joint ventures, all of which include research and design activities organized by various members of CMEA since 1964.[38] Moreover, Rumania's rejection of the proposal to abolish certain research and design organizations was reiterated at the Ninth Congress of the RWP. Ceausescu was almost certainly alluding to Khrushchev's 1962 proposal to abolish parallel design and research efforts in CMEA countries when he declared that:

> Proposals to abolish certain departmental research institutes and to give up research in higher education have even been made. Life demonstrates that such an attitude towards science can have grave consequences, cause a lag throughout the entire field of science, put a brake on the country's economic and social advancement, and lead to dependence on foreign countries. We feel the consequences of such an erroneous and unscientific outlook in scientific research and, implicitly, in certain fields of material production.[39]

The course of events both immediately preceding and following the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its allies has served to revive the debate among the East European communist countries on the future role of CMEA and on the forms that economic and scientific and technical collaboration should take. Again, the abrasive issues of supranationality and integration have become the focal points of this debate.

Rumania's support of the Dubcek regime in its efforts to introduce reforms and its condemnation of the interference by the Soviet Union

[36] N. S. Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 22.
[37] *Rude Pravo*, 7 December 1963.
[38] G. Ruzhanski, 'Shiryatsya proizvodstvennie svyazi bratskikh stran', *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya*, no. 11, 1965, pp. 21–24.
[39] *Scinteia*, 21 December 1965.

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and other East European countries in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs precluded its being invited to the Dresden conference that was convened in late spring 1969 to chastise Czechoslovakia. In a speech to the Bucharest Party *aktiv* Ceausescu indicated that an invitation to attend the conference had not been expected, but he made clear Rumania's objection to the discussion at that conference of CMEA matters in Rumania's absence. Although he stressed Rumania's desire for '. . . comprehensive development of economic and scientific collaboration with all of the socialist world system . . .', he stressed that such co-operation must be carried out within '. . . the spirit of the [CMEA] statute and the fundamental principles adopted by the member states '.[40]

In the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union launched a campaign calling for strengthening co-operation and unity among the socialist countries. This campaign, supported in varying degrees by the other East European countries that had participated in the invasion, was accompanied by the announcement in September 1968 of the Soviet doctrine of 'limited sovereignty'. According to this doctrine the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another socialist country was declared justified to save the socialist system.[41] It was against this background of growing debate on issues vital to Rumania that must have prompted Ceausescu to make the following statement in anticipation of the conference of CMEA representatives called on the initiative of the Soviet Union and scheduled to convene in January 1969 in East Berlin. Ceausescu declared:

> In our opinion the CMEA statute offers broad possibilities for efficient collaboration among member-countries and fully corresponds to the present and long-term requirements of the development of collaboration among socialist countries. We cannot in any case agree to the renunciation of the fundamental principles of the statute and to the promotion of certain theses and proposals concerning integration of the CMEA member-states, to investing this organization with suprastate prerogatives and the creation of certain supranational economic bodies. This would hurt the sovereignty and independence of the states and could not but harm the co-operation among the member-countries. . . .[42]

The official communiqué issued at the close of the CMEA conference in East Berlin consisted of a recitation of CMEA accomplishments and did not reveal any significant action taken to strengthen co-operative action within CMEA. Indeed, despite Poland's reported strong advocacy of supranational planning by CMEA it appears that there was such a divergence of views among the member-countries that no significant agreement could be reached on how to strengthen co-operation within CMEA. Rumania could not have failed to be pleased with the outcome of the Berlin conference.

40 Ibid. 28 April 1968.
41 *Pravda*, 25 September 1968.
42 *Scinteia*, 30 November 1968.

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Between the Berlin conference and the convening of the twenty-third session of CMEA in Moscow in April the Rumanian press continued its campaign against giving CMEA a supranational character, and indirectly attacked the doctrine of 'limited sovereignty' without mentioning the Soviet Union.[43] The twenty-third session of CMEA did not give the organization a supranational character. Indeed it appears that the primary approach to co-operation within CMEA will continue to be bilateral consultations and multilateral co-ordination of long-term plans for selected scientific and technical problems. For a limited number of fields of research, plans will be co-ordinated for a longer period than five years. The session adopted resolutions to improve the effectiveness of the CMEA organs, undertake joint long-range forecasting of economic, scientific, and technical developments in the most important branches of the economies of the member countries. The session supported the creation of joint inter-state organizations without supranational authority for production, research and design activities but on a purely voluntary basis by interested members.[44] Available information to date suggests that the resolutions of the twenty-third CMEA session did not result in changes in CMEA's character that are unacceptable to Rumania.

THE central importance of scientific and technical progress over a broad front to comprehensive industrialization was given special emphasis by Ceausescu in his report to the Ninth Party Congress in which he declared that 'the programme for the development of socialist society during the next five years and satisfying the constantly increasing needs of the national economy are indissolubly linked with the progress of science, with the intensification of basic and applied research in every field'.[45]

The determination of the Rumanian regime to continue its comprehensive industrialization programme with special emphasis on heavy industry, and particularly on machine building, despite attempts by the Soviet and other East European leaders to dissuade them, was stressed by Ceausescu at the Ninth Party Congress and in subsequent speeches. The implementation of this policy is reflected in the five-year plan for scientific research which includes 480 priority research themes. Of these, 272 fall in the field of engineering where the main emphasis is on reseach in metallurgy, machine-building, electronics and automation.[46]

Rumania's policy to pursue comprehensive industrialization, while concomitantly avoiding undue dependence upon foreign science and technology, of necessity requires a greater national scientific and technical

[43] See: *Scinteia*, 24 January 1969; *Lumea*, no. 5, 1969; *Economice Viata*, 17 January 1969.
[44] *Pravda*, 21 June 1969.
[45] *Scinteia*, 20 July 1965.
[46] *Buletinul Oficial al Respublicii Socialiste Romania*, vol. II, no. 40, Part 1, 30 June 1966, pp. 296–301.

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resourcefulness than has been manifested hitherto. In her first phase of industrialization Rumania drew upon the technologies of the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia that had been mastered during the period extending from before the Second World War to shortly after its conclusion. From 1958 to 1965 Rumania made use of the more recent technological developments of these nations augmented by some of the new technological achievements from Western Europe.[47] As Professor Montias has correctly pointed out, 'Except for the manufacture of oil-drilling equipment, where Rumanian engineers were responsible for a number of innovations, Rumania's scientific contribution was small, consisting mainly in the adaptation of foreign processes to local conditions'.[48] Rumania's industrialization programme requires the importation of considerable quantities of equipment from abroad; and in order to acquire the funds to purchase it Rumanian products must be technologically competitive on foreign markets. In a recent speech, Ion Gheorghe Maurer stressed the interdependence of domestic research and development capability, foreign trade and Rumania's industrialization programme when he declared that:

> For a long time . . . we made it a custom to acquire licences; these were for products being made under advanced technical conditions and having qualities that made them competitive on the world market. However, we did not realize from the very beginning that every product must be developed, because on the world market—and this is a characteristic trait of modern production—no product remains very long. Either it is improved very quickly or it is replaced by another product of superior quality. The developing and perfecting of the production can only be the result of our own work. . . . In today's world, in which scientific research has the place it has, it is impossible for an economy to progress if it does not organize its own research.[49]

In the same speech Maurer voiced the Rumanian regime's determination to augment its own R & D effort by looking to both Eastern Europe and the West to acquire needed advanced technology. He stated that:

> It is normal that, first of all, our collaboration efforts be oriented towards the socialist countries with which we share the same points of view regarding the world and regarding the objective we must pursue. At the same time, it is also fully justified that our foreign policy is steering towards the development of relations with all other states of the world regardless of their social systems. Isolation within the framework of a group, regardless of whether this group is created through adherence to certain concepts or through certain geographical characteristics, reduces for every state its possiblity to utilize what technology and science are achieving in other states.

[47] John M. Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 246.
[48] Ibid.
[49] *Scinteia*, 14 July 1969.

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THE recent changes introduced in the system for planning and co-ordinating Rumania's scientific and technical effort have probably resulted in some improvement in the overall utilization of the country's scientific and technical manpower and material resources. Especially, the creation of the National Council for Scientific Research should improve the regime's ability to tie the R & D effort more efficiently to priority economic programmes and to plan for future R & D needs on a national scale in a more systematic way than hitherto. It is too early to assess the effects of the reforms in the administration and financing of R & D. Despite the attempt to delegate increased operational authority downwards in the industrial R & D bureaucracy, the continued existence of the industrial ministries may well prove to be a strong brake on generating the initiative and resourcefulness hoped for at the enterprise and institute levels. It is also too early to assess the impact of the increased emphasis placed on economic incentives through contractual arrangements between research institutes and the enterprises. Nevertheless, this approach has considerable potential for enhancing incentive for both research institutions and the enterprises to apply research results on a timely basis. The impact of the reforms in the S & T information system, education and the construction of new research institutes and laboratories will not be felt for a few years hence. Nevertheless, these reforms, if carried through, will increase Rumania's scientific and technical competence over the long term.

It is clear that Ceausescu's policy is not an attempt to achieve scientific and technical autarky—a most unrealistic goal for any country but particularly for a country of Rumania's size and limited resources. Rather, the upshot of Rumania's current national science policy is to create a vigorous and productive research and development effort which, while augmented by foreign scientific and technical achievments, will not leave Rumania unduly dependent on scientific and technical results from the Soviet Union and the other members of CMEA. Rumania's drive for increased scientific and technical self-sufficiency is an excellent example of a small country's attempt to escape from the threat of becoming a scientific satellite of a superpower or a dependant of the more scientifically and technically advanced countries within CMEA with all the attendant political and economic dependence which underlies scientific and technical dependency. This policy is manifested in Rumania's continued but limited participation in CMEA-sponsored scientific and technical collaboration schemes and concurrent collaboration with the West. The expansion of scientific and technical relations between Rumania and the West is by no means unique for the East European states in recent years. But, placed within the context of Ceausescu's remarks about the threat to national sovereignty and independence inherent in scientific and technical dependence on foreign powers, Rumania's scientific and technical relations with countries outside CMEA are more politically significant than those of the other East European countries.

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STUDENT REBELLION AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Gerhard A. Ritter

IN contrast to traditional protest movements, which could be construed as ingredients of general political opposition in individual countries, the current protest movement is not principally directed—like the protests of students and workers, in say, the countries of the Eastern bloc, in Greece, Spain, Portugal and numerous Latin American countries—against existing governments or systems of authority. Its real target is modern highly industrialized society and its determining characteristics, such as specialization and a sharply differentiated division of labour, hierarchized bureaucracies and technocratic 'material pressures', the compulsion to maximize output, and in general the cramping by functional requirements of scope for individual action in economic, social and political affairs.

THE social groups which sustain rebellion differ from country to country. Those involved in the countries of Europe, both East and West, undoubtedly consist of students and intellectuals, drawn from the privileged middle and upper classes. In the United States rebellion additionally possesses a firmer social basis in the underprivileged negro population.

It is only too obvious that we are not dealing here with Marxist-type movements sustained by a distinct class—e.g. the working class—involved in the production process. Nor, apart from the economic implications of improvement in the status of a racial minority, are the rebels linked by common economic interests. On the contrary, one essential feature of the movement consists precisely in the fact that its intellectual vanguard is identical with its social representatives, and that their links with the production process are more tenuous than those of any other section of the population. This applies not only to students, who do not enter the production process until they have completed years of further education, but also to members of under-privileged minority groups who, often through no fault of their own, e.g. because of inadequate educational opportunities, find it hard to obtain regular employment. It is also characteristic that student supporters of rebellion belong mainly to faculties whose approach is essentially theoretical, faculties which supply no clear guide to a career and from which there is no smooth transition to 'established' activities at the conclusion of courses of study. The effect of this remoteness from the production process is that one of the most important weapons of the political struggle, namely, withdrawal of labour in the form of strikes, cannot be employed with any prospect of success by these

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groups. The spread of the use of violence stems not least from a situation in which non-violent methods have proved to be largely ineffective.

It can, of course, be argued that a future general strike of students would harm society by robbing it of a trained élite. A strike of this kind would be hard to implement, however, because its first and principal victims would be the students themselves, whereas its effects on society would not become apparent until later. Moreover, the aim of the would-be revolution, again discounting the important special case of the American negro, differs from that of classical social revolutions in that current revolutionary movements not only lack the support of social groups defined by specific interests but cannot seriously aspire to the emancipation of a third, underprivileged, group of some kind.

Karl Marx stated that a revolution has certain objective prerequisites: maturity of productive forces, revolutionary awareness on the part of an organized working class which forms a numerical majority, and socio-economic crises. In economically backward Russia and China, the revolution was not derived from economic and social conditions prescribed by Marx himself. It was, however, fundamental even to Lenin and Marx that a revolutionary movement can succeed only if it bases its course of action on a correct analysis of the social situation and on the wishes of the mass of the people (although these may be open to manipulation). As Richard Lowenthal has clearly shown in an article on the 'Dissociation of Revolutionary Practice from Marxist Theory', the extreme groups of the New Left, which are characterized by blind activism, now dispense with any sober analysis of the over-all social situation as a prerequisite of their political strategy. The consequence of this attitude is not only an irrational overestimation of revolutionary prospects but also, and frequently, an individually self-indulgent conception of revolution which avoids all concrete definition of aims and their relation to the methods used in their fulfilment.

ONE of the most striking aspects of rebellion in Western capitalist countries is the fact that, apart from the American blacks, supporters of rebellion in these countries do, as we have seen, belong to privileged groups which, in contrast to the masses involved in the production process, have no immediate need to earn their own living. *Overt* protest by such a group would be impossible in a totalitarian state because the state would deprive its members of their privileges and harness them to the production process. What is more, institutionalized tolerance and the upholding of constitutional principles allow relatively wide scope even to radically opposing attitudes, with far smaller risks to life and liberty than in communist and undeveloped countries. It should be remembered that rebellion has hitherto been concentrated in a sector of society which is often dismissed as its

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'luxury' sector: the arts, the humanities, and that area of the social sciences which is of little or no immediate importance to economic life. Governments and peoples would no doubt react more sharply if rebellions were to disrupt the production process on a massive scale.

Indeed, one of the prerequisites for the presence of radical revolutionary movements in highly industrialized countries, so far from being poverty and social oppression, is the very affluence which makes a good and secure social status a matter of course rather than a worthwhile goal. It is coupled with the relative tolerance and liberalism of such societies towards dissent. Characteristically, one of the aims of radical groups is to destroy this tolerance, which they regard as a repressive consolidation of the 'tyranny of the majority', and replace it with a selectively liberating tolerance which combines 'intolerance towards movements of the Right' with 'toleration of movements of the Left' *à la* Marcuse. It is of course the movement itself which defines what should be regarded as right-wing, conservative and reactionary. A further aim is to provoke counter-violence by the application of violence and thus unmask the 'fascist nature' of existing society. A procedure of this type not only possesses all the characteristics of a self-fulfilling prophecy but may be risky from the point of view of the radicals themselves, because deliberate polarization of society may lead to a lowering of the tolerance threshold and to the elimination of the conditions which have hitherto facilitated rebel movements.

In the Western world, a major technical reason for the spread of revolutionary movements consists in the improved communications attributable to student exchanges and, above all, to the modern mass media, which promote spontaneous reactions to events in other countries, facilitate the copying of forms of radical protest, and provide supporters of the protest movement with a far-flung public forum.

Another feature typical of the modern protest movement in Western capitalist countries, in contrast to opposition movements in communist countries, is that supporters of the movement see themselves as representatives of the world's conscience, although they often lack the information requisite for a rational assessment of the position in other countries. Nor do they apply the same stringent critical standards to socialist countries or ex-colonial developing countries as they do to their own countries.

Yet another typical reason for the movement must be sought in the lack of genuine authority, founded on objective considerations and personal example, which attaches to the parent-teacher generation. There is no doubting the particular severity of this collapse of authority in the case of the Federal Republic, where the 50–70 age group found itself exposed to the justified charge of dereliction in the face of the National Socialism and therefore feels profoundly insecure about its own past and present attitudes, and where the generation of middle-aged politicians is numerically weak as a result of the Second World

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War. Other concomitants of this are helplessness when confronted by provocation and a paucity of genuinely convincing champions of the principles underlying the new democratic German society.

Every new generation starts by ignoring the lessons of history and the experiences of the older generation, and by trying to refashion the world anew. However, this natural attitude acquires greater weight when, in an age of particularly swift and far-reaching changes, adjustment of tradition and experience to a constantly changing world is more than usually difficult, when the older generation fails to come to terms with its own past, and when many representatives of the older generation, in their turn, ignore personal experience and strive to recapture their youth and intellectual virginity by jumping on the bandwagon of rebellion. Many of them find this all the easier because the ideas currently propagated are not new and clearly run parallel to the ideals of their own youth, for example, those of the German Youth Movement.

A further aspect of rebellion may be found in fundamental criticism of the modern democratic political system, the chief targets of rejection being majority decisions and the separation of powers, the principle of representation, the party system, and the existence of pressure groups. That the present political system and its supporters are intolerable is held to be sufficiently proved by the fact that the rebels' own ideas, of whose truth and justice they stand in no doubt, are wholly or at least provisionally incapable of implementation.

It is, at the same time, an indubitable failure of political education that the complexity of the democratic process in modern industrial society has been inadequately explained. Further causes of the protest movement in Western industrialized nations lie in the fact that young people, in particular, take natural exception to the spirit of crass apolitical materialism which prevails so widely today, and feel a psychological need for grand new ideologies which will accommodate their capacity for enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. Exception is also taken to the contrast between the idea of individual participation—an idea stressed with particular force in the Western democracies—and its limited fulfilment in practice.

IN my estimation, however, the most deep-rooted causes of rebellion should be sought in the pressures of highly industrialized and bureaucratized productive society which are common to Western capitalist countries and the industrially advanced communist states alike. Widespread incomprehension of modern society and disquiet in regard to a situation in which the individual feels himself to be no more than a cog in an intricate machine or a pawn manipulated by huge power-structures often lead, on Left and Right, to a culturally pessimistic reaction which can manifest itself in many forms, such as a concentration on obsolete values of the past, in ostentatious voluntary withdrawal of 'drop-outs' from productive society (hippies, beatniks,

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drug addicts), and in a desire for active destruction of that society and its replacement by simple and comprehensible conditions.

The objects of odium include bureaucracy, which is held to stifle all personal initiative, and, more especially, occupational pressures, the loss of enjoyment associated with such pressures being made still more apparent by better opportunities for use of leisure than in the past. A further target of culturally pessimistic criticism is the pressure towards ever greater specialization, which requires a long period of training, curtails potential chances of individual development, makes the product of labour ever more dissatisfying, and entails a far-reaching renunciation of general insights into the world. Estrangement from the principle of rationality and basic criticism of the conditions of modern industrial society on the part of major sections of the current protest movement do, in fact, represent a reversion to the days of anti-modernist revolt against industrialization and the division of labour, a phase whose roots go back to pre-Marxian times. Doubt is thereby cast on such principles underlying Western industrial society as cost-consciousness, rationalization, and maximization of output.

This is also manifest in the Chinese modification of Marx's theory about the introduction of communist society. To Marx, increased productivity and a consequent surplus of goods were essential to the realization of a classless communist society in which each would be able to live according to his needs and tensions would be eliminated by universal superabundance, whereas China's experiment with people's communes was an attempt to create communist man *prior* to the development of the economic conditions stipulated by Marx, i.e. an attempt to realize communist society in conditions of poverty. For Marxists it would indeed be paradoxical that a classless communist society may be practicable only at a relatively inferior stage of development and on the basis of a subsistence level which satisfies the immediate needs of its members, whereas a diversified and highly advanced industrial society constantly creates for its members new and ever-developing requirements whose complete and simultaneous fulfilment is necessarily impossible. The rebels may be right to the extent that—albeit unwittingly—they see the main obstacle to the realization of communism in highly industrialized society itself rather than in its capitalist form alone. The smooth running of a modern industrial society not only entails the existence of bureaucratic machines and technocratic élites but also, in the West, destroys the chances of a genuine and socially transformative revolution, which, by dispensing with the apparatus associated with the old system, would inevitably produce a breakdown of supplies to the inhabitants of industrial centres. It is no coincidence, therefore, that while the 20th century has witnessed *coups d'état* and changes in political systems resulting from occupation by foreign powers, no successful revolution has ever occurred in a highly industrialized country.

Thus, as Richard Lowenthal has so convincingly argued, what lies

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at the heart of the radical protest movement in the West, as of recent tendencies in several of the developing countries, is a negation of some of the basic values which Karl Marx himself considered to be naturally inherent in Western civilization.

LET us inquire whether a change is occurring in the attitude and behaviour of those involved in rebel groups, and, if so, what form it takes. It can certainly be said that members of radical groups—especially when they live together, engage in concerted action, and jointly experience the reaction of the police or other upholders of the 'system'—develop a strong sense of community which, like similar youthful associations in the past, will continue to exist when most of the rebels have found their way into normal 'bourgeois' occupations. This may well produce a new version of the mutual assistance given in professional life by wearers of the old school tie and members of German students' associations or American fraternities—a development whose importance is hard to predict. It is equally hard to predict—given that most of today's rebels will sooner or later become disillusioned about the chances of the fulfilling their aspirations in a non-revolutionary situation—whether loss of interest in the absolute aims of youth will lead to a loss of interest in all public activity or to a willingness to help in the improvement of existing society by means of detailed co-operation on an individual basis.

One of the most dangerous consequences, and one which extends beyond those engaged in radical activities, is an already noticeable indifference to the law. Positive law is often disdained as a purely formal legal construction and dispossessed of all legitimacy on the grounds that it is an instrument of those in power. Legal obscurities and a collective dread of intimidation greatly hinder the punishment of illegal acts, with the result that those who engage in these acts feel, increasingly, that they have a natural right to do so, and that the general public are becoming progressively less aware of the illegal nature of many acts. As campaigns gradually mount in intensity and the rights and liberties of others are infringed on an ever more massive scale, so the threshold of that which is deemed wrong rises to a level at which even physical and mental intimidation of unpopular individuals, destruction of public institutions and damage to private property are felt to be justified, and the penalization of such acts—reference always being made, of course, to the just aims of the 'idealists' who perpetrate them—is considered repressive. The alarming thing is that, in its naturally illusory desire to pour oil on troubled waters, society largely accepts this claim by a privileged minority to exemption from legal norms. We thus have the beginnings of a trend which led in the Weimar Republic, though admittedly under revolutionary conditions, to a situation in which hardly any attempt was made to punish illegal acts committed by convinced right-wing radicals, particularly when, like the present rebels, they belonged to socially favoured classes.

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The inference to be drawn from the tendency, observed by radical minorities, that people yield to their wishes the more violently they express them, must inevitably be that illegal acts and violence pay better dividends than rational argument. Thus, brutalization of the forms of political controversy and the adoption of ever more skilfully wielded manipulative techniques for the enforcement of minority wishes are already discernible as future consequences. Closely coupled with this is the fact that radical minorities can exercise great power, mainly because of lack of imagination on the part of political élites, apathy among established groups, absence of convincing leadership, the state's substantial failure to impose its authority on our society. An additional factor in the case of the German Federal Republic is lack of civic courage in the majority of citizens.

I believe that violent protest, kindled by individual injustices but ultimately to be regarded as symptomatic of deeper causes, will represent a sporadic but recurrent form of revolt against advanced industrial society. Apart from the active rebels, growing affluence and a greater obligation by the state to provide for the welfare of the individual will produce an increasing number of people who drop out of society without actively rebelling against it. These groups will take it for granted that the state should guarantee them a living even if they themselves make no contribution to the maintenance of society. I do not believe that a revolution directed against the foundations of society has any genuine prospect of success because the mass of the population demands the maintenance and steady improvement of their standard of living and will not, therefore, tolerate any really radical and permanent disruption of the production process. It is quite conceivable, on the other hand, that particularly sensitive institutions with few natural powers of resistance—e.g. universities, whose work depends on rational discussion, unprejudiced critical commitment and universal tolerance—may be crippled and in some cases even temporarily immobilized. The consequences for society will not, however, become manifest until later, when lack of potential leaders causes relative stagnation in the societies affected.

One side-effect of the emergence of rebel groups is the tendency to politicize wide areas of social life. The positive effect of this may be a greater awareness of the need for political control of the bureaucracy. The disadvantages are even more obvious. Art, philosophy, science, religion and the relations within a family or team of workers have little or nothing to do with politics and wholesale politicization of this type misconstrues the nature of politics and leads to tendential co-ordination of all spheres of existence and thus to conformism, rejection of a sphere of individual liberty transcending the state or people, abolition of basic rights and the separation of powers. It is also profoundly inhumane.

The passionate demand for participation is often, though not necessarily, bound up with the striving for wholesale politicization.

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Many of those who aspire to 'democratization' of all public and private institutions and bodies and all social spheres confine themselves, as Wilhelm Hennis has stressed in an interesting lecture on the problems presented by the concept of 'democratization', to analysing power structures and systems of authority in institutions such as schools of higher education, factories, hospitals, universities, and families. The social functions of these institutions and the inevitable differentiation of those who work in them or are embraced by their activities, on the other hand, are wholly or largely ignored. Yet the mechanical transference of basic principles of the general political order to the subordinate social institutions is extremely questionable. It overlooks the disparities which result from the nature of man and his different functions, disparities which necessarily exist, say, in the relationship of parents to their dependent children, of a doctor to his patients, of a teacher to his pupils or a master-craftsman to his apprentices.

Authority which stems from greater experience and wider knowledge must naturally be confined to the domain in which it is functionally necessary. These remarks should not, of course, be taken as a defence of hierarchical systems or a fundamental attack on all types of participation. They are simply meant to emphasize that, if participation is to have any meaning, it must be guided not by general political ideologies but by specific objective considerations: by the heterogeneous conditions prevailing in individual institutions and the varying opportunities for participation by groups of people who work in them or are affected by their work.

Thus the *danger* of participation is that insufficient qualification or ideological prejudices on the part of its advocates transforms it into a synonym for wholesale politicization of all social institutions. The effect of this can be that effective exploitation of participatory rights becomes the monopoly of small groups which have a purely political identity and which, while securing the acclamation of the still uninvolved masses by means of deliberate demagogy, intimidation or subtle manipulative techniques, only seek to obstruct or cripple the real work of the institutions. *Favourable prospects* for objectively oriented participation are dependent on the individual's overcoming his sense of alienation, on an injection of interest and knowledge which will increase the institutions' functional capacity, and on the creation of an important counterpoise to the restriction of the policy—and decision-making process to bureaucratic and technocratic élites. It is therefore necessary to define precisely what is intended by the demand for participation in each individual case, and to judge whether participation will increase or decrease efficiency.

THE final question, namely, whether the protest movement is ultimately supplying motive-power for a necessary adjustment of society to changing conditions, is impossible to answer with an unqualified yes or no. On the one hand, violent protests will continue

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to have the welcome effect of focusing the attention of wide sections of the public on official errors of judgement, social injustices and weaknesses in our society; on the other, the absolute and often irrational nature of demands, coupled with their increasing 'fetishization', can only render the solution of concrete problems more difficult. It may be that a protest movement is a sort of aimless machine which can be used by others, who are ready to tackle practical problems, as a means of carrying through genuine reforms. It may equally be that the changes which come about under pressure prove to be anything but an improvement, or that the irrationality and absurdity of radical demands will lead to a hardening of opinion which would make even limited and necessary reforms impracticable. It is probable that all the three reactions outlined here will manifest themselves in the various spheres of social life. The crucial factor would then be their order of appearance and the way in which they affected individual sectors.

Life in an increasingly complex, highly industrialized productive society, with its abundance of unavoidable pressures, is a fate which we are not only unable but—in view of the alternative, which would be a relapse into poverty and social insecurity—positively unwilling to escape. We cannot evade our destiny by taking refuge in a romanticizing cultural pessimism, by dropping out of society or by fighting it blindly. Instead, there must be an attempt, involving great intellectual exertion, to master problems rationally as they arise, to improve the individual's prospects of self-determination by careful doses of differentiated participation, to control any self-aggrandizement on the part of bureaucrats and technocrats by improving the effectiveness of organs of control and/or creating new control mechanisms and combating technocratic ideologies, and to guard the sphere of personal liberty against the pressure of official and private bureaucracies, social conformism, and intimidation by activist groups. This is a task which calls for more than fine sentiments. It also demands experience, a sense of proportion, a capacity for rational thought and judgement, a readiness for commitment coupled with constant questioning of one's own position.

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CPSU: THEN AND NOW

John Keep

THE Soviet Communist Party of today, with more than 13 million members, is arguably the world's most powerful political organization. Its leaders' decisions affect every aspect of the lives of many hundred millions of people inside and outside the USSR. Self-evident as this fact is, we may sometimes forget that this vast bureaucratic body grew out of a tiny group of militant revolutionaries operating in the obscurity of the underground resistance movement against Tsarism. In this distant era, at the moment of its greatest success, the Party's forerunner had an active following of only 12,000 persons.

The general history of the RSDLP and the CPSU, in so far as it can be reconstructed with the sources at our disposal, has been rendered familiar to English-speaking readers by the work of Leonard Schapiro and others. Scholarly research on the subject is becoming more specialized. Both the books under review here deal with the relatively limited but highly significant problem of Party membership. They are of unequal value, but each of them in its own way helps to enlarge our knowledge and understanding.

Dr Lane's volume * is concerned with the formative years between 1898 and 1907. This period has already been studied fairly thoroughly (to the unjustified neglect, it may be added, of the decade 1907–17), but for the purposes of an analysis of the Party's composition it possesses two significant advantages. First, it was an age of crisis—of high hopes and equally deep disappointments, as the vigorous growth of 1905 gave way to a difficult transition to semi-legality. Secondly, there is an abundance of published material, both contemporary and historical. Of particular value are the memoirs and other studies (mainly of course by Bolsheviks, and none of them free from partisan bias) which appeared in the 1920s, before Stalin laid his heavy hand upon scholarship in this field and myth-making took precedence over serious work. On the basis of this and other relevant material Lane has attempted what one might call a profile of the RSDLP. He offers us, in fact, two things: a comparative study of the movement's fortunes in seven selected localities, and an analysis of the Party as a whole in terms of social origin, education, age structure and other criteria. Neither of these tasks has been broached before.

The first investigation (occupying the second part of the book) is in this reviewer's estimation the more valuable. This is because, owing to the relative immaturity of Russian social democracy at

* David Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism: A Social and Historical Study of Russian Social-Democracy, 1898–1907*. Publications on Social History of the International Institute for Social History, vol. 6 (Assen, Van Gorcum, 1969), 240 pp.

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this time, it was the local (town) committees that mattered most. The central Party authorities, especially when under Bolshevik control, claimed far-reaching prerogatives but were seldom able to exercise them in practice, partly on account of police persecution but partly because their exaggerated pretensions aroused a natural resentment lower down the hierarchy. Indeed, the top leaders often lived in a kind of make-believe world, formulating detailed schemes of organization or issuing directives which the rank and file, if they knew of them at all, might dismiss as irrelevant. Despite their formal commitment to democratic values, many members of the Party's élite behaved rather like the bureaucrats satirized by Saltykov-Shchedrin; in their self-contained milieu they reproduced some of the more obnoxious features of the Tsarist order they combated. Thus it was the local activists who performed the difficult task of recruiting popular support by circulating literature and organizing strikes or demonstrations, and who bore the brunt of the day-to-day struggle with the police.

As Lane rightly points out, there were important differences between the structure and activities of a committee in St Petersburg or Moscow and one in a remoter centre such as Baku or Omsk. In the latter city, for example, by 1905 the 'forces of order' had been weakened by the impact of the Russo-Japanese war (a factor not mentioned here); the social democrats could easily win support among the political exiles and the relatively well-educated railwaymen; and members of the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions worked together fairly amicably, sometimes ignoring the Party schism altogether. By contrast, in Moscow the weight of tradition made itself powerfully felt until the summer of 1905; the workers were economically under-privileged, with fairly close links to the rural milieu whence they sprang, and culturally backward; at a critical moment the hitherto quiescent extreme left-wing groups were suddenly faced with a mass of combustible but politically unstable material.

The celebrated Moscow uprising of December 1905, the most significant episode in the Party's early history, was staged by local Bolshevik militants who, however, grievously overestimated their chances of success. Lacking really close contact with ordinary workers, they overlooked the fact that their grievances, though acute, were primarily socio-economic, and that they could not give sustained backing to an insurrectionary coup. Lane agrees that this affair was 'badly organized', but is curiously unsympathetic to the viewpoint of the Mensheviks (to say nothing of those who stood further to the right). They argued—after the event—that the Party ought rather to have concentrated on building up its popular support by work in the trade unions and other mass bodies. 'The Mensheviks', he writes (p. 126), 'were hesitant rather than counter-revolutionary'. Most Soviet historians would admit as much. But the important thing surely is that at the time factional differences became obscured and that, whatever their allegiance, the militants allowed themselves to be carried away

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by a wave of emotional zeal and threw themselves into a desperate armed struggle.

Such behaviour is not unusual in a revolutionary situation, as in war, and can easily be explained in terms of crowd psychology. But Lane will have none of this. Instead we are solemnly offered a breakdown by occupational categories of those who were killed in the uprising—as though the bullets were fired in one direction only, and were distributed neatly according to the part played in the affair by members of each social group. This approach suggests that Lane is afflicted by the modern disease of *furor sociologicus*, a passion for quantifying the unquantifiable: a point to which we shall return. Of the 788 known victims, 705 belonged to the lower classes; the rest were students, professional men, officials, etc. On the basis of this evidence we are assured that 'probably . . . the majority were not feckless layabouts or "toughs" as sometimes asserted by historians of revolutionary movements' (p. 128). Probably not. On the other hand, such a view (though not advanced by any reputable modern writer) cannot be dismissed on the showing of these figures, which are quite simply inadequate to yield any instructive conclusion as to either the social composition or moral standing of the insurgents.

TURNING to the first part of this study, one may first commend the author for his zeal in collecting and arranging the statistical material on which his analysis rests. However, the value of his inquiries is somewhat uneven, partly owing to insuperable technical problems and partly for reasons that are more open to criticism. We may consider first the validity of some of his main findings and then the worthiness of the statistical sample on which they are founded.

Perhaps the most useful achievement is the substantiation of the view, advanced rather tentatively by some earlier Western historians, that the schism in Russian social democracy coincided with fairly distinct regional and national divisions. 'By 1907', Lane writes, 'on a line from Astrakhan to St Petersburg, to the west lay the Menshevik support and, with the possible exception of Siberia, to the east Bolshevik' (pp. 41–42). At the Fifth Party Congress in that year there were among the Menshevik delegates nearly twice as many Jews as there were among their rivals; they also had an overwhelming majority of the Georgians and Ukrainians present. A legitimate inference is that already at this time an undercurrent of (Great) Russian national feeling ran through the Bolshevik faction, for all its vocal endorsement of the virtues of proletarian internationalism. These sentiments, still latent and implicit, were to be expressed much more overtly in later years. It would certainly be useful to know more about the early phases of this phenomenon. However, Lane does not attempt to establish the national allegiance of the *lower*-echelon groups in the Party hierarchy; nor does he explain this omission. (His analysis of the regions in which activists worked

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(p. 43) cannot tell us much, since most of these men did not operate in their areas of origin.)

A statistical test to ascertain the age of Party members at this time confirms one's supposition that most of them were very young. But here, too, one needs more information about the middle-ranking strata before any firm conclusions can be drawn. On this point, again for reasons that are not clarified, Lane's data (p. 33) relate to an unusually small sample: 94 activists and 71 rank-and-file members, all of whom were factionally committed and thus not truly representative. Of this sample nearly half, we are told, were under 25 (in which year?). On the basis of such scrappy evidence it seems rash to conclude that 'the Bolsheviks were younger than the Mensheviks at the lowest levels of party organization' (p. 37). At the *top* this was certainly the case: in 1903 the Menshevik leaders were on the average 10 years older than their Bolshevik rivals, and this 'generation gap' was a factor in the celebrated 1903 schism. However, we knew this long ago from Bertram Wolfe's classic biographical study, *Three Who Made a Revolution.*

Similar doubts arise over Lane's interpretation of his figures for the social composition and educational background of Party members, set out in his first and basic table (Table 1, pp. 22–23). He comments (p. 21):

> As far as class analysis is concerned, few of the Social Democrats were not 'workers'. . . . If we include the [members of] 'unknown' factional allegiance, we may conclude that the RSDLP was predominantly a 'working-class' party. This finding is of some importance, for it refutes the commonly held view that the RSDLP was composed 'mostly of middle-class intellectuals'.

If this could be shown, many histories would indeed have to be rewritten. Yet a scrutiny of the table suggests that, even on the basis of these figures, manual workers had a majority of little over 60 per cent. Of the 986 persons in the sample, 173 are identified as having upper- or middle-class occupations and 464 lower-class ones, leaving 349 whose occupation is unknown. (The reason for this high 'unknown' element will be apparent later.) We may reduce this last-named category somewhat by taking away, and adding to the first category, 106 individuals who either belonged to the gentry estate (*soslovie*) or, if their estate is unknown, whose parents were upper or middle class; similarly 41 individuals belonging to the peasant estate or with lower-class parents may be added to the second category. This leaves 147 townsmen (*meshchane*) and 55 of whom neither the estate nor the parents' occupation is known. Given the opportunities for social advance open to townsmen in this period of economic expansion, and the balance between upper- or middle-class and lower-class Party members already arrived at, it would be reasonable to allot between one-third and one-half of these to the first category, giving it a proportion of some 35 per cent to 38 per cent of the whole sample. This estimate is corroborated,

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interestingly enough, by the figures for educational attainments. Of the 986 persons involved, 378 (38 per cent) had secondary or higher education. Was this *really* a 'working-class party'?

In any case, the most important point is not social origin but social *weight*. It can scarcely be questioned that the leading positions in the RSDLP were held by members of the intelligentsia, using this term in its contemporary sense to mean those earning their living by non-manual labour as zemstvo employees, office workers, students, or even as 'professional revolutionaries'. At the 1907 Party Congress (as appears from the table on p. 38 but not from the commentary) about two-thirds of the delegates were non-manual workers and about one-fifth professional revolutionaries. Thus the RSDLP was proletarian in aspiration but far from being proletarian in fact.

It is worth stressing this point because the all too evident gulf between the Party's image and the reality lay at the root of the factional schism, especially after 1906. Prominent Mensheviks such as Axelrod or Larin (later more famous as a Soviet planner) were afflicted by a 'crisis of conscience'. They looked westwards—to the German SPD, and even to the emergent British Labour Party, as organizations supposedly closer to the socialist ideal of a genuinely proletarian party, in which the leaders were elected by, and responsive to the mood of, the mass of the membership. Along with this went a more tolerant attitude towards constitutional politics in general and a de-emphasis on absolute ideological rectitude. These novel ideas were energetically resisted by the Bolsheviks and even by many Mensheviks, who clung to the accepted organizational pattern—partly from inertia or self-interest, and partly from a sincere belief that Stolypin's Russia was not and would never be sufficiently 'European' for the Party to forsake its underground milieu in safety. It was the tragedy of Russian social democracy that the pessimists were proved right, and that the Party never had a genuine chance to achieve maturity by operating in a free and open political environment.

This tragic dimension of the subject is, alas, concealed from Dr Lane by his unduly narrow frame of reference. Sociological techniques, useful as they are, have their inherent limitations. Above all it is necessary to preserve a sense of proportion. Here the *furor sociologicus* can sometimes lead to the verge of absurdity. A conspicuous example is a 'content analysis' of the slogans featured at the end of propaganda leaflets issued by certain Party committees during 1905. The object of this exercise is to determine which expressions were more commonly used by either Bolsheviks or Mensheviks. It emerges that, for example, the phrase 'long live revolution' was to be found in 37·8 per cent of the Bolshevik leaflets in St Petersburg and in only 27·8 per cent of the Menshevik ones. Lane declares triumphantly (p. 84):

> Looking more closely at the calls for 'revolution' in the original sources, one finds that the Mensheviks did not mention the word at all in their slogans from March to October, whereas the

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Bolsheviks did so. The content analysis of slogans confirms that the local Menshevik leaders in St Petersburg were not so extreme as their Bolshevik rivals.

Quite apart from the dubiety of the statistics (the 27·8 per cent turns out to mean a mere five leaflets out of 18), there are the obvious points that such slogans were of a ritualistic exhortative nature (and were not closely controlled from above, like those issued by the Kremlin on ceremonial occasions today); that greater frequency in their use might equally well be interpreted as proof of a more emotive approach to one's audience; and that the factional differences indicated could be equally well deduced, with far less labour, from a conventional study of programmatic and policy statements. But rather than argue with Dr Lane one ought perhaps to award him an appropriate honour from Peter Simple's 'Stretchford University'.

A final point of criticism must be made in rather more serious vein, for it bears on the statistical basis underlying Lane's analyses of the Party's composition. His sample consists of just under one thousand members whose names are mentioned in certain works of reference. These works are the protocols of Party congresses between 1903 and 1907, the first edition of the *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, and a biographical compilation of 1931, *Deyateli revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Rossii*, publication of which was suspended before it had gone beyond the fourth letter of the alphabet (Lane includes only those whose surname begins with the letter A or B). Do these sources give a fair cross-section of Party members? The first naturally contains references only to more important personages. The latter two works were compiled at a time when many former social democrats will quite understandably have sought to emphasize their Bolshevik connexions during the period in question, or at least to play down any allegedly 'petty-bourgeois' social or political affiliations: hence the very high proportion of members of unknown factional allegiance (613 out of 986). Many persons active in the period 1898–1907 will have died or disappeared in the upheavals of the years after 1914. Moreover, although the editors of *Deyateli* . . . did their best to be objective according to their lights, they filtered their information for political reliability. V. Nevski states frankly in his foreword to the volume (p. x): 'it stands to reason that this latter [i.e. oral] information, usually very reliable from the factual point of view, has been especially scrupulously checked from the ideological point of view'. One of the acknowledged biases of the biographical entries it contains is the exclusion of all but the most prominent members of the Jewish Bund and the Polish and Latvian Social Democratic Parties (who were to have been listed in a subsequent volume that was never printed). Thus data drawn from this source give an artificial predominance to Russians, the gravity of which it would now scarcely be possible to determine. Finally, the fact that the editors of *Deyateli* . . . included only persons who joined the social democratic movement up to the end of 1904, before the mass influx

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of the revolutionary year 1905, means that one cannot take the data it contains as representative of the state of the movement at its peak. Yet in Lane's study the all-important distinction between the pre-1905 and 1905–7 periods is blurred.

For these reasons the arguments advanced in this volume must be treated with a good deal of caution. Nevertheless, historians of the RSDLP and its successor will be grateful to the author for his industry in opening up, with such a wealth of data, a potentially rewarding field of inquiry.

PROFESSOR Rigby's study* covers a much longer span and is altogether a more ambitious undertaking. His aim, as he modestly defines it, is to examine 'the history of recruitment to the Soviet Communist Party and the composition of the party during the first half-century of the Soviet regime'. However, the scope of the work is broader than this might imply, for the ramifications of the subject extend to almost every aspect of Soviet public life. As the first attempt to provide a comprehensive treatment of this difficult question, it must be accounted a major landmark in Soviet studies.

Rigby bases his arguments upon a close analysis of all available published evidence, which owing to the secrecy enshrouding certain phases of Party history often has to be drawn from the most recondite sources. We are told quite frankly where information is sufficient to support only tentative conclusions or various hypotheses. The depth and precision of the research undertaken for this volume may be indicated by the fact that, where data are lacking on certain aspects of all-Union Party membership, the gap is filled in by projections based on data concerning one of the less familiar union republics (the Uzbek Party historians, curiously enough, are sometimes relatively forthcoming). Indeed, for certain facts on recruitment during the Second World War we are invited to descend to a much lower level in the hierarchy: for example, to the Vokzal *raion* of Tomsk. (How many passengers on the Trans-Siberian, one wonders, gazing from their train windows upon the bustle in the station precinct, will have suspected that this, properly handled, might serve as the material for serious scholarly inquiry?)

Moreover, in the body of his work Professor Rigby avoids undue use of political science jargon, but in the introductory chapter explains the principles of the 'functional approach' by which he has been guided. He expresses the hope that students of comparative politics may be encouraged to consider the wider implications of his theme, for there is much in the Soviet political system that helps us to understand how others work. The book has an excellent index and, making allowance for the intractable nature of the material, reads remarkably well. The

* T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917–1967*. Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University (Princeton University Press, 1968), 573 pp.

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statistical data are set out clearly, although some of the tables might with advantage have been consolidated at the end of the volume to facilitate cross-reference. But then this work is not designed for the faint-hearted reader who expects to have his information served up in pre-packaged form.

Rigby, like Lane, divides his study into two sections. The first provides a chronological account of the Party's changing enrolment policies, set against the contemporary scene in national politics, from the revolution to the jubilee year 1967. The second part is devoted to an examination of certain special aspects of these policies, viewed as a whole. We may first consider briefly (at some risk of over-simplification) a few of the principal findings relating to the Party's turnover, national composition and social make-up, and then review their possible implications for the future.

The lack of stability in the Party's membership, especially in the earlier years of the Soviet regime, is remarkable. There is little continuity between the men who worked in the underground movement prior to 1917 and those who ruled Russia once victory had been won. In 1922, five years after the February revolution, only half the 24,000 Bolsheviks who had at that time been enrolled were still in the Party's ranks: such was the toll of civil war, famine and disease, to which were added the effects of Lenin's insistence upon ideological purity. By 1939, after the further strains of Stalin's forced collectivization drive and the purges, less than 5,000 *podpolshchiki* were left, and even of civil war veterans only one-fifth survived (p. 352). The Second World War brought about another great upheaval. In 1946 only one-third of the members could recall life in the Party before the Nazi invasion, and only one-sixth had enlisted in the Party prior to the *Yezhovshchina* (p. 276). Subsequently, however, matters improved. In the Khrushchev era there were far fewer expulsions than there had been in Stalin's last years, to say nothing of the 1930s. On the other hand the effect of this was offset by a considerable expansion of membership, particularly of course among younger men—although this campaign was not on the feverish scale of earlier enrolments. Since Khrushchev fell from power recruitment has again tapered off, so that in 1967 over half the members had been in the Party for 10 years or more.

A corollary of this is the existence of a 'secular trend towards maturity' which is making it harder for the CPSU to preserve its much-vaunted youthful image. The over-forties, who in 1927 comprised a mere 14 per cent of the membership, had risen to 48 per cent four decades later. For the over-fifties the corresponding figures were three per cent and 13 per cent (p. 354). Within the last decade 'for the first time a significant number of party members were reaching retiring age'. In one way this makes for stability; at the senior levels there are now better prospects of promotion, and thus competition for these jobs can be expected to decrease. On the other hand, if the Party wishes to preserve a reasonably healthy balance between men of various age

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groups it must sooner or later launch another fairly brisk recruitment drive among people in their teens and twenties. But will they join? And if they do, will they be satisfied with relatively lowly and onerous jobs? Or as Rigby puts it soberly:

> The age structure of the CPSU membership has implications which deserve closer attention by students of the Soviet political system, since it must obviously affect the atmosphere and work-style of primary organizations, the relations between the latter and the 'non-party masses', career patterns and opportunities, and the climate of attitudes and experience within which the party apparatus itself functions (p. 359).

Of equal significance are the data on the national composition of the CPSU, which show that, despite the many twists and turns of Party policy over the last half-century, the bias in favour of the (Great) Russian element, inherited from the pre-revolutionary era, has persisted. In the 1920s a sincere effort was made to carry the communist gospel to the national minorities, which, considering the natural obstacles, may be considered fairly successful. The Russian element fell from 72 per cent in 1922 to 65 per cent in 1927, and natives improved their position vis-à-vis Russians in the Party organizations of most union republics (p. 366). Thereafter the flow of direct information dries up for about 30 years. Although no overall figures on national composition were published, scattered data relating to certain regions (Ukraine, Central Asia) indicate that 'nativization' was first accelerated, as part of the mass recruitment drive of the first Five-Year Plan period, but then fell off during the purge years. For the 1940s and 1950s we have to rely mainly on a rather inadequate sample: the data concerning delegates to Party congresses, of whom only the regional (not national) origin is known. On the basis of this and other evidence Rigby cautiously deduces that the Russian element in the Party increased greatly during the war and immediate post-war years, but thereafter may have lessened. At any rate by 1961, when the veil is partly lifted again, Russians comprised 63·5 per cent of the total membership—only slightly below the 1927 figure (p. 378). During the next few years their share declined by just over one per cent. This was a significant over-representation, judged by the ratio of Russians to non-Russians in the population as a whole. According to the 1959 census Russians then accounted for 54·7 per cent of all Soviet citizens.

In regard to the other nationalities only a few salient facts may be noted here. Over the last 20 years the Ukrainian and Belorussian communists have recovered fairly satisfactorily from the heavy losses they suffered during the war, but their ratio to the total population of these republics remains significantly below that in the RSFSR. In 1965 the non-Slav peoples of the USSR, taken together, had a slightly smaller share of the total Party membership (18·9 per cent) than they had in 1927, although they comprised a slightly larger proportion of the total population (p. 391). Georgians and Armenians have traditionally had

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strong communist parties, whereas the peoples of the Baltic republics, Moldavia and most of Central Asia still have far fewer communists than the all-Union average. These differences seem to arise less from deliberate policy than from long-term historical factors, such as the wartime experience of certain minority groups or the eastward flow of migrants since the war. During the early part of the present decade (1961–65) in most non-Russian republics natives were tending to provide a progressively larger share of the recruits. For this reason Rigby takes the view that, 'assuming a reasonable scale of recruitment, national inequalities in the incidence of party membership may be well on the way to elimination in a further twenty or thirty years' (p. 393). This does not, however, necessarily mean that the Kazakhs or Kirgiz, for example, will improve their position relative to Russians within their republican organizations: for this to happen, the present colonization drive would have to lose its impetus.

One rather surprising finding relates to Party membership among the Jews. Despite the restrictions imposed upon ordinary Soviet Jews in recent years, the proportion of them who belong to the Party seems to be higher than for any other national group. It stands at an estimated 80 per 1,000, as against 65 per 1,000 for the Georgians and 58 per 1,000 for the Russians (pp. 386 and 378). (The first figure is, however, only an approximation, since Jews are not identified separately in the overall statistics.) But the percentage of Jews in the total Party membership has declined appreciably over the years, as one would expect, and in 1965 comprised a mere 1·5 per cent.

TURNING now to the social and occupational composition of the CPSU, the most striking feature is the continuing failure of the leadership's efforts to make the Party a genuinely proletarian organization, with the corollary that members of the élite have come to play an increasingly important role in its affairs. According to the current official formula, the CPSU comprises 'the best representatives of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia'. It contains a leavening of members from all strata of society and types of employment, including the humble and ill-paid. Nevertheless, as Rigby puts it,

> the majority of its members are drawn from groups which are relatively high in power, income or prestige, and persons in these groups are, on the average, *several times* more likely to be party members than persons who are not (p. 453).

The bureaucratization of modern mass political parties, however democratic their formal ideology, is of course a world-wide phenomenon. Yet few of us can resist a modest cheer for the efforts made by romantic idealists, in various countries and at various times, to turn back the relentless forces of progress, doomed to failure though such efforts may be. Among those who have endeavoured to swim against the tide are

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the student rebels (or some of them) of the late 1960s and the Russian Marxists of the first quarter of the twentieth century. The latter were deeply impregnated with the radical utopian ideals of the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia. It was this spirit that motivated the pre-revolutionary right-wing Mensheviks' protest against the dictatorial tendencies of Lenin (and Stolypin). The belief in inborn proletarian virtue may well be, as Rigby remarks, 'a Marxian equivalent of the myth of the "noble savage"'—yet how essential it is to our political culture! The story he relates is really the second instalment of the tragedy whose first part fell within the scope of Lane's study. Rigby is more sensitive to this aspect of his theme, but might reasonably have made his point more sharply. Surely it is a latent guilt conscience that makes the *apparatchiki* of today suppress or misinterpret membership statistics? Are they not trying to convince themselves, as well as the rest of us, that their Party is more proletarian than it is or ever can be?

Significantly, the old social-democratic dream of a 'genuinely working-class party' lived on among the Bolsheviks after they came to power. In 1925 the leftists ensconced in Zinovev's Leningrad organization publicly advocated a massive expansion of the Party's ranks so as to embrace some 50 per cent to 60 per cent of the country's industrial workers. This suggestion brought down upon their heads the wrath of Stalin and his followers, who indicted them for Menshevik sympathies (p. 148). At this time the Stalinists were themselves still anxious to recruit bench-workers (and then peasants, too), but their motives were subtly different from those of the left-wing idealists. Their chief concern was with top-level political manipulation: they hoped to use the influx of pliable recruits to drown the Trotskyist opposition, which had most support from among white-collar Party members. In the short term they were successful. But as Rigby aptly remarks:

> During the 1930s society exacted from the party a terrible revenge. 'Socialism', far from completing the triumph of the working class, begot a new class of technically trained administrators. The Revolution passed from the destruction of old bonds to the creation of new ones (p. 197).

It is worth trying to piece together the statistics of this process. In January 1927 factory and transport workers comprised 36·8 per cent (or 39·4 per cent, on another reading of the figures) of Party members. The high point of manual worker membership was reached in April 1930, when such persons constituted 48·6 per cent of the whole. We do not know what percentage they formed in 1939, but in Uzbekistan (for which figures are available) they were halved, and this trend can be taken as roughly indicative of that in the Party as a whole. Whereas in 1929 81·2 per cent of those enrolled were workers, in the period November 1936 to March 1939 this sank to 41 per cent. (Cf. pp. 162, 116, 167 and 224.)

Meanwhile the white-collar workers, who in the years 1925–32 had

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dropped from 49·2 per cent to 37·6 per cent (or 28·4 per cent?) of the membership, made good their losses. In 1929 they had comprised a mere 1·7 per cent of those enrolled; in the period 1936–39 their share was 43·8 per cent; and in the immediate pre-war years it may have been over 70 per cent. The 'Great Patriotic War' led to a massive influx of Red Army men, who were predominantly of peasant origin; but from 1944 onwards the earlier trend was resumed, and in the post-war years non-manual workers accounted for roughly half the recruits. Under Khrushchev the balance was shifted in favour of persons active 'in the sphere of material production', and as a result the figure for white-collar entrants fell from 46·2 per cent in 1955 to 34·3 per cent in 1960. Subsequently, however, the pendulum once again swung back in their favour. (Cf. pp. 116, 199, 225, 289 and 306.)

In 1967, if we take the official standard classification according to 'social position', 'workers' comprised 38·1 per cent of the membership, 'peasants' 16 per cent, and white-collar workers and others 45·9 per cent. Seen against the background of the social composition of the entire population (according to the 1959 census), it transpires that workers and peasants are under-represented by 10 per cent and 50 per cent respectively, while white-collar groups are over-represented by 125 per cent (in very rough figures). It is even more instructive to consider the occupations in which these persons are currently employed; and it is by establishing such an occupational breakdown (in the table on p. 348) that Rigby renders perhaps his greatest service to scholarship. As he explains, some of the data must inevitably be no more than educated guesses, but the general picture is clear enough. Slightly juggling his categories, we find that more than one-third of Party members (37·9 per cent) are in industry, transport and construction. Another 18·4 per cent are in agriculture and 5·4 per cent in other economic or civic services. Cultural activities (science, health, education, including students) absorb 15·3 per cent. But it is the next largest group, comprising 14·4 per cent of the whole, who matter most. Just over half of these men belong to one or other of the bureaucratic apparats (Party, governmental or economic), while the remainder are in the armed forces or police. It is in these latter occupations that we find the highest degree of 'Party saturation'. Access to the higher levels of government or the judiciary, the officer corps and (probably) the police is virtually restricted to Party members. Among lower government officials, scholars and managers roughly one-third to one-half are Party members. The proportion declines until it reaches 1:15 among ordinary industrial workers and 1:21 among ordinary collective farmers (p. 428).

AFTER such a mass of valuable information (of which only highlights have been singled out here) it may seem a trifle peevish to conclude by pointing to the many uncertainties that still remain—the more so since Rigby frankly acknowledges that there are natural limits to what we can discover by applying his methods of inquiry. Yet,

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looking back upon the chequered history of Party membership, we may be forgiven for wondering just how far official policy-making enters into it and how far the changes that occurred were the product of spontaneous developments, or at least of decisions made independently of the will of those whose task it was to shape membership policy.

This question arose, as we have seen, in connexion with the Party's national composition. To take a concrete example from another field: in 1931–32 the percentage of communists in the armed forces, which had hitherto been rising slowly, leaped to over 25 per cent, a proportion not reached again until the final stages of the Second World War. At that time the USSR was at peace with foreign powers (although not, arguably, with its own peasant subjects). Commenting on this sudden growth, Rigby writes:

> It is unclear whether this represented a deliberate policy of preferential party recruitment in the armed forces, or whether it merely reflected the fact that general party recruitment policy at this time concentrated on those groups who made up the bulk of army conscripts, namely young workers and collective farmers (p. 247).

A number of such phenomena are treated in these pages as though they were the product of conscious membership policy; only in the concluding chapter do we hear much about the so-called 'dysfunctional elements' that enter into the picture: e.g. 'the leadership has not always been clear as to what "mix" of members it needed'; 'membership policies have had unexpected side effects . . .'; 'the voluntary element in recruitment has skewed the distribution of several variables in given categories of recruits' and so forth. The last point is particularly important, since joining the Party is in the last resort an individual decision; it may be taken for a variety of imponderable reasons, which may or may not coincide with the functional requirements of the political system. Rigby's argument is that these requirements have in some cases been 'mediated through the personal motives making for self-selection' (p. 516). But how? This seems to posit that the recruit acts in conformity with some higher purpose unapprehended by himself—or indeed even by his superiors, who may likewise not be fully aware of the 'functional imperatives' underlying their policy. A metaphysical element has surely here entered into the picture. One suspects that a rather different and simpler pattern would emerge if public opinion pollsters could freely ask Party members why they joined or persuaded others to join; since no such evidence exists, it might have been helpful to comb the literary sources for descriptions of the kind of motives that prompt such decisions. Admittedly, such a mundane approach would not take us nearly as far as we can go with the refined and sophisticated methodology employed by Professor Rigby.

He has drawn an authoritative portrait of the body that rules over the USSR 53 years after the 'Great October': somewhat ageing, increasingly well educated, stoutly Slav, and mainly representative of

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the country's various élites. Where will it go from here? So unpredictable is the CPSU—it is after all only a generation since the revolution was enthusiastically devouring its children—that no political scientist, or for that matter no historian, should really hazard a prediction. Yet this study shows that the leadership has throughout been faced with the problem of reconciling two incompatible tasks: to strengthen the Party's 'links with the masses' and to saturate with its members all potential sources of power. Now as Soviet society grows more complex, so the objects that need to be brought under control multiply and the more jobs the Party has to fill. At the same time this expansion at the top, predominantly involving mature white-collar elements, must be balanced by an expansion at the lower end of the scale, among the young and the socially underprivileged. But there are natural limits to this growth, for if the Party should ever come to absorb a large proportion of adult Soviet citizens it would risk forfeiting its vanguard character. The mystique, the fact of being 'in the know', which has hitherto exercised such a powerful attraction upon actual and potential Party members, would lose force once it were shared by every third or fourth citizen. In such an eventuality the leaders would surely have to reconsider the Party's fundamental purposes. This may seem a remote prospect, but in the long run it is hard to see how structural changes can be avoided.

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DOCUMENT: SOVIET UNION

APPEAL OF SOVIET SCIENTISTS TO THE PARTY-GOVERNMENT LEADERS OF THE USSR

To the Central Committee of the CPSU; to L. I. Brezhnev;
To the Council of Ministers of the USSR; to A. N. Kosygin;
To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; to G. V. Podgorny;

HIGHLY esteemed Comrades! We are appealing to you over an issue of great importance. Our country has achieved a great deal in developing production, in the field of education and culture; it has brought about a cardinal improvement in the living conditions of workers; it has done much to form new socialist relations between men. These achievements are of world-wide historical significance and have had a profound influence on events throughout the world laying a firm foundation for the future progress of the communist cause. But we are also faced with serious difficulties and shortcomings.

This letter discusses and develops the standpoint which can be formulated briefly in the following theses: first, at the present time it is a matter of urgent necessity to carry through a number measures directed towards the further democratization of public life in the country. This necessity stems, in part, from the intimate connexion between technological and economic progress, scientific methods of management and freedom of information, publicity and competition. This necessity also stems from other domestic and foreign political problems.

Second, democratization would further the preservation and consolidation of the Soviet socialist system, the socialist economic structure, our social and cultural achievements and the socialist ideology.

Democratization implemented under the aegis of the CPSU in cooperation with all sections of society would preserve and consolidate the leading role of the Party in the economic, political and cultural life of society.

Last, democratization should be gradual in order to avoid possible complications and setbacks. At the same time it should be consistently implemented root-and-branch and should be based on a carefully drawn-up programme. Without a radical democratization our society will not be capable of solving the problems it faces and will not progress in a normal fashion.

There is some reason to suppose that the standpoint expressed in these theses is shared to a greater or lesser extent by a considerable portion of the Soviet intelligentsia and the foremost section of the working class. This standpoint is reflected in the opinions of youth both studying

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and working and in numerous small discussions. However, we consider it best suits the purpose to present this standpoint in a coherent written form in order to promote a broad and open discussion of these most important problems. We are striving for a positive and constructive approach, acceptable to the Party-State leaders of the country; we wish to elucidate certain misunderstandings and unfounded apprehensions.*

IN the past decade the national economy of our country has begun to show threatening signs of dislocation and stagnation, the roots of which, however, can be traced back to an earlier period and are very deep-seated. The growth rate in national income has been going inexorably down. A rift has opened up between what is necessary for normal development and the real introduction of new production capacities. Numerous facts point to mistakes in determining technological and economic policy in industry and agriculture, impermissible procrastination in answering urgent questions. Defects in the system of planning, accounting and incentives often lead to a contradiction between local or bureaucratic and State or national interest. The result is that reserves are not available and used for production research as they should be, and technological progress is severely retarded. For the same set of reasons the country's natural resources are often destroyed without any control or punishment: forests are chopped down, reservoirs are polluted, valuable farm land is flooded, soil is eroded or salinated, etc. The chronically difficult situation in farming is generally known, especially in livestock rearing. Real wages of the population in recent years have almost ceased growing; food, medical and everyday services are improving only very slowly and are unequal territorially. The number of goods in short supply is on the increase. The country is showing clear signs of inflation.

Especially alarming for the future of the country is the slowdown in the expansion of education: our total expenditure on all forms of education is one third that of the USA and is increasing more slowly. Alcoholism has grown at a tragic rate and drug addiction is beginning to rear its head. In many parts of the country the crime rate is systematically increasing. In a number of places the symptoms of corruption are becoming ever more noticeable. In scientific and technological organizations, bureaucracy, departmentalism, a formalised approach to work and lack of initiative are becoming entrenched.

The decisive factor in comparing the results of economic systems is, as is generally accepted, labour productivity. And it is here where matters

* NB. Since January 1970, a 'Letter to Brezhnev' signed 'Sakharov' or 'Academician Sakharov' has been given wide circulation in Moscow. This letter was then published in different versions by the Western press. In its first issue for 1970 the emigré anti-Soviet journal *Posev* published an article under the pretentious heading 'The Truth About the Present' signed 'R. Medvedev'. This same article, which is full of nonsensical inventions, was then broadcast in Russian by Radio 'Liberty' (GFR). We declare that none of us was the author of the letters and articles in question. These 'documents' seem to us blatant forgeries and are evidently distributed with provocatory aims.

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are at their worst. In our country labour productivity continues, as before, to be many times lower than in capitalist countries and its growth rate is sharply declining. This situation is especially alarming if we take the leading capitalist countries and in particular the USA. By introducing into the economy elements of state regulation and planning, these countries have done away with the destructive crises which formerly plagued capitalist economy. The widespread introduction of computing techniques and automation into the economy has guaranteed a rapid growth of labour productivity which in turn has assisted them partially to alleviate certain social difficulties and contradictions (unemployment benefits, a shorter working day, etc.). When we compare our economy with that of the USA, we see that ours is lagging behind, not only quantatively but—and this is the saddest part—qualitatively. The more novel and revolutionary the aspect of the economy, the wider becomes the rift between the USA and ourselves. We are ahead of the USA in the production of coal but behind in the production of oil, gas and electric power, ten times behind in chemistry and immeasurably behind in computer technology. The latter is especially essential, for the introduction of electronic computers into the national economy is of decisive importance which could radically change the face of the system of production and culture in general. This phenomenon has rightly been called the ' second industrial revolution '. Meanwhile the total capacity of our pool of computers is hundreds of times less than in the USA, and as for the use of electronic computers in the national economy, here the rift is so enormous that it is impossible to measure. We are simply living in a different era.

Things are no better in the area of scientific and technological discovery. Here no increase in our role can be marked up. It is rather the reverse. In the late 'fifties our country was the first to launch a sputnik and to send a man into space. By the end of the 'sixties we had lost the lead in this field (as in many others). The first men to set foot on the moon were Americans. This is one of the outward signs of an essential and ever-growing gap between our country and the West extending through the whole spectrum of scientific and technological activity.

In the 'twenties and 'thirties the capitalist world underwent a period of crisis and depression. At that time we, by exploiting the upsurge of national energy which had been unleashed by the Revolution, were creating industry at an unheard-of tempo. That was the time when the slogan ' Overtake and Surpass America ' was coined. And we really were overtaking it in the course of the next few decades. Then the situation changed. The second industrial revolution came along and now, at the onset of the 'seventies we can see that, far from having overtaken America, we are dropping further and further behind.

WHY is this? Why have we not only failed to become the pioneers of the second industrial revolution but, as it transpires, are we even incapable of keeping abreast of the developed capitalist countries

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in this revolution? Can it be that the socialist system does not present the same opportunities as the capitalist system for the development of productive forces and that in the economic competition between capitalism and socialism capitalism will emerge victorious?

Of course not. The source of our difficulties does not lie in the socialist system at all, but, on the contrary, in those features and circumstances in our life which run counter to socialism and are alien to it. This source lies in the anti-democratic traditions and norms of public conduct which were laid down during the Stalinist period and which have not been eradicated even to this day. In our country it is usual to dismiss non-economic compulsion, restrictions on exchange of information, restrictions on intellectual freedom and other manifestations of the anti-democratic distortions of socialism which occurred under Stalin as the price paid for the process of industrialization. They are not considered to have had a serious effect on the economy of the country, although it is admitted that they had most weighty consequences in the military and political sphere and on the lives of broad sectors of the population as well as entire nationalities. We shall leave aside the question of how far this point of view is justified in regard to the earlier periods in the development of the socialist national economy, although the decrease in the rate of industrial development in the pre-war years would suggest rather that it is not. But there can be no doubt that from the beginning of the second industrial revolution these manifestations became a decisive economic factor and now act as the main brake on the development of the country's forces of production. As a result of the increased scale and complexity of economic systems, problems of management and organization have come to the fore. These problems cannot be resolved by one or two persons in positions of power and who claim to know everything. They demand the creative participation of millions of people at all levels of the economic system. They require a broad exchange of information and ideas. Herein lies the difference between the modern economy and that, say, of the Ancient Orient.

However it is in seeking exchange of information and ideas that we come up against the greatest stumbling block in our country. Truthful information about our shortcomings and negative phenomena is classified as secret, the reason given being that 'it could be used by enemy propaganda'. Exchange of information with foreign countries is restricted for fear of the 'penetration of foreign ideology'. Theoretical conclusions and practical proposals which strike some people as too bold are pared down to the bone without any discussion, for fear that they could 'undermine the foundations'. We have to face outright mistrust of all creatively-thinking, critical and active individuals. This is the situation which supplies the conditions for promotion up the official ladder, not of those who are distinguished for their high professional qualifications and belief in principle, but of those who are distinguished for their devotion in words to the Party cause, and their devotion in deeds to their narrow private interests or their passive execution of instructions.

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Restrictions on freedom of information not only hinder control over the leaders and undermine the initiative of the people but also deprive the middle-rank leaders of both rights and information, turning them into passive executors of instructions, into simple functionaries. The leaders of the higher echelons have information passed up to them which is too incomplete and too polished and, moreover, they are deprived of the possibility of making effective use of the powers at their disposal.

The economic reform of 1955 was an extremely useful and important undertaking, initiated to tackle the basic problems facing our economic life. However we are convinced that if all these obstacles are to be surmounted, purely economic measures alone are not enough. Moreover, these economic measures cannot be put through in their entirety unless accompanied by reforms in the field of management, information and publicity.

The same applies to such promising undertakings as the organization of 'firms'—complex production combines endowed with a high degree of autonomy in economic, financial and personnel matters. Whichever specific aspect of the economy we take, we soon arrive at the conclusion that its satisfactory solution requires a scientific answer to such general questions of principle in the socialist economy as forms of feedback in the managerial process, pricing methods in the absence of a free market, general planning principles, etc. There is much talk in our country now about the need for a scientific approach to organization and management. This, of course, is correct. Only a scientific approach to these problems enables the difficulties which crop up to be overcome, and allows those opportunities for economic management and technological and economic progress opened up in principle by the absence of capitalist ownership to be exploited. But a scientific approach requires full information, unprejudiced thinking and creative freedom. Until these conditions are met (and, moreover, not just for certain individuals but for the masses) all talk about scientific management will remain just idle chatter.

Our economy can be compared to traffic at an intersection. As long as there were only a few cars the man on point duty could cope and the traffic flowed freely. But the volume of traffic is growing unceasingly and so a traffic jam builds up. What can be done about it? The drivers can be punished and the man on point duty changed, but this will not save the situation. The only solution is to widen the crossing. The obstacles blocking the development of our economy lie beyond it, in the socio-political sphere, and all measures which fail to remove these obstacles are doomed to inefficacy.

The vestiges of the Stalinist period have a negative effect on the economy not only indirectly in so far as they render impossible any scientific approach to the problems of organization and management, but also, and to no lesser extent directly, in so far as they bring an all-round reduction in the creative potential of representatives of all professions. But in the conditions of the second industrial revolution it is

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precisely creative work which is becoming more and more vital for the national economy.

IN this regard it is impossible to avoid mention of the relationship of the State and the intelligentsia. Freedom of information and creativity are necessary to the intelligentsia because of the very nature of its work, because of its social function. The urge of the intelligentsia to increase this freedom is both legal and natural. The State, however, counteracts this urge and brings to bear all kinds of restrictive measures, administrative pressure, dismissals from work and even court trials. This opens up a gulf of mutual mistrust and a profound lack of mutual understanding which stands in the way of fruitful co-operation between the Party-State sector and the most active sections of the intelligentsia, i.e., those sections which are most valuable to society. In the present state of industrial society, when the role of the intelligentsia is growing unceasingly this gulf must be seen as suicidal.

The overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia and youth understands the need for democratization and also appreciates the need for caution and gradualness in this cause. But it cannot understand or condone actions which are clearly anti-democratic in character. Really, how can one justify detaining in prisons, camps and mental hospitals those people who are in opposition but whose opposition is legal, lying in the field of ideas and convictions? In a number of cases, moreover, it is not even a question of opposition at all, but simply of a desire for information, for a forthright and unprejudiced discussion of important social issues. It is impermissible to detain writers because of their works. Beyond comprehension or any possible justification is such an absurd and damaging move as the expulsion from the Writers' Union of the most important and popular Soviet writer, who is profoundly patriotic and humanitarian in all his activities, or the rout of the *Novy mir* editorial board around which were gathered the most progressive forces of the Marxist-Leninist orientation.

It is also necessary to speak about ideological problems once more. Democratization, with its full information and competition, would return to our ideological life (the social sciences, art, propaganda) its much-needed dynamic and creative character by extirpating the bureaucratic, ritualistic, dogmatic, officially hypocritical and talentless style which now plays such a large part in it.

The course leading towards democratization would remove the rift dividing the Party-State apparatus from the intelligentsia. Mutual misunderstanding would give way to close collaboration. The course leading towards democratization would call up a surge of enthusiasm comparable to that of the 'twenties. The best intellectual forces would be mobilized for the solution of national economic and social problems.

Carrying out democratization is no easy process. Its normal course would be threatened from the one side by individualistic, anti-socialist

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forces and from the other by adherents of 'strong government', demagogues of the fascist model who would be able to exploit for their own ends the economic difficulties of the country, the mutual misunderstanding and mistrust of the intelligentsia and the Party-State apparatus, and those philistine and nationalistic trends which exist in certain sections of society. But we should realize that our country has no other way out, that this difficult task has to be faced. If democratization were to be carried out on the initiative and under the control of the higher organs the process could proceed according to plan, and it would give units of the Party-State apparatus time to adjust to the new style of operations which differ from the past in that they allow greater publicity, openness and broader discussion of all problems.

THERE is no doubt that the majority of members of the Party apparatus, having been educated in a modern, highly developed country, would be capable of adjusting to this style of operations and would quickly come round to appreciate its benefits. Sifting out the few that are incapable of adjustment would be all to the general good.

We propose the following tentative programme of measures which could be implemented over four or five years:

1. A statement to be issued by the higher Party-Government organs regarding the need for further democratization, the speed and method of putting it into effect. Publication in the press of a number of articles discussing problems of democratization.
2. Restricted distribution (via Party organs, enterprises and institutions) of information regarding the state of the country and of theoretical works on social problems which, for the time being, it is inexpedient to make the object of wide-scale discussion. Such materials should be gradually made available to more and more people until finally restrictions are removed altogether.
3. Wide-scale organization of complex production combines (firms) endowed with a large measure of independence in questions of production planning, technological processes, sales and supplies, financial and personnel matters. Extension of the same rights to the smaller production units. Scientific assessment after painstaking research of the forms and level of State control.
4. An end to the jamming of foreign broadcasts. Free sale of foreign books and periodicals. Membership of the country in the international copyright system. Gradual (three to four years) extension and facilitation of international two-way tourism. Facilitation of international correspondence and also other measures to extend international contacts, in the first place the extension of these tendencies in regard to the Comecon countries.
5. Setting up of a public opinion research institute. Initially restricted and later complete publication of materials showing the attitude of the population to the most important questions of domestic and foreign policy as well as other sociological materials.

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6. An amnesty for political prisoners. A decree to establish the obligatory publication of full stenographic reports of trials of a political nature. Public control of places of detention and psychiatric institutions.
7. Certain measures to improve the work of courts and the Public Prosecutor's Office, which would be made independent of the executive authorities and local influences, prejudices and connexions.
8. Abolition of registration of nationality in passports and questionnaires. A single passport system for all inhabitants of town and country. Gradual abandonment of the system of registration of passports, carried out in parallel with the levelling out of territorial inequalities in economic and cultural development.
9. Reforms in the field of education. Increased funds for primary and secondary schools, improvement in the material status of teachers, their autonomy and rights to experiment.
10. Passing of a press and information law. Provision of means for public organizations and groups of citizens to set up new press organs. Total abolition of preliminary censorship in all its forms.
11. Improvement of the training of leaders in the art of management. Establishment of practical training periods for probationers. Improvement in the information available to leaders at all levels, their rights to autonomy, to experiment, to defend and test their oninions in practice.
12. Gradual introduction of the practice of nominating more than one candidate to a single seat at elections to Party and Soviet organs at all levels, including indirect elections.
13. Extension of the rights of Soviet organs. Extension of the rights and responsibilities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
14. Restoration of all rights to nations forcibly resettled under Stalin. Restoration of national autonomy to resettled peoples and the possibility for them to return (where this has not yet been done).
15. Measures designed to increase publicity in the work of leading organs within limits determined by the interests of state. Creation of consultative scientific committees including highly qualified specialists in different branches attached to leading organs at all levels.

This, of course, should be regarded as a tentative plan. Moreover, it should clearly be complemented by a plan for economic and social measures drawn up by specialists. We would stress that of itself democratization by no means offers solutions to economic problems. It only creates the prerequisites for their solution. But without these prerequisites economic and technological problems cannot be solved. From our friends abroad we sometimes hear the USSR compared to a huge truck, whose driver presses one foot hard down on the accelerator and the other on the brake. The time has come to make more intelligent use of the brake!

In our opinion the proposed plan demonstrates that it is entirely possible to chart a programme for democratization which would be acceptable to the Party and State and, at first approximation, meets the most pressing needs of the country's development. Naturally a broad

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discussion and profound scientific, sociological, economic and socio-political research as well as life experience would suggest essential amendments and additions. But it is important, as the mathematicians say, to prove the ' theorem of the existence of a solution '.

It is also necessary to consider the international consequences of our country's acceptance of a course leading towards democratization. Nothing could so enhance our international authority and strengthen the progressive communist forces throughout the world as further democratization, accompanied by intensified technological and economic progress in the first socialist country in the world. Without doubt the possibilities of peaceful coexistence and international co-operation would burgeon, the forces of peace and social progress would be strengthened, the attraction of the communist ideology would grow and our international position would become more secure. It is especially vital to shore up the moral and material positions of the USSR vis-à-vis China; opportunities would grow for us to use technological and economic aid, for example, in order to indirectly influence the situation in that country in the interests of both peoples.

A NUMBER of correct and necessary foreign political actions of our government are not properly understood, since citizens possess only limited information on these questions, and in the past there have been instances of plainly inaccurate and tendentious information being issued. This, naturally, does not promote confidence. One instance concerns economic aid to underdeveloped countries. Fifty years ago the workers of war-torn Europe gave aid to peoples of the Volga regions who were dying of hunger. Soviet people are no more callous and selfish than they. But they have to feel sure that our resources are expended on real aid, on the solution of serious problems and not on the erection of pompous stadiums and the purchase of American cars for local officials. The state of the world today and our country's opportunities and mission positively demand our broad contribution to economic aid to underdeveloped countries in conjunction with other states. But if the public is to gain a correct understanding of these questions it is not enough to be given verbal assurances, the need must be demonstrably proven, and this calls for fuller information and democratization.

Soviet foreign policy is at base one of peace and co-operation. But lack of information causes public uneasiness. In the past there have been certain negative features of Soviet foreign policy which bore the mark of messianism, which were over-ambitious and which forced one to conclude that it is not only imperialism which bears responsibility for international tension. All such negative features of Soviet foreign policy are closely associated with the problem of democratization and this cuts both ways. Great uneasiness is caused by the lack of democratic discussion of such questions as military aid to a number of countries including, for instance, Nigeria, where there has been a bloody war,

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about whose causes and progress the Soviet public knows very little. We are convinced that the resolution of the U.N. Security Council on the Israeli-Arab conflict is fair and reasonable, albeit too vague on a number of important points. Uneasiness however, has been caused by questions about whether our attitude is not perhaps too far removed from this document and whether it is not too onesided. Is our position realistic on the status of West Berlin? Is our striving to extend our influence in places far away from our borders always realistic at a time of difficulty in Sino-Soviet relations, and at a time of serious difficulties in technological and economic development? Of course, in certain cases, such a 'dynamic' policy is necessary, but it should accord not only with general principles but also with the real possibilities open to our country.

We are convinced that the only realistic policy in the age of thermonuclear weapons is one leading towards greater international co-operation, the obstinate search for lines of possible convergence in the scientific, technological, economic, cultural and ideological fields, the rejection in principle of weapons of mass destruction.

We are using this opportunity to give voice to our opinion that it is most desirable for the nuclear powers to make unilateral and group statements of intent not to be the first to resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Democratization will further the public's understanding of our foreign policy and facilitate the removal of all negative features from this policy. This, in turn, will remove one of the aces in the hand of the opponents of democratization.

WHAT has our country to expect if a course leading towards democratization is not taken? It can expect to lag behind the capitalist countries in the second industrial revolution and to gradually revert to the status of a second-rate provincial power (there have been such instances in history); economic difficulties will grow; relations between the Party-Government apparatus and the intelligentsia will be exacerbated; there will be a danger of outbursts to right and left; national problems will be exacerbated, for in the national republics the movement towards democratization, coming from below, inevitably assumes a national character. This prospect becomes even more daunting when one takes into account the danger from Chinese totalitarian nationalism which, though it can be seen as only temporary in its historical context, will neverthless be very serious in the coming years. We can counter this danger only by increasing or, at least, maintaining the present technological and economic gap between our country and China, by increasing the number of our friends throughout the world, and by offering the Chinese people the alternative of co-operation and aid. This must be obvious when we consider the vast numerical preponderance of the potential enemy, his militant nationalism, the protracted length of our

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eastern borders and the sparse population of the Eastern regions. Therefore the stagnation in the economy, the slowing down in the rate of development, in conjunction with the insufficiently realistic (and not seldom over-ambitious) foreign policy in all continents could lead our country to catastrophe.

HIGHLY esteemed Comrades!

Our country has no other way out of the difficulties facing it than a course leading towards democratization taken by the CPSU according to a carefully drawn-up plan. Any advance on the right, i.e. a victory for the hard administrative method line, for 'tightening the screws', not only would fail to solve any problems, but, on the contrary, would push these problems to breaking point, would lead the country into a tragic impasse. Passive temporizing tactics would in the long run lead to the same result. Now our country still has the chance to take the correct road and carry out the necessary reforms. In a few years it will perhaps be too late. What is needed is the recognition of this situation on a country-wide scale. It is the duty of each man who recognizes the source of these difficulties and the way to overcome them to point out this way to his fellow-citizens. Understanding the need for the opportunity offered by gradual democratization is the first step on the road to its implementation.

19 March 1970.

A. D. Sakharov
V. F. Turchin
R. A. Medvedev *

* Since 29 May, the twin brother of Roy Medvedev, Jaures, had been forcibly detained in a psychiatric hospital in Kaluga. He was released on 27 June following an unprecedented wave of protests against his detention by some of the most prestigious Soviet scientists, among them Pyotr Kapitsa, Boris Astaurov, Mikhail Leontevich, Nikolai N. Semenov, and Andrei Sakharov. Alexander Solzhenitsyn called such acts of sending political opponents to mental hospitals 'spiritual murder'.

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DOCUMENT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

** The communication printed below is from a prominent Czechoslovak academic who for obvious reasons must remain unknown.*

THE Minister of Interior together with the Minister of Culture established a committee which imposed a tight financial control over the Union of Czech Writers: every penny, even the salaries of drivers and office girls, has to be approved of individually by this commission. The Central Committee of the Writers Union is not acknowledged as such by the authorities: it has only the status of a preparatory committee, because its statute has not been approved yet by the Ministry of Interior. The combined ministries (Interior and Culture) demand a number of changes in the statute. The Central Committee of the Writers Union is willing to accept some of these changes, but only if the membership approve of them—which would require a conference. But the authorities demand a *putsch*, not democracy, and so there is no hope for an agreement. Besides, any oral agreement is valid only for a day or two—the authorities change their decisions as often as they wish, irrespective of what they have promised. The correspondence between the Writers' Union and the ministries is priceless study material for specialists in semantics and for textual critics.

One of the two remaining literary journals of the Union has just been banned—*Host do domu*. This leaves only one other, the *Orientace*, a very learned magazine with a very small circulation.

Several books, already bound and ready for the booksellers, have been confiscated: among them Bohumil Hrabal's *Prose 1938–1952*, a collection of his early writings which it was not possible to publish under the Novotny regime; further, Hrabal's newspaper articles, collected for the first time for a book publication; my own *The Tank Corps*, written in 1955 and confiscated now for the second time (for the first time under Novotny). The Czech edition was sent to the printers together with the French Gallimard edition; the Gallimard edition came out before Christmas 1969, the Czech edition was delayed, until the seizure last month. Further, essays by Professor Jan Patocka, a philosopher, specialist in Greek philosophy and in the philosophy of Comenius, entitled: *The Sense of Today* (*O smyslu dneška*). An older novel by Egon Hostovsky, the Czech writer who is an American citizen—because he 'lives abroad'—books by all authors who are 'living abroad'—have been 'suspended' or banned. As you probably know, about 12 films in various stages of production were stopped (among them Zdena's first feature film 'Visit Permitted', about a visit of an old village woman in a concentration camp where her son is imprisoned. The topic of the fifties, especially trials and camps, is banned again). Six finished films were also banned (the 'progress' is in the fact that they were not destroyed, as the new

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Director of Barrandov Film Studios explicitly stressed), among them a new film by Jiri Menzel based on stories by Hrabal: *Skrivanek na niti* (Nightingale on a string).

So far there has been no move against 'incomprehensible modern art'. As I always said, they would rather tolerate incomprehensible than really comprehensible art.

So far only four writers (out of a membership of 300) have joined the pro-invasion ranks: Vojtech Cach, a very inferior playwright and novelist of the early socialist-realist period; Ivan Skala, a mediocre poet who was one of Novotny's henchmen; Pavel Bojar, a very inferior poet and novelist, always a hard-liner; and Rudolf Cerny, a mediocre novelist, staunch supporter of the most extreme, anti-semitic and purely Stalinist Jodas group. Several non-party members collaborate mainly for financial reasons and because of a literary inferior complex. These are Josef Hanzlik, a younger poet; and Karel Misar, a novelist: both took jobs on the *Plamen* magazine back in 1956 or 1957, when Jiri Hajek, the characterless collaborator of all regimes, beginning with Gottwald and ending now with Husak, fired three editors who criticised his politics. These people do not collaborate quite as openly, but criticise the Dubcek times etc. They include further Vladimir Pribsky, a very ambitious but rather inferior novelist, who first tried to join the avant-garde but when he received some bad criticism for what he had written, became embittered, and so he now collaborates. Vaclav Hons, a complete non-entity and two very old and rather senile writers Jan Hostan, another non-entity Josef Sekera, another of the very mediocre Party-liners (he is, however, a member of the PEN Club committee in Prague).

On the other hand several of the old-time communist writers have returned their party-cards to the Central Committee and refused to have anything to do with the regime: most prominent among them is Vasek Kana, the leader of socialist realist playwriting in the early fifties, and author of the classical piece of this kind *Parta brusice Karhana* ('Old Karhan's Gang'), about an old worker who learns to understand socialism. Kana is a true 'workers' writer', self-taught, very inferior, of course, but regarded always as a 100 per cent communist. Another writer of this kind who refused to collaborate is Jan Mares. A number of prominent communist writers were expelled from the party, among them Jan Otcenasek (*Romeo, Juliet and the Darkness*)—a nice man, who, however has always been a very loyal communist, Jiri Sotola, one of the best modern poets, editor-in-chief of the *Kveten* magazine, banned in 1959 during the first attempt to stop the 'thaw'; Karel Ptacnik, an important novelist who received the State Prize in 1955 or 1956, and several others.

At the philosophy faculty all professors and lecturers have to appear before a committee which 'discusses' with them their opinions and decides whether they can remain at the faculty or whether they will be fired. However, most people wrote their rebuttal of the regime before

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they could be summoned to appear before this committee; so they are not called to appear and the authorities try to find the 'healthy group' among the teaching staff. So far this healthy group has numbered only 11 people (out of some 400). The dean has already written letters of dismissal to several professors (including the Shakespearean scholar and Chairman of the English Department Zdenek Stribrny, Milan Machovec, a historian who was the chief speaker of the communist-Christian-dialogue movement, and Karal Kosik, the Marxist philosopher)—but the trade union representatives refused to sign those letters; and according to the law nobody can be dismissed without the approval of the trade unions—unless, of course, his dismissal is ordered by 'higher places'. Letters of dismissal were written also to 23 members of the two abolished departments: the Department of the History of Workers' Movements and the Department of Politology. Is it not ironical that in a workers' state the Department of the History of the Workers' Movement gets abolished?

Contrary to some newsmen's reports (like the report by the Canadian representative of *Der Spiegel*, whom I heard on local radio) the Brezhnev-Kosygin visit was a complete fiasco: the road from the airport to Prague Castle was lined only by policemen, standing 10 metres apart. The only 'crowd' assembled on the little Castle Square: and this was, of course, artificially created by the old method: 'enthusiasts' brought by buses from all over Bohemia. This is the report of an absolutely reliable eye-witness: Mr. 'Spiegel' maintained, that Brezhnev was 'actually cheered', in Prague and that this was the sign that the people of Czechoslovakia have come to accept the *fait accompli*, and that they are irretrievably lost to the West. He probably just watched Prague TV, sitting in Vienna (there you can watch it if it is transmitted by Bratislava, as this certainly was)—and the TV men, of course, just showed the 'cheering crowd' of quislings on Castle Square.

A very private story: my very dear friend Pavel Bosek, a communist journalist and writer, who participated in the Text-appeals organized by Ivan Vyskocil, where I too read my texts, was summoned to appear before a committee which was to decide about his future (he was editor of a small but very influential youth-magazine, specializing in pop music and cabaret). He was asked: 'Well, comrade, what do you think about 21 August?' 'Which 21 August do you mean?' said Bosek. '21 August 1968, of course'. 'Oh, you mean the day of the Occupation?' said Bosek, and received no further questions.

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